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Abstract 
In the literature on Global Value Chains (GVCs), development strategies have mainly 
borrowed from the upgrading concept, as largely applied to sectoral development. 
The study about sectoral upgrading and its applications in the real world has initially 
been applied through lead firms, but recent developments have tended to interpret 
upgrading as taking place through the actions of three key sets of agents: i) lead 
firms; ii) development agencies; and iii) states.  
This thesis attempts to advance understanding of upgrading processes in GVCs 
through an examination of those three upgrading agents in the cocoa industry of 
Indonesia. Particularly, the thesis addresses the question of how upgrading 
interventions are approached and applied by the agents, and to delineate the 
underlying institutional factors that influence each agent. 
This thesis finds that the upgrading interventions through policies and programs 
devised by the development agents are highly influenced by underlying institutional 
interests. Issues of political economy, ideological views and commercial interests 
strong shape the activities of upgrading agents, and therefore the development 
outcomes of these interventions. Furthermore, it is mostly incidental when these 
interests align with the development interests of smallholder cocoa farmers. The 
study also found that upgrading interventions tended to perpetuate the 
dependency of small producers on external supports, especially their relationship 
with global cocoa buyers as ‘captive’ suppliers. 
This thesis concludes with the need to explore deeper the institutional settings 
within which upgrading agents are embedded, and so which influence the decision 
making processes in the upgrading interventions along the GVC. Successful 
upgrading, whether related to the enhanced capacity of smallholders to improve 
their livelihoods or to the development of downstream industrial capacity, demands 
attentiveness to the perspective and interests of other potential upgrading agents in 
the chain. This thesis presents an alternative actor-oriented approach to GVC 
analysis, which it is argued provides a more realistic assessment of upgrading 
possibilities within developing countries than previous models. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background 
Over the last few decades, economic development in developing countries has been 
significantly shaped by three pivotal actors: the state, development agencies and 
commercial firms. The analysis to understand the role of those actors in shaping 
economic development outcomes has mainly emphasised two contrasting 
ideological framings, the free market ideology and the importance of state 
intervention.  
Studies and analyses using those analytical framings have been widely applied to 
understanding economic growth in the East Asian countries. For example, the 
analysis of state support in driving economic development has been widely 
articulated through the Developmental State literature (C. A. Johnson, 1982; Wade, 
1993), and the role of Import Substitution and late industrialization (Felix, 1989).  
Other analyses lean more towards the free market, whilst still acknowledge the 
critical role played by the State in the East Asia Miracle, yet (Burkett & Hart-
Landsberg, 1998; Kwang-Suk, 2009; World Bank, 1993). 
Recent developments, particularly in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, suggest that these two contrasting ways to analyse and develop economic 
development strategies are insufficient to understand the dynamics of regional and 
national economic change. Globalization has made economic actors more 
interconnected with each other, and the way that economic actors coordinate their 
production systems (through modes of governance) ranges across a broad 
continuum, from spot markets through to intensive coordination through captive 
relationships and integrated operations.  To understand this range of governance 
structures, and how such strategies of the firm shape regional economic 
development outcomes, an alternative approach has been suggested by Gary 
Gereffi and other researchers, through the Global Commodity Chain - or Global 
Value Chain - framework  (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky, & Sturgeon, 
2001; Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Gereffi, Korzeniewichz, & 
Korzeniewichz, 1994; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000, 2002; Kaplinsky, 2000). 
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1.1.1 Global Value Chains as an analytical tool 
As an analytical tool, the global value chain (GVC) concept is one of a number of 
approaches to understand inter-firm relations that starts with the simple idea that 
the design, production and marketing of products involves a chain of activities 
divided between different enterprises often located in different places.  
In the development literature, this type of analysis was initially known as the global 
commodity chain. It focused on the opportunities and constraint of actors in 
developing countries in improving their position pursuant to a global integration of 
production and trade in specific commodities (Gibbon, 2001, p. 345). It highlights 
the shifting bases of power, exercised by lead firms in global industries and the ways 
in which governance structures of these industries shape the creation of markets as 
well as national development outcomes (Gereffi, 2001, p. 32). Its core concern is 
with understanding of the dynamics of how firms within a global value chain are 
interconnected with each other (Kaplinsky, Morris, & Readmen, 2002, p. 1160).   
The analytical framework was primarily introduced by Gereffi through his writing on 
the organisation of buyer-driven and producer-driven commodity chains (Gereffi, 
1994). The framework later became known as the Global Value Chains (GVC) 
approach. It is defined as: 
‘The full range of activities required to bring a product or service from 
conception through the different phases of production  (involving a 
combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer 
services), delivery to final consumers and final disposal after use (Kaplinsky, 
2000, p. 121) 
 
The dimensions of analysis within the GVC approach can be divided into two main 
areas. The first two dimensions, the input–output structure, and the territoriality of 
the chain, are largely descriptive. They describe the discrete value chain activities 
that spread across organisations and locations within the industry or sector being 
examined. The other two dimensions, the governance structure and the 
institutional settings, are causal and more analytical. These two dimensions are the 
central innovative feature of the GVC approach. They explain the organisational and 
spatial features of a GVC and highlight the external pressures that limit the 
decisions made by actors in the chain (Sturgeon, 2008). According to Neilson and 
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Pritchard (2009) these causal dimensions are linked by the concept of upgrading, 
which is the process in which economic actors are able to improve their position 
within the GVC to capture greater ‘rents’. The concept of value chain upgrading is 
the central thematic concern of this thesis, and will be further developed in Chapter 
Two.  
1.1.2 Global Value Chains as a development strategy 
GVCs are now frequently applied as a development strategy, whereby upgrading 
initiatives are enacted or supported by various actors within and external to the 
GVC. As it is used in the GVC literature, the concept of upgrading has tended to 
emphasise the significant role played by lead firms in driving upgrading for local 
firms and other economic actors in developing countries.  It was initially discussed in 
relation to industrial upgrading, where it referred to the ways where economic 
actors in the developing countries could enhance their capacity by initially 
integrating into global value chains (Gereffi, 1999). 
Having linkages with global buyers, a firm in a developing country can develop 
know-how about producing high quality products, operating efficiently, designing 
products and even develop its own brand (Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey & Schmitz, 
2000).  In this regard, global buyers – or lead firms in the parlance of GVC theory - 
have a strong influence in shaping upgrading possibilities for economic actors in 
particular industrial value chains, such as the apparel industry (Gereffi, 1999), global 
cocoa-chocolate industry (Fold, 2001), agricultural sector (Gibbon, 2001; Gu, Liu, & 
Sui, 2008; Humphrey, 2005; Kaplinsky, 2004), and the automotive industry (Gu et 
al., 2008).  
The important role of lead firms or global buyers in driving industrial upgrading, 
however, needs to be extended to a discussion of the significant role of institutional 
settings, and actors such as the state and development agencies, in driving 
industrial upgrading and supporting poverty alleviation in developing countries. It 
has been demonstrated (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009) that chain governance 
structures and institutional settings are mutually constituted, and elsewhere that 
the state has been pivotal in driving upgrading for the local horticulture producers 
(Selwyn, 2008). Therefore, this thesis will examine the role played not only by lead 
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firms, but also the Indonesian state and international development agencies in 
supporting upgrading. 
In the context of development agencies, the GVC concept has been mainly 
employed in the context of improving the livelihoods of the poor producers by 
linking them to global buyers. In this regard, upgrading is the underlying concept to 
support pro-poor development strategies as adopted by various Development 
Agencies such as, UNIDO (2011), USAID (Kula, Downing, & Field, 2006; Panlibuton & 
Lusby, 2006; Panlibuton & Meyer, 2004), The Netherland Development 
Organization-SNV (Baan & Janssen, 2006), and German Technical Cooperation 
Agency GTZ (2008). The application of GVCs as a development strategy in this way, 
shows that lead firms, state and development agencies alike can amplify upgrading 
processes through specific interventions that might improve the livelihoods of poor 
producers in developing countries. This thesis addresses the role and impact that 
these three sets of institutional actors perform in facilitating upgrading outcomes in 
the Indonesian cocoa industry.  
For the above reasons, this study contributes to a real-world understanding of the 
processes of upgrading in a specific industry, looking at how the positionality of 
these three actors drive the institutional settings of the value chain in developing 
countries, and ultimately how this positionality shapes outcomes for smallholder 
cocoa producers. 
1.2 Why the Indonesian Cocoa Industry? 
The Indonesian cocoa industry had expanded rapidly since about 1980, when it 
contributed little to global supply, to become the third largest cocoa producer in the 
world in late 1990s, contributing around 13 per cent of global supply in 2000. During 
this time, it provided a vital source of cash income for many remote rural 
communities and helped some households escape from poverty. However, this 
remarkable achievement in the 1990s had been somewhat overshadowed by the 
latent issues of declining cocoa production that has occurred since, due to pest and 
disease infestations and aging trees. The cocoa producers are mainly smallholder 
farmers (estimated at numbering around 500,000 farmers), and most of them are 
poor, or potentially fall under the ‘nearly poor’ category. As a result, their income is 
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just slightly at or above the poverty line, and declining levels of production would 
also impact on the increasing number of poor people in the country.  
It is not surprising that various actors are very concerned to improve cocoa 
production, such as the state, the development agencies and the lead firms in the 
cocoa industry. The Indonesia state for example, had launched the 300 million 
dollar National Cocoa Program (GERNAS) in 2008, to revitalize the industry by 
focusing on the rehabilitation, replanting and expansion activities (Departemen 
Pertanian, 2008). Meanwhile, Development agencies such as USAID supported the 
Indonesian government to improve the cocoa sector by granting four consecutive 
projects between 2000 and 2010, in which the focus were on improving the income 
of the poor farmers through combating the pests and diseases infestation and 
facilitating market linkage. Finally, chocolate companies, such as Mars Inc. through 
its local operation, PT. Mars Indonesia, have supported technical capacity building 
for smallholder farmers along with its commercial operations/ buying stations 
throughout the country. 
Despite this support from the key actors towards national cocoa production 
improvement, production data from the International Cocoa Organisation (the 
ICCO) indicates a significant decrease from the highest level of 560 thousand tonnes  
in 2005 (ICCO, 2008) to 425 thousand tonnes in 2014 (ICCO, 2014a). This data raises 
an interesting question; what factors underlie these various interventions such that 
national production has declined, reflecting an apparent failure to support 
upgrading at the farm-level?  Three case studies of interventions by the three sets 
of actors will explore the underlying factors of program upgrading delivered by each 
institution in the following result chapters in this thesis. 
Industry upgrading can also occur by firms in a particular region or country 
assuming new functional roles within the global value chain, such as engaging in the 
downstream processing of raw materials. In relation to upgrading of cocoa 
processors, the Indonesian government has used trade policy as a tool to encourage 
value-adding upgrading activities in Indonesia. In 2007, the national government 
abolished a value added tax on cocoa; and in 2010, it imposed an export tariff for 
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unprocessed cocoa beans. This combination of policies was hoped to improve the 
international competitiveness of the Indonesian processing sector (cocoa grinding). 
After three years of implementing these government policies (2009-2011), the 
result of government policies has been to encourage significant foreign investment 
in Indonesian cocoa processing activities, but with few local processors benefitting 
from these policies. This thesis, then, is concerned with processes of upgrading 
occurring at two key nodes in the value chain: i) at the producer level, where 
farmers are encouraged to grow cocoa more efficiently through ‘process’ upgrading; 
and ii) at the industry level, where firms have been encouraged to engage in 
‘functional’ upgrading and the downstream processing of raw material into 
intermediate cocoa products, and in some cases consumer products. 
Looking from the GVC perspective, the success of interventions to encourage 
Indonesian cocoa industry upgrading, are ultimately related to the global market 
dynamics. The Indonesia cocoa industry is a part of global cocoa industry which has 
undergone dramatic and dynamic re-structuring. The important features of the 
restructuring are the increasing concentration of global players, processors and 
chocolate manufacturers, mostly as a result of corporations’ strategy to stay 
competitive in the market. As the majority of final products of cocoa beans are 
marketed and produced by a handful of multinational companies in the consuming 
countries, therefore, any changes at this global market will eventually affect actors 
in producing countries. Promoting upgrading as a national strategy, therefore, may 
occur if it is in line with the multinational companies’ strategy. This notion is widely 
accepted in the global value chain literature, where the global firms have an 
important role in facilitating firms or business actors in providing market access, 
transferring knowledge and latest technology. Adding to this, and as emphasised 
throughout this thesis, industry interventions are inevitably embedded within the 
vested interests of the particular actors implementing them. For the government 
and development agencies, the interest might be to support the poor people out of 
poverty (although it is rarely this straightforward); for the private companies, as 
indicated by Fold and Neilson (2016), on top of a possibly genuine interest to 
support the poor farmers, their primary interest is in ensuring corporate profits and 
a sustainable supply or raw materials. The question is, therefore, in what 
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circumstances could these interests converge to facilitate genuine upgrading 
opportunities for actors in developing countries?  
There has been minimal discussion in the literature of the role and influence of the 
positionality of states, development agencies and lead firm in facilitating upgrading 
within the global value chain. Addressing this relative research gap would allow us 
to better understand how to engage in the GVC in a way that facilitates meaningful 
upgrading to take place.   
1.3 Research Questions 
With the above conceptual and empirical backdrops, this thesis attempts to 
advance understanding of the upgrading concept in the GVC through the cases of 
state, development agencies and a lead firm driven initiative in a specific sector in a 
developing country. Three main questions guided this aim: (1) What interventions 
have been undertaken by the state, firms and development agencies to promote 
upgrading within the Indonesian cocoa industry? (2) How are processes of value 
chain upgrading facilitated and shaped in practice by the actions of these different 
sets of development actors? (3) How can an improved understanding of upgrading 
processes be usefully applied to ensure appropriate development outcomes in 
developing countries? 
1.4 Methodology  
This research was conducted through an industry-wide case study of the Indonesian 
cocoa value chain. The case study method is useful to understand a complex 
problem and to understand the underlying factors in decision making (Scholz & 
Tietje, 2002). George and Bennet (2005) identified four advantages of doing the 
case study method that make it valuable in testing hypothesis as well as in theory 
development: ‘the method has potential to achieve high conceptual validity; strong 
procedures useful means to closely examine hypotheses, exploring causal 
mechanism in the context of individual cases; and, their capacity for addressing 
causal complexity’ (p.19). The qualitative method applied in this thesis is considered 
to possess three strong characteristics of describing, understanding and explaining 
(Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993, p. 39). As such, those characteristics were strongly 
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presented in the result chapters. The presentation of the cocoa industry case was 
delivered through embedded cases of three development actors in the industry; the 
Indonesian state, development agency and lead firm.  
The complexity of issues in the cocoa industry required a thorough analysis. The 
analysis required supporting data materials from multiple sources of evidence. 
According to Yin (2003), the case study method employs various evidence such as, 
archival records, documents, interviews, participant observation, direct observation, 
and physical artefacts. He further pointed out that ‘the various sources are 
complementary and a good case study will therefore use as many sources as 
possible’ (p.80). 
Two periods of fieldwork were conducted. The initial period of field work was 
conducted in Indonesia during the period of July 1st to October 28th, 2010; and, the 
second field visit was conducted from December 1st, 2013 to April 4rd 2014. Some 
methods were specifically employed for specific chapters, while some others were 
generally applied for several resulting chapters. The various data gathering methods 
employed during that period are as follows: 
a. Collecting information from archival records.  Archival records have many forms, 
such as ‘service records, organizational records, maps and charts, list of names 
and relevant commodities, survey data, and personal records’ (Yin, 2003, p. 83). 
Yin (2003) indicated that in certain cases, the data obtained from the archival 
records, can be very important, even becoming a main source of analysis, but in 
some other cases, it might be only passing relevance. As such, following the 
structured presentation of this research (presented in later section of this 
chapter), archival data was became the main source of analysis in the chapter 
three, as the chapter presented a descriptive analysis of Global Value Chains of 
cocoa industry. While in the chapter four and six, the archival records were used 
to merely support the discussion in those chapters. For example, presenting the 
comparative data between Indonesian beans export and Malaysian grinding 
capacities, and presenting the list of institutions and trainers that had been 
trained by Mars. Among the data obtained from the archival records during the 
research were beans production, total cocoa farms, export and import of cocoa 
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beans and semi processed cocoa products. That data was collected from the 
Bureau Statistics of Indonesia, FAOSTAT, ICCO, and CSP records. Lists of industry 
players and charts about cocoa grinding capacities in Indonesia were obtained 
from ASKINDO (the Cocoa Association of Indonesia).  
b. Reviewing documents both from internal documents and newspapers. 
According to Yin (2003), there are a variety of documents that could be sources 
of information. These include letters, memoranda, agendas, announcement and 
minutes meeting, written reports, proposal, formal studies and newspaper 
clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media (p.81).  Those 
documents are helpful to validate and amplify evidence from other sources, 
such as verifying the correct spellings and titles or names of organizations that 
might have been mentioned in interviews; ‘corroborating information from 
other sources’; and, doing inferences from documents (Yin, 2003, p. 81).  In my 
research, data obtained from internal documents contributed to the analysis of 
chapter four, five and six.  For example, GERNAS documents and Export Tax 
Decree from the Government of Indonesia; and, meeting minutes, letters, and 
file presentations related to the government policies from ASKINDO, 
contributed to the analysis of chapter four. Project design documents, progress 
reports, presentations and evaluation reports of IFC and USAID funded projects 
contributed to chapter five. Meanwhile, internal websites and reports from 
Mars, and CVC-CDC program design documents were contributed to the 
discussion in chapter six. In addition to those documents, reviews of various 
newspaper articles on the cocoa industry development, both in the national and 
international media outlet were undertaken. The reviews set the background 
context of the industry, becoming secondary sources; and at the same time also 
became a primary data source for discussions, mainly in chapter four and six. 
The review focused on the period of January 2009 up to December 2014. It was 
an important period in the Indonesian cocoa industry, since it was the period 
when the Indonesian government started implementing GERNAS and export tax, 
and where Mars start applying policy on sourcing certified cocoa beans.  It is 
important to highlight that those documents were used in aggregation with 
other sources of information, such as interviews and observations that also 
carried out through this research.  
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c. Conducting interviews with cocoa  industry stakeholders. Interviews are 
generally considered the main element of data gathering for the case study 
approach (Yin, 2003, p. 85). The interviews for this thesis were undertaken 
through a combination of the open ended and semi structured interview styles. 
The open ended question generally started by  asking a single question and 
allow the interviewee to answer freely, with the interviewer only following 
interesting matters arising during the interview; meanwhile, semi structured 
interview is an interview where the researcher has prepared a list of questions 
with specific topics to be covered (Bryman, 2004, p. 321). Through this method, 
three main issues were addressed in this study.  The first was information 
related to the government policy, and its impacts to the industry players. This 
discussion is mainly presented in chapter four. The second was issues related to 
dynamics of Development agencies working to facilitate market and financial 
access for the smallholder cocoa farmers, which was discussed in chapter five; 
and, the third were issues in the supply chains, such as smallholder cocoa 
production, quality of cocoa beans, market, price, cocoa standards and 
strategies of multinational players sourcing cocoa beans in Indonesia, all of 
those were discussed in the chapter 6.  During the field work, 37 stakeholders 
were interviewed, including actors in the supply chain, (smallholder farmers, 
local traders, exporters,  and processors),  Government institutions (Deputy 
Ministry of Agriculture, Director General of Processing and Marketing for 
Agriculture, Director of Estate Crops, Head of Estate Crops at the provincial and 
district level), The industry associations (ASKINDO, Indonesian Cocoa Farmers 
Association (Asosiasi Petani Kakao Indonesia -APKAI), Indonesian Cocoa Industry 
Associations (Asosiasi Industri Kakao Indonesia-AIKI)), and Non Government 
Organisations (NGOs) working for cocoa development and local banks. At times, 
those interviewed also facilitated access to internal company reports that were 
not otherwise publicly available.  
d. Conducting a Focus Group Discussion (FGD).  This method is a form of group 
interview which was attended by several participants, with ‘the emphasis in the 
questioning on a particular tightly defined topic; and the accent is upon 
interaction within the group and the join construction of meaning’ (Bryman, 
2004, p. 346). The FGD has several advantages. According to Bryman (2004), for 
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the researcher, it helps ‘to understand why people feel the way they do; to 
study the ways in which individual collectively makes sense of a phenomenon 
and construct meaning around it; to stand a chance of ending up with more 
realistic accounts of what people think’ (p.348). The FGD was conducted with 11 
farmers, mostly the head of farmer groups in Polman district, West Sulawesi. 
The main topic was the implementation of the GERNAS, in particular 
questioning how effective the program improves farmers’ cocoa production, 
which was mainly discussed in the chapter four. 
e. Doing participant-observation during the field visits. Participating in training of 
trainers (TOT) of Rainforest Aliance (RA) certification. Participant observation is 
active participation where the researcher might play a variety of roles within a 
case being investigated (Yin, 2003, p. 87). The method helps the researcher to 
‘observe what actually happens, rather than what people say happens; it also 
helps the researcher ‘to discover the unwritten rules or norms of people’s 
behaviours (Howe & Lewis, 1993, p. 86).   This method was undertaken as the 
opportunities arose during field visits and training activities. At this training, the 
researcher was involved in the steering committee of the TOT and as a 
moderator during the two full days of class room training plus one day cocoa 
farm visit. The researcher also joined four management meetings of Cocoa 
Sustainability Partnership (CSP), discussing the current industry issues such as 
export tax, GERNAS, and  international certification programs targeting 
smallholder farmers.  
f. Another important data source was obtained from a structured survey of 200 
cocoa farmers in Papua and 600 cocoa farmers in Sulawesi, conducted in 2008 
and 2009 prior to and at the onset of research for this thesis. I led this field 
survey team, and much of the data remains largely unpublished. This survey 
focussed on farmer livelihoods, land ownership, and farm practices, pest and 
disease infestations, productivity, source of credits, and types of relationship to 
buyers. The process of the field survey was conducted through  (i)  training  five 
enumerators, then continued with (ii) questionnaire testing and adjustment, 
and followed by  (iii) field surveys with  two hundred farmers and (iv) finally, 
tabulating result in a standard format. This survey is referred to as the SRTA 
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(Survey Rumah Tangga ACIAR) survey for the remainder of the thesis, and 
provided an important source of information and insights into development 
processes from the perspective of smallholder farmers. 
g. Undertaking direct-observation about Mars operation in Sulawesi. This 
observation was conducted through a less formal data collection process during 
the second field visit, and included opportunities during the course of 
undertaking field interviews. During the visit period, 12 stakeholders were 
interviewed and two field approaches were employed: 
i. Participating in the National cocoa conference on certification, in Makassar 
South Sulawesi, on December 10th, 2013. 
ii. Conducting field visit, observation and semi structured interview at the Mars 
field operation in South Sulawesi, covering Makassar, Luwu District, North 
Luwu District and East Luwu district during a one-week period between 
March 5th to 12th, 2014. All those areas are the major cocoa producing 
districts where Mars run operations right in the centre of cocoa production 
regions.  
It is relevant to note that the researcher has been involved in various cocoa industry 
initiatives since 2004. In this way, I have at times been an ‘insider’, which has helped 
me gain specific insights into the perspectives of industry actors and other 
stakeholders. However, it is also likely to have affected the way I have been 
perceived by various industry actors. From 2004 until 2008, I was an Agribusiness 
Development Analyst with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) on its 
Program for Eastern Indonesia Small and Medium Enterprises Assistance (PENSA) 
program, and the Executive Secretary of the Cocoa Sustainability Partnership from 
2005 until 2008. In 2013, I commenced work as the Program Officers for the 
livelihood program at the Ford Foundation. These experiences have permitted 
valuable insights as a ‘participant’ within efforts to facilitate upgrading within the 
Indonesian cocoa industry. 
This study tries to portray and understand the real issues faced by  cocoa industry 
players in Indonesia with regard to the issues at the international, national and local 
level that influence the upgrading activities to take place. Therefore, multiple 
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methods are applied. By doing this, it is expected that the comprehensive picture of 
the cocoa industry can be described and discussed thoroughly. As such, the process 
of triangulation was conducted using multiple sources. According to Yin (2003) the 
process of triangulation is ‘much more convincing and accurate if it is based on 
several different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode’ (p.92).  
The analysis of the case study evidence employed a theoretical proposition 
approach with Explanation-Building techniques.  According to Yin (2003), theoretical 
proposition is about causal relations—answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, 
reflected in a set of research questions, review of literatures, new insights, which in 
turn guide the case study analysis; it helps the researcher to present the entire case 
study and to define alternative explanations to be examined (p.102-106). The 
explanation building techniques develops a case in the narrative form, where the 
explanation reflects some theoretically significant prepositions, and is applied not 
simply as an analysis of each individual case, but also in the cross-case analysis (Yin, 
2003, pp. 110-111). The presentation of this case study research was guided by the 
research questions presented in the previous section, as theoretical prepositions. 
Those questions help the researcher to qualify data materials to be presented and 
examined in the results chapters. The analysis of each chapter was built to explain 
the individual case studies presented in chapters four, five and six. Those three 
chapters will be tied together in the cross-case analysis in chapter seven, building an 
explanation of potential theoretical contributions and future policy 
recommendations. 
In summary, the various methods applied in this research were intended to gather 
data that can describe a comprehensive picture of how the cocoa industry works in 
Indonesia. The data gathered through these various methods has allowed strong 
evidence to enrich or even challenge the applicability of upgrading concepts within 
the GVCs. 
1.5 Limitations 
Throughout this study there are several limitations to be acknowledged. First, the 
limitation is in the context of presenting the GVC of the cocoa industry. Even though 
the global value chain framework should rightly encompass all actors from input 
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suppliers up to the retailers and consumers, the scope of this study focuses on 
smallholder farmers, traders and cocoa processors in Indonesia. Thsse actors are 
the major beneficiary of the upgrading activities in Indonesia.  
Second, through this study, there are three case studies presented as the driver of 
upgrading in the case of cocoa sector in Indonesia. In this regard, the main 
limitation in this study is the cases may be specific to the three actors that drive 
upgrading in the cocoa industry in Indonesia, the Indonesian state, the USAID and 
IFC as the Development Agencies, and PT. Mars Symbioscience as a lead firm. Even 
though these organisations are major players in the Indonesian cocoa sector, the 
results derived from this study could be specific to those organizations.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This current chapter (Chapter one) has set the background to the research, 
including the theoretical foundations of study, case background, and methodology 
conducted during the study. Chapter two reviews the literature on processes of 
economic development and the alternative, the global value chain framework. The 
concept of upgrading in the GVC is further discussed in relation to its application as 
a Development Strategy by the State, Development Agencies and Lead Firms with 
the primary objective to alleviate poverty. Chapter three presents the Global Value 
Chain for cocoa, describing recent trends and issues from farming systems to the 
consumers demand in the global cocoa industry. The GVC dimensions of input-
output, territoriality, trade policies, market restructuring and governance in the 
global context are discussed to set up a basis for the upgrading discussion in the 
Indonesian context.  Chapter four presents the role of the state in facilitating 
upgrading for domestic cocoa players. Through this chapter, the discussion 
emphasises the underlying factors driving the state to exercise government policies, 
programs, regulations, and infrastructure supports. Chapter five examines the role 
of development agencies in driving upgrading for small producers. It discusses the 
programs and initiatives from development agencies to facilitate upgrading for the 
very weak actors in the cocoa value chain. Program supports and the underlying 
factors that motivate the Development Agencies are discussed. Chapter six looks at 
the role of multinational buyer linkage programs with smallholder farmers. This 
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chapter discusses the multinational buyer initiatives to provide technical assistance 
to smallholder farmers as well as to promote voluntary certifications standards, 
such as Rainforest Alliance (RA) and UTZ Certified (UTZ). Chapter seven brings 
together the field results presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six into an analysis of 
how the various interests interplay to facilitate upgrading in Indonesia. This 
discussion elaborates on the need to develop improved analytical frameworks for 
understanding upgrading processes that are both actor-oriented and politically-
sensitive. Chapter eight concludes the study.  
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CHAPTER 2: EC0NOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS: FROM THEORY TO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
2.1 Introduction 
There has been extensive discussion of how governments in the developing 
countries could appropriately adopt suitable strategies to lift their economies. The 
debate on suitable strategies to improve the economies intensified in the post-
World War II period, when many of the newly independent countries sought 
development strategies to alleviate poverty.  
This chapter will discuss the traditional approaches to economic development 
strategies that have been undertaken over the last six decades, and the alternative, 
contemporary development approaches adopted to advance the developing 
countries. The discussion is organised into three main sections. In the first section of 
this chapter, I will review the key literature on economic development starting from 
the 1950s, in an attempt to provide (a) a theoretical background to the 
development strategies that have been employed in developing countries, and, (b) 
an understanding of the underlying ideological economic paradigms of the 
competing approaches. The discussion will focus on the rise and fall of different 
economic development theories and on the historical moments that have marked 
the changes in their popular application.  
The second section discusses a contemporary approach to development strategy 
that borrows explicitly from the concept of Global Value Chains (GVCs). This 
concept, which is both an emerging theory and an analytical tool, was initially 
presented to facilitate a better understanding of the modern national and global 
dynamics of economic development.  Literature related to the concept is reviewed 
and discussed to portray the evolution of the framework, from the initial 
theorisation up to the latest development application of the concept.  
Finally, in the last section drawing upon the GVC literature, I discuss the concept of 
‘upgrading’ both as an analytical tool and as a specific development strategy. In this 
section, upgrading is intensively discussed, in particular economic upgrading as a 
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development strategy, along with the roles of the economic and development 
agencies driving the upgrading activities. As a development strategy, upgrading 
emphasises the need for firms in developing countries to initially position 
themselves within global value chains. Positioning could be undertaken through a 
linkage with the leading firms within their respective industries. In this context, GVC 
theory emphasises that leading firms have an especially significant role to play in 
nurturing the capacity and capability of firms in developing nations. After acquiring 
the requisite knowledge and skills, firms in developing countries can gradually 
improve their competitiveness and their business scale, which in turn will create 
jobs and improve the economy.  I will argue that states and development agencies 
play equally significant roles in facilitating upgrading activities for actors within 
global value chains, especially for the weakest actors. This argument will be further 
elaborated upon in chapters four and five and six of the thesis. 
2.2 Overview of economic development theories: Theoretical background  
Almost all of the theories on economic development since World War II have been 
influenced by competing ideological positions; that is, they have either embraced 
liberal ideas of markets or emphasised the role of the state in shaping economic 
activities.  This background literature review will explore influential economic 
theories of development in an attempt to understand the ideological underpinnings 
of the particular development policies.    
2.2.1 Modernisation theory  
Modernisation theory emerged in the 1950s as an influential discourse to prescribe 
an economic development path for the newly independent countries in a post-
colonial world. During this period, the cold war between the US and the Soviet 
Union escalated: rivalry extended to gaining influence in the developing countries, 
particularly regarding their economic development strategies. Political competition 
expanded to include a contest between the liberal free market ideologies rooted in 
Adam Smith’s notion of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market shaping the wealth of 
nations, a notion championed by the US; and a socialist ideology whereby the state 
played a major intervening role in both markets and planning. The latter ostensibly 
a Marxist ideology, promulgated by the Soviet Union (Webster, 1984). 
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W.W. Rostow, a US economist, was perhaps the foremost proponent of 
modernisation theory. In his classic work, titled ‘The stages of economic growth’, he 
outlines five stages of economic development based on the historical stages of eight 
industrialized countries: the UK, the USA, Germany, France, Sweden, Japan, Russia 
and Canada. The stages started with the traditional society, wherein a majority of 
economic activities were derived from agriculture. The second stage involved the 
preconditions economic for take-off, characterised by the expansion of trade and 
the emergence of industrial innovations. The third stage, take-off, saw modern 
industrial techniques applied to various sectors including agricultural processing, 
railroads extensions and ship building. The next stage was the drive to maturity; 
that is, when society effectively applied a range of technologies to the bulk of its 
resources, putting heavy engineering at the centre of economic growth. Around this 
time, the number of people working in agriculture decreased significantly while the 
proportion of semi-skilled and white collar workers increased. The final stage was 
the age of high mass consumption. At this stage, the economy was orientated 
mostly towards services and consumer goods, which were being produced on a 
massive scale (Rostow, 1959) .  
Rostow’s ‘stages of economic growth’ intended to argue against the Marxist view of 
modernisation. Despite the similarities that marked the traditional societies in the 
initial stages and subsequent industrialisation, the Marxist view argued that the 
stage of high mass consumption would be followed by a worker revolution 
culminating in a communist society.  Communism assumed common ownership of 
the means of production as opposed to individualist-utilitarianism that is the 
hallmark of competitive markets and private property (Rostow, 1959, pp. 1-16).  
Alexander Gerschenkron, an economic historian who specialized in Russia and 
Eastern Europe in the 1960s, countered the uniformity stages of Rostow’s theory  
with the introduction of  his ‘backwardness’ theory. The key idea behind his theory 
was that countries undergoing industrialization would have different experiences 
depending upon their degrees of backwardness when industrialization commenced. 
Explaining Gerschenkron’s critique, Gwynne (2009) writes: ‘As other countries 
modernise and backwardness in a country deepens; the underprivileged society will 
become increasingly sensitive to the contrast between  itself and modernizing elites, 
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and new ideologies could galvanize a society toward a ‘spurt’ of industrialization 
and accelerated growth’ (p.165).  
Both Rostow’s and Greschenkron’s theories were based upon Durkheim and 
Weber’s theories, in particular their views on modernity, which contrasts between 
traditional and modern societies.  In his first major work, The Division of Labour in 
Society (1893), Durkheim emphasized the gradual shift from ‘traditional to modern’ 
societies in response to the needs for scarce resources. Weber elaborated upon the 
contrast between traditional and modern societies emphasising ‘rationality’ in 
society.  Societies expanded their capitalist manufacturing to establish profitability 
and capital accumulation through an efficient use of capital, expansion, cost 
reduction, diligent investment, and meeting consumers demand (Webster, 1984, 
pp. 45-49). 
2.2.2 Dependency theory 
In the early 1960s, Dependency theory was employed to describe the 
underdevelopment of many developing countries, many of which had experienced 
the control of colonial countries.   Frank (2008) argues that the assumptions used in 
the dual society of modernisation theory are false, due mainly to the incorrect 
assumption within modernisation theory that the past and present of the 
underdeveloped countries resemble the earlier stages of the developed countries 
(p.258-259).  In fact, it is very important to consider external factors, e.g.,  economic 
and other relations throughout the histories of the developed and underdeveloped 
countries; in other words, aspects of unequal  relations between the ‘metropolis’ 
and its ‘economic colonies’ that occurred throughout history in the ‘expansion of 
[the] mercantilist and capitalist systems’ (Frank, 2008, pp. 258-259). 
Raul Prebisch, an Argentinian economist, who initially postulated this unequal 
relationship in the international economic system in the 1940s, described it as a 
process in which one is the industrial centre and the other is the agrarian periphery, 
with the former dominating the latter (as explained by Love, 1980, pp. 45-46).  
Santos (1970), another Latin American economist, explores this view through the 
definition of dependency: 
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[It is] ….a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned 
by the development and expansion of another economy to which the 
former is subjected. The relation of inter-dependence between two or more 
economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of 
dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can 
be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this 
only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a 
negative effect on their immediate development (p.231). 
Frank uses the term ‘metropolis-satellite structure’ to delineate the impact of this 
unequal relationship of ‘industrial centre-agrarian periphery’.  The first key 
implication is that this structure leads to development in the metropolis and 
underdevelopment in the satellites. For example, although development of the 
metropolitan cities of Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo began in the nineteenth century, 
they were and have remained satellite developments of Britain and the United 
States. Second, it was also argued that the greatest satellite development occurs 
when peripheral ties to the metropolis are weakest. For example, the most rapid 
development of Latin America seemed to occur following the cessation of its 
relationship with its former colonial countries during World War II. Another example 
of a non-participation satellite, due to its relative lack of natural resource wealth, is 
Japan, which rapidly developed its economy following the Meiji restoration period. 
Finally, Frank argued that the most underdeveloped and feudal regions today are 
those which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past. He took, for example, 
the former super satellite development and present ultra-underdevelopment of the 
once sugar exporting West Indies, North-eastern Brazil, the ex-mining districts of 
Minas Gerais in Brazil, highland Peru, Bolivia, the central Mexican states  of 
Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and others whose names were made world-famous 
centuries ago through silver mining (Frank, 2008, pp. 262-265). 
Greek economist, Arghiri Emmanuel postulated ‘unequal exchange’ through trading 
is also considered a source of inequality and dependency (Emmanuel, 1977). As for 
Emmanuel (1977) employing the theory of unequal exchange, presented another 
form of dependent relationship between the rich (metropolis-centre) and poor 
countries (satellite-periphery). Explaining Arghiri Emmanuel theory, Hartwick (2009) 
describes how the theory ‘contrasts the perfect mobility of capital with the relative 
immobility of labour’, and has resulted in vastly different wage rates concerning the 
two (p.94). It was suggested that peripheral countries export agricultural products, 
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which embody large quantities of cheap labour, and import industrial products 
representing small amounts of expensive labour. This unequal exchange conducted 
through trading activities led to the devaluation of exported products from the 
periphery. In turn, it has the potential to cause major economic stagnation in the 
poor periphery countries, as explained in Hartwick (2009, p. 94).  
Drawing on the above viewpoints, dependency theory scholars have assumed that 
market failure is an internal characteristic of an underdeveloped economy, and that 
the state has an important role to play in correcting it.  Raul Prebish along with 
Celso Furtado, a Brazilian economist, were visible advocates of such interventionist 
approaches, which have been translated into a development strategy for 
industrialization, namely the Import Substitute Industrialization (ISI) strategy (Love, 
1980; Szmrecsányi, 2005).  
The ISI strategy is now generally acknowledged to have resulted in both positive and 
negative impacts on national economies. Benefits were generated from: protecting 
infant industries; helping to diversify the economy; reducing excessive dependence 
on imported consumer goods; utilising some domestic natural resources; creating 
opportunities for employment; and, contributing to economic growth. Conversely, 
the policy has several well-known weaknesses including an inducement for 
inefficient and uncompetitive industries, particularly those subject to economic 
scale underutilization and nurtured by protection, balance-of-payment deficits, and 
the potential to create a monopolistic market structure (Alavi, 1996, pp. 18-35). 
According to Webster (1984), both the modernization and dependency theories 
explain poverty as a product of economic and social structures, and not primarily of 
cultural values. The main difference was the analysis that saw an explanatory shift 
from ‘tradition- modernity’ towards a ‘non-capitalist to capitalist society’ 
relationship, that directed analytical emphasis away from the ‘centres’ rich 
countries to the ‘peripheral’ poor countries of the world economy.   
It is interesting that the discourse surrounding economic development that 
emerged between the 1950s and the 1970s intensified during the cold war between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, wherein both sides promoted their 
respective ideological views of the political and economic system.  The influence of 
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the cold war, either directly or indirectly, extended their ‘battle ground’ to the 
developing countries in the form of ideological economic paradigms. 
2.2.3 Washington consensus 
In the 1980s, the Latin American countries faced various economic crises including 
huge external debts, crises believed to have been caused by accumulated issues 
originating from ISI policies and a hike in international oil prices during the 1970s. 
Imported oil required quick cash; but the inward looking orientation of ISI policy 
that had been adopted for several decades did not allow them to raise export 
earnings.  As a result, the Latin American countries experienced an imbalance in 
foreign exchange, resulting in increased external obligations (Franko, 2007). 
In an effort to relieve the debt burden of the Latin American countries, John 
Williamson argued for the need to help the debtor countries to overcome the 
countries’ burden using good policies instead of the Brady Plan1.  Williamson coined 
the term ‘the Washington Consensus’ for a set of policies that seemed to reflect the 
broader views of various Washington-based organisations. The consensus has been 
explicitly associated with ten policy instruments:  (1) fiscal discipline; (2) controlling 
budget deficits; (3) prioritizing public expenditure on basic health care, education 
and infrastructure; (4) financial liberalization; (5) ensuring a competitive exchange 
rate; (6) trade liberalization; (7) liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; 
(8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and, (10) securing the informal sector to gain 
property (Williamson, 2008, pp. 2-18).  
Several points indicated that the Washington Consensus underlined the views of 
free markets and liberalisation paradigms as an approach to generating efficient 
economy and growth.  According to Öniş & Şenses (2005), this efficient market view 
                                                        
1
 This was a U.S. strategy that emphasized debt-forgiveness for highly indebted developing 
countries, named after US treasury secretary Nicholas Brady who proposed the debt-reduction 
agreement ideas; whereby bonds issued by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) to convert bank loans to mostly Latin American countries into a variety of new bonds to help their 
defaulted national debts 1980s.   
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was rooted in the neoliberal orthodoxy's preference for individualism, market 
liberalism, and a smaller role for governments in the economy. 
This view seems to have been widely accepted by the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
began using these policy reforms as a condition of lending to developing countries 
(Sheng, 2009, p. 110), and as a means to create efficient markets. This approach 
contrasted with the ISI strategy adopted by many Latin American countries, which 
embraced heavy reliance on ‘government manipulation of market prices, barriers to 
entry and access to imports and finance’ (Felix, 1989, p. 1455), all of which 
appeared to contribute to the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
The reduction of government intervention in the market became a general rule for 
the IMF when dealing with economic crises.  But, during the Asian economic crisis of 
1997, that mainly affected Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea, IMF programs 
not only accelerated the crisis but turned it into a recession (Stiglitz, 2003). The IMF 
program in Korea, for example, pursued financial liberalisation and floating of the 
exchange rate, a combination of which led to wild fluctuations in the Korean Won 
(KRW). The currency devalued around 90% in two months; but, it stabilised in six 
months after an aggressive high interest rate policy, as high as 30% (S.-J. Lee & Han, 
2006, p. 307). In Indonesia, the IMF program not only impacted in economic and 
monetary terms, but also led to massive social riots culminating in political regime 
change. Based on the experience of responding to the Asian crisis, the highly 
prescriptive application of market liberalization in developing countries was 
seriously questioned, and led to the setback of the Washington consensus, even the 
underlying assumptions about minimum state intervention for an efficient market.  
Joseph Stiglitz, exploring the dominant economic theory adhered to in the 1970s, 
showed that market failures were widespread, especially in developing economies 
rife with imperfections in information, limited competition and incomplete markets. 
Under these conditions, it is evident that markets are not always operating 
efficiently. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the Washington consensus 
prescriptions failed to work as promised (Serra, Spiegel, & Stiglitz, 2008).  
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According to Williamson (2008), however, the set of policies had been interpreted 
differently from their initial intention. There were three main interpretations: the 
first was that the set of policies has been interpreted as ‘bashing’ the state, a new 
imperialism, the creation of a laissez-faire global economy and, that the only thing 
that matters is growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and doubtless much else 
besides’(Williamson, 2008, p. 21). Even though Williamson argued that the ten 
policy reforms did not have any close relationship to the above, economic  
historians stated that it was implied, as the developed countries ‘kicked away the 
ladder’ they had used to climb up to where they are now  (Chang, 2003, pp. 24-28).  
As Chang points out that many developed countries only championed free trade 
after long protection of their economies, when their technological capacity was 
unchallenged. Britain, in the 19th century, only championed free trade after 
longstanding tariff barriers associated with the Corn Laws had been implemented 
between the period 1721 and 1846. In the early 20th century, Germany applied 
strong tariff protection to its strategic iron and steel industries, while the USA 
industries were the most protected in the world until 1945. Viewed from this 
historical perspective, promoting free trade seems to be primarily about the need to 
open up new markets for products from the developed countries.  
The second interpretation is that the policies ‘refer to policies the Bretton Woods 
institutions applied towards their client countries’. As Williamson (2008) argues, in 
the beginning there were no differences, but over time some substantive 
differences emerged, such as in the interpretation of ‘competitive exchange rate’ 
and ‘liberalisation of capital flows of FDI’ (p.21). Further Williamson explained that 
the former deviated from either float their exchange rate cleanly or fix it firmly by 
adopting some institutional device like a currency board, to competitive exchange 
rate implying intermediate control. This is important, since both fixed and floating 
rates can easily become overvalued.  Meanwhile, the liberalisation of capital moved 
towards ‘liberalisation of capital accounts’ rather than towards ‘limited 
liberalization of capital flows to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)’. In effect, ‘it was 
the liberalisation of capital that ignited the Asian crisis of 1997’ (Williamson, 2008, 
p. 21).   
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The last interpretation of ‘the Washington Consensus’ was that it should be used 
“as a synonym for neo-liberalism or market fundamentalism”.  The application of 
the Washington consensus, which was originally designed to provide an answer to 
the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, has been interpreted loosely and 
treated as a single alternative for economic development policies in developing 
countries. According to Williamson (2008), however, ‘the failure of the consensus 
started when the policy became a prescription list, advocated to all countries at all 
times as many critics have interpreted  it to be’ (p.24).  
2.2.4 Developmental state 
The Washington consensus is sometimes associated with a policy of Export Oriented 
Industrialisation (EOI), a strategy pursued by several East Asian countries (such as 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan) over many decades at a time when the Latin American 
countries were adopting the ISI strategy.  However, as Wade (1993) points out the 
East Asian countries’ success was not without government intervention: the state 
played an active role in nurturing the success of the countries, particularly in 
selecting industrial policies, providing education, establishing trade protection and 
social protection, establishing an organization which had the capability to direct 
state intervention in the process of economic development. A more critical view 
espoused by Andrew Sheng  (2009) is that the World Bank study of the success of 
the Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993), which was funded by the Japanese, was 
essentially an intellectual attack on the World Bank philosophy of liberalism. The 
study indicated that the ‘Japanese model of development worked because of their 
strong, and selective  government intervention in the markets’ (Sheng, 2009, p. 
111).  
The ‘Developmental state’ reflects this alternative interpretation of the East Asian 
development experience (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). Johnson (1999), suggested 
that high growth in East Asian countries was supported by solid ‘institutional 
arrangements’ characterised as: (1) putting the economic development of a country 
as the main priority of state action: (2) guiding markets with instruments produced 
by an elite economic bureaucracy; (3) establishing an institutionalized relationship 
between the elite bureaucracy and private business; and, (4) providing a supportive 
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political system that will allow the elite bureaucracy to operate effectively. In other 
words, the underlining factor of the success of the East Asian countries was the 
strategic role that the state played in the process of economic development (Öniş, 
1991, pp. 109-111). 
A significant point with regard to the strategic role of that state is that it does not 
set out to provide an alternative market.  Johnson (1999) defines a strategic 
industrial policy as one that emerges when a ‘state deliberately changes the 
incentives within markets in order to influence the behaviour of civilian producers, 
consumers, and investors’ (p.48-50).  In support of this definition, Johnson provides 
an example of American policy intervention in the country’s real estate industry that 
induced family ownership of houses.  
Another important feature of the developmental state is the model of intervention 
locally rooted in national business contexts (Amsden, 1989).  For example, the 
‘public-private partnership’ style in the developmental state varies among the East 
Asian countries. While the Korean style is similar to the Japanese style, which 
resulted in the Korean chaebol conglomerates, Taiwan has opted not to imitate 
these styles (Öniş, 1991, p. 118). Drawing upon a comparison of the Japanese, 
Korean and Taiwanese strategies implementation in developmental states, Öniş 
implies that there is no standard approach to successful development despite using 
the same developmental principle. As Johnson (1999) states: ‘None of the East 
Asian countries is cloning the Japanese development model’ (p.40).  
Another aspect to be recognised is the critical existence of twin policy supports and 
disciplines. Using a subsidy to nurture particular industries and expecting them to 
survive and be competitive, required discipline of tight business performance 
evaluation. Otherwise, the subsidy tended to emerge as a source of rent seeking 
(Öniş, 1991, p. 113). In this context, governance of any related subsidy requires 
constant evaluation to avoid rent-seeking business behaviour.  
Another aspect revealed by  Johnson (1999) is the potential for a high level of 
‘structural corruption’ that could severely impact upon  economic development 
(p.40). This might happen when the developmental approach undertaken by 
developing countries was implemented without an explicit pilot agency, such as the 
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Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan. Countries including 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia were among those without this agency, but which 
assumed a similar approach to economic development. It is interesting, therefore, 
that these three countries were among the first to be affected by the 1997 crisis.   
Adopting a different view of the developmental state approach, Williamson 
emphasises the role of government in establishing technical education, promoting 
the diffusion of technological information, funding precompetitive research, 
providing tax incentives for R&D, encouraging venture capital, and stimulating the 
growth of industrial clusters (Williamson, 2008, p. 27). These roles are presented as 
alternatives to industrial policy where government agency favours particular 
industries and players (Williamson, 2008, p. 27), and ignores the citizens in favour of 
the elites, a policy experienced by the Koreans (K.-S. Lee, 2009). 
In short, the developmental state approach is believed to have been a key factor in 
East Asian development, where selective state intervention has been the main 
feature of the approach.  The policy strategies developed in the East Asian countries 
embraced common features of ‘state interventions’ to guide particular industries to 
compete in international markets (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). Nevertheless, the 
model of intervention varied, in line with the contexts of national issues in each 
country. An important lesson from this perspective is the pragmatic approach 
adopted by the various states to nurture economic development. What is 
interesting in this approach is, according to Johnson (1999, p. 32), that the 
economic paradigm underlying the policy ‘goes beyond the contrast between the 
American and Soviet economies of the cold war’.   
2.2.5 Post Washington Consensus   
From the mid-1990s to the first decade of the 2000s, various efforts sought 
alternative development approaches and strategies to respond to the perceived 
failure of the Washington Consensus.  An alternative approach was considered 
necessary to provide a better approach to developing countries’ development.  
With this in mind, some new approaches have emerged to provide an alternative, 
for example the amendment suggestions of the Washington Consensus (Piasecki & 
Wolnicki, 2004), the Barcelona development agenda (Serra & E.Stiglitz, 2008), and 
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the BeST (Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo) consensus (K. Lee & Mathews, 2010). Interestingly, 
the three approaches signify an important role for the state in the tackling of 
imperfect market failures and strong financial institutions, and promote the need 
for policy experimentation.       
Despite their similarities vis-a-vis the inclusiveness of institutions, the three 
alternative approaches bring different emphases. The Washington Consensus 
amendment proposed by Piasecki and Wolnicki (2004) emphasises the need to 
incorporate  comprehensive human behaviour such as ‘developing countries’ 
religious beliefs, ethical standards, and ethnic traditions’ (p.312).  The inclusion of 
social policy formulations and the removal of business impediments are highly 
recommended. Emphasis is also on the need for efficient information flows and a 
mechanism to absorb such information. Lastly, development policy focuses on the 
well-being of human life and the environment. 
In terms of this analytical approach, Piasecki and Wolnicki (2004) maintain that 
contemporary approaches to development studies more often include ‘interaction 
between economic, social and environmental problems that may be situated on the 
local, international or global scales’ (p.312). In such situations, solutions to those 
problems may come from the ‘public sector, the private sector, or from civil society’ 
(Piasecki & Wolnicki, 2004, p. 312).  Solutions may be rooted in the local needs and 
suited to the traditional conditions. It became clear that a new economic agenda 
was required that would initiate sound reforms. 
The Barcelona Development Agenda, which was proposed by a group of economists 
from developing and developed countries who met in Barcelona in September, 
2004, identified seven policy lessons which should serve as priorities for reform in 
both rich and developing nations. The seven policy issues included: (1) the 
importance of the role of both state and market; (2) prudent financial, monetary, 
fiscal and debt policies; (3) national freedom in experimenting with policy making; 
(4) international trade institutions to promote development; (5)  international 
financial arrangements; (6) international flows of capital and labour;  and, (7) 
environment sustainability  (Serra & E.Stiglitz, 2008, pp. 58-60).  Within the abstract 
general principles of the Barcelona agenda, it seems that the proposed agenda was 
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not aimed at tackling domestic development strategies; the agenda suggests 
international movement to develop better global institutions. In this context, this 
meant the willingness of the rich countries to restructure the global institutions that 
were contributing to the imbalance in development.  
With reference to the general principal outlined in the Barcelona Development 
Agenda, Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2008) proposed a framework emphasising 
three main considerations: ‘growth strategies; local specificities; and, prioritising 
solutions to the highest constraints on economic growth’ (p.325-327). Rodrik (2008) 
further elaborated upon the ‘practical approach to formulating’  growth strategies, 
an approach that starts with (1) diagnostic analysis of the most significant 
constraints on economic growth; (2) developing policy design to identify 
constraints; and, (3) institutionalizing the process of diagnosis and policy response 
(357-366). Furthermore, Rodrick states that the framework employed economists as 
evaluators of trade-offs rather than advocates, providing options for economic 
growth with consequences, without being bound to particular ‘ideological views’ 
that assume that a similar set of policies could work equally everywhere.  In other 
words, the framework embedded all major existing strategic approaches to growth, 
and served to clarify the conditions under which they were relevant. 
Adopting a different approach from the Barcelona consensus, ‘the BeST consensus’ 
proposed by K. Lee and Mathews (2010) focused on developing countries’ strategies 
(91-101).  The BeSt Consensus suggested a pragmatic approach to development 
strategies, drawing on the economic success of the East Asian countries, particularly 
China, Korea and Japan.  
The BeST consensus approach highlighted the importance of sequential 
development processes, which start by establishing the preconditions for 
development, in which the state has a strategic role in providing the preconditions, 
progress to building the capacity of development agents, and developing 
institutional environments favouring the advancement process. Finally the state exit 
from the market interventions (K. Lee & Mathews, 2010).  
Despite the claim that the BeST consensus has been ‘suitably adopted’ by 
developing countries, due to the similarity of the efforts employed to alleviate 
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poverty, the claim may be over simplifying the complexity of the issues and the 
uniqueness of the individual countries.  Some studies (Ellison & Gereffi, 1990; 
Piasecki & Wolnicki, 2004) indicate that knowledge of cultural values, social 
conditions, religions, human resources, country endowments, and the ‘historical 
moments’ that occur during the period of economic development is critical to 
understanding developing countries problems. All those factors require a vigilant 
thought when designing solutions for countries problems. 
In light with this argument, Stiglitz (2003) argued that globalization and 
liberalization might open economic growth opportunities in developing countries. 
But, it could work if undertaken properly and incorporated the characteristics of 
each individual country. A gradual approach was emphasised when promoting 
economic development, considering each country is different and it has its own 
history, culture and traditions. In this context, Stiglitz recognised the imperfect 
market situations that were mainly ignored by international development 
institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, when installing the Washington 
consensus as generic solutions for economic development.    
Drawing on the various theoretical backgrounds and approaches alluded to above, 
clearly those charged with developing policy strategies need an accurate 
understanding of the real world situation. Implementation requires a framework of 
analysis that can successfully integrate macroeconomics, the institutional 
environment at both the local and international levels, the need to improve the 
capacity of agents of economic growth in developing countries and to acknowledge 
contemporary global challenges and historical events such as worldwide crises and a 
global market shift to new emerging economies. 
2.3 GVC as an analytical framework 
The post-Washington consensus debate surrounding development policy seemed to 
dovetail with an alternative framework for understanding global economic change 
through global value chain analysis. Gereffi et al. (1994) stated that ‘Global 
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Commodity Chains (GCC)2 allows a meso-level of analysis that bridges the macro 
global scale of world-economic historical structures and an emphasis on the social 
embeddedness of economic activity within specific geographic locations’ (p.2). In 
this regard, GVCs integrate different scales of analytical space at the global, national 
and local level to understand the dynamics of economic development. 
The GVC also offers guidance to various decision makers across governments, non-
government activists and industry players to design development strategy that 
could lessen the negative impact of an open economy for communities, workers and 
industry (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000). The GVC framework is applicable to various 
development strategies that could allow various actors in the emerging economy to 
use the same guidance to advance economic development.   
The following discussion will describe the GVC approach in more detail, discussing 
the roots and the metamorphosis of the theory, and the general dimensions of the 
analytical framework. 
2.3.1 The roots and metamorphosis of the GVC concept 
In 1994, the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) concept emerged as an alternative way 
of analyzing economic development strategies, and providing the theoretical 
foundation for the subsequent evolution of the GVC. The GCC was initially 
introduced in a book titled “Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism” edited by 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994). In particular, the chapter written by Gereffi (1994) 
titled ”The organization of buyer-driven global commodity chains: How US retailers 
shape overseas production networks” attracted enormous scholarly attention. In 
this chapter, Gereffi offers the GCC analytical framework which includes three 
dimensions of analysis: input-output structure, territoriality and governance. Shortly 
after, the institutional dimension was introduced and subsequently incorporated 
into the framework. Then, in 1999, the process of industrial upgrading (discussed in 
greater detail below) was presented as a key analytical concept within GVC analysis 
(Gereffi, 1999).  
                                                        
2 GCC is the early name of the GVC concept (section 2.2.1 explains the metamorphosis of the 
concept) 
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As various scholars have pointed out, the origins of the GVC concept were rooted in, 
or at least inspired by Hopkins and Wallerstein’s (1977) World System research 
(Bair, 2005; Neilson & Pritchard, 2009; Sturgeon, 2008).  The term ‘commodity 
chain’ was initially stated and defined in Hopkins and Wallerstein’s article as 
follows: 
“…what we mean by such chains is the following: take an ultimate 
consumable item and trace back the set of inputs that culminated this item-
prior transformation, the raw materials, the transportation mechanisms, the 
labour input into each of the material processes, the food inputs into labour. 
This linked set of processes we call commodity chain” (Hopkins & 
Wallerstein, 1977, p. 128) 
Subsequent to the GCC’s being developed by Gereffi in 1994, the concept has been 
applied across broad areas of study in the social sciences, marking the acceptance of 
the term ‘GCC’. For example, it has variously been applied to the study of industrial 
clusters, and how local firms can be improved by various upgrading paths in the 
tightly competitive global economy  (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000); to the study of 
inequality within and between countries (Kaplinsky, 2000); to the study of global 
industry restructuring and its impact on producers in developing countries (Fold, 
2001); and, to the study of the upgrading of agricultural producers (Gibbon, 2001).   
Starting around 2000, the GCC metamorphosed into the GVC when various scholars 
focusing on related network studies met in Bellagio, Italy, to discuss “Global Value 
Chains Initiatives” as part of a Rockfeller Conference (Neilson, 2014).  The shift in 
terminology was  driven by an effort to avoid the narrowly associated term 
‘commodity’ with ‘raw products’; and, the intention was to cover the wider studies 
that had been done on the manufacturing sector (Gereffi et al., 2001). 
Even though the terms Commodity Chains (CC), GCC and GVC are similar from the 
network and chain perspectives, Bair (2005) argues that the terms actually 
designate clear and distinct conceptual ideas, that could be seen mainly at two key 
differences. The first key difference has its genesis in the debate surrounding 
globalisation. For example, when comparing the CC-World System and the GCC, the 
first sees globalisation as a long historical process starting with the emergence of 
capitalism in the sixteenth century, while the GCC literature understands it primarily 
as a contemporary phenomenon, a consequence of the integration of global 
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production. A second difference is identified in the purpose of the research.  The 
CC-World System perspective emphasises the study of a capitalist world-economy in 
its totality, including ‘capital accumulation, surplus distribution and tracing the 
distribution of the surplus between various links’ (Bair, 2005, pp. 154-167). The GCC 
perspective is more focused on how global particular industries are organised. 
The above terms and concepts, signaling relatively recent studies in the literature, 
indicate that the GVC concept is sometimes interchangeably applied with a similar 
‘network’ inspired concept, known as the Global Production Network (GPN). 
Barrientos, Gereffi, and Rossi (2011) use a GPN metaphor in the introduction to 
their article and then also use the term GVC to describe the concept of social 
upgrading.  In fact the GPN concept arose as a deliberate strategy to address some 
of the perceived limitations of the GVC concept and the specific meaning of the 
chain metaphor (Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002). However, this 
convergence is not surprising given that much of the GPN analytical framework 
described by Henderson et al. (2002) showed similarities with GVCs, e.g., 
recognition of territoriality within production networks (the territoriality),  attention 
to the design, production and marketing (the input-output), the distribution of 
power discussion (the governance), the significance of labour and the process of 
value creation (input-output), the institutions, and lastly, technological upgrading 
and capturing economic prosperity (upgrading mechanism). 
2.3.2 The general dimensions of the GVC 
The analytical dimensions of the GVC can be classified into five main areas, the 
input-output, territoriality, governance, institutions and upgrading dimensions, 
although ‘upgrading’ is sometimes simply considered a process occurring within the 
chain. Those dimensions allow comprehensive and meaningful understanding of 
global and local dynamics of economic development.  Sturgeon (2008) pointed out 
that the first two dimensions, the input–output structure and the territoriality of 
the chain, are largely descriptive. Meanwhile the other two primary dimensions, 
governance structure and institutional settings, are causal. These dimensions 
explained the power relationship among economic actors within the value chains 
and explicate the external and internal environments that restrict policy selections 
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made by value chain actors.  Neilson and Pritchard (2009) argued that these causal 
dimensions are further linked by the concept of upgrading. The relationship and 
engagement between the value chains and the institutional settings dictates that 
specific actors define the potential upgrading within the value chains.  
2.3.2.1 Input output 
The input-output dimension of GVC can be defined as ‘a set of products and services 
linked together in a sequence of value adding economic activities’ (Gereffi, 1994, p. 
97). This definition, however, is purely a description of products flows, from 
designing process, transforming raw material to intermediate or finished products, 
transporting the products to markets, and, finally, consumption of products in final 
markets.  
Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) classified the description of an input-output 
structure into  two main stages. The first stage is to describe the activities of various 
actors in the chain, such as research, design, production, distribution and marketing 
activities; and the second stage is to identify the dynamics and structure of the 
industry being studied.  In particular for the second stage, the description includes 
identification of the dynamics of sourcing practices: types of companies 
(multinational or national, state owned companies or private), companies’ scale of 
operation (global, national, and local); and companies’ size (large, medium or small 
scale).  
In short, the description will map out who the players are in the industry being 
investigated, how extensive the scale of their operations is, and where they locate 
their business activities. This ‘industry map or lay-out’, would be the first entry to 
understand the nature of industry dynamics that later on will be discussed in the 
following four dimensions.  
2.3.2.2 Territoriality 
The territoriality is the geographic scope to identify the changing dynamics in the 
industry being investigated. The dynamics include the shift of production from one 
area to another, or the shift of markets from a traditional region to an emerging 
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region. Thus, territoriality provides a descriptive angle from which to understand 
the dynamics of real world situations. 
The spatiality of production and consumption is very important to grasping the 
dynamics of an industry. The ‘spatiality helps us to understand how chains operate 
differently  through time and space’ (Leslie & Reimer, 1999, p. 402). Further Leslie 
and Reiner elaborated that the understanding is essential to any articulation of the 
politics of consumption, the formation of industrial policy, to mediating 
relationships along the chain, recognizing the ways in which consumers transform 
and use commodities and, finally, to understanding the ways in which goods are 
linked at the retailing, advertising or consumption sites.  At this context, 
territoriality provides a descriptive angle from which to understand the dynamics of 
ground reality. 
2.3.2.3 Governance 
The governance dimension has been described as ‘authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are 
allocated and flow within a chain’ (Gereffi, 1994, p. 97). According to Gereffi (2001), 
governance in the GVC is distinct from both the neo-classical and  political economy 
economic perspectives, as the GVC highlights the power exercised by lead firms, and 
shapes the economic outcomes of global industries. Neo-classical economics stress 
the pure market as the key factor in economic progress, whereas political economy 
tends to emphasise the economic power afforded by state actors in shaping 
national competitive advantage. Further, Gereffi reiterated that the GVC 
governance offers an alternative view of examining governance structures in the 
global economy, emphasizing the organisational structure of transnational 
companies or lead firms in various industries. 
Governance structures were initially differentiated into two types of governance: 
the ‘producer driven’ and ‘buyer driven’ commodity chains. Producer-driven 
governance structure is characterised by high capital and technology intensive 
production activities, wherein transnational companies or manufacturers are the 
key players in coordinating production networks; for example, producers of aircraft, 
automobiles, cellular phones and computers. Thus, profit is generated mainly from 
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innovation of advanced products, the capability to control suppliers and effective 
marketing activities (Gereffi, 1994). 
On the other hand, buyer-driven governance structure is characterised by 
downstream activities, including large retailers, branded marketers, and branded 
manufacturers. Sourcing from developing countries commonly becomes a feature of 
this particular form of governance due to the need for mass labour to produce 
consumer goods such as garments, footwear, toys, household wares, consumer 
electronics, and a variety of handicrafts.  In this case, profit derives from high-value 
research, design, sales, marketing and financial services (Gereffi, 1994, 1999). 
This dichotomous view of organisational governance implies that lead firms exercise 
considerable power, and that other participants in the chain are dependent on the 
said firms.  However, based on the study of the global cocoa-chocolate industry, 
Fold (2002)  suggests that the power within the chain can also be ‘bi-polar’. Lead 
roles are played by both the grinders (cocoa processors) and the branders 
(chocolate manufacturers). The former dominate the supply of cocoa beans, while 
the latter dominate the final branded products.       
In light with this critique, Gereffi et al. (2005) introduced a new typology of global 
value chain governance, which is constructed around three factors:  first, the 
complexity of transactions; second, the ability to arrange information systematically 
(codifiability); and lastly, the competence and capability of suppliers. Derived from 
these three factors, governance is divided into the following five types: 
1. Markets: products are easy to produce, transactions are simple, and buyers 
and sellers can easily switch to other parties. 
2. Modular value chain: products are quite complex but suppliers could 
produce them with little information and coordination from buyers. 
3. Relational value chains; products are complex, thus requiring frequent face-
to-face interactions and strong coordination between supplier and buyers. 
For this reasons, the cost of switching to new partners is high. 
4. Captive value chains: Product specifications are complex but supplier 
capabilities are low. Therefore, it requires a great deal of intervention and 
control from the leading firms. 
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5. Hierarchy; Products are complex and highly competent suppliers cannot be 
found; thus lead firms will be forced to develop and manufacture a product 
in house.   
The above governance typology provides a more detailed explanation to facilitate 
an understanding of the relationships that may occur between firms in developing 
countries and lead firms in the global market. Thus, the typology provides an 
analytical framework designed to capture real relationships among firms in the 
global value chain.  
In this context, the typology will help, for example, policy makers to develop 
appropriate development strategies for a particular country and industry, which fit 
the nature of the governance structure within the chain and fit the place where 
actors or organisations are situated.  At this point, an understanding of institutional 
settings is crucial, to comprehend how markets work in the real world. 
2.3.2.4 The institutional settings 
The institutional settings are the third dimension in the GVC concept that provides 
geographers with a useful tool to examine how a product/community system 
intersect with space and place  (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009). As recognized by Martin 
(2000), local economic outcomes are shaped by the interaction of rules 
(institutional environment) and actors (institutional arrangement) in the economy, 
which varies across space and place.  
North (1990) defined institutions as  the ‘rules of the game’ in a society or humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction, which can be either formal 
(constitutions, laws and contracts) or  informal  (codes of conduct, norms, and any 
informal constraint embedded in the society). It is differentiated with the 
organization. The ‘organisation’ is the player of the game, which provides a 
structure to human interaction, rather than the rules.   
Despite the institutional settings supposedly covering local dynamics that are 
embedded within certain places and space; the application of the institutional 
dimension of the GVC, has been mostly related to global rules of trade and national 
policy. For example, the study on the impact of the North Atlantic Free Trade 
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Agreement (NAFTA) on the regional differences in the pattern of US apparel imports  
(Frederick & Gereffi, 2011; Gereffi, 1999), the changing trade regimes of the 
International Coffee Agreements (ICA) (Ponte, 2002), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and international competition (Gereffi, 2011), and liberalisation of the 
domestic automotive market (Gu et al., 2008).  
This tendency in fact had been criticised by some scholars.  Henderson et al. (2002) 
argued that the GVC concept lacked consideration of the linkage between firms and 
the social and institutional contexts at the national and sub-national levels. This 
criticism was further emphasised by Bair (2005) where it is pointed out that the GVC 
seems to neglect discussing the broader institutional environments where value 
chain actors operates.  
In this regard, Neilson and Pritchard (2009) attempted to enrich the institutional 
dimension by paying attention towards: (i) ‘greater analysis of the institutional 
environment; and (ii) a more nuanced and contextual  critique of governance 
structures which takes explicit account of how these are shaped by (and go towards 
shaping) the institutional environment’ (p.56). Further, Neilson and Pritchard 
argued that the interaction of institutional settings and the governance of the GVC 
embed a causal dimension, which is closely linked to the upgrading concept of the 
GVC.  
2.3.2.5. Upgrading concepts 
The concept of upgrading in the GVC literature is widely considered to cover two 
main thematic areas: economic and social upgrading.  In the early development of 
upgrading in the GVC, upgrading activities were mostly oriented toward economic 
activities or industrial development such as industrial upgrading (Gereffi, 1999), 
cluster upgrading (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002), and agricultural sector upgrading 
(Gibbon, 2001). More recent application of the upgrading concept has been 
expanded towards social upgrading, such as improving labour conditions of firms in 
GVCs (Knorringa & Pegler, 2006), and how labour could conduct gradual upgrading 
to achieve decent work and better paid  (Barrientos, Gereffi, et al., 2011; Barrientos, 
Mayer, Pickles, & Posthuma, 2011). 
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a) Economic upgrading 
The major argument postulated by Gereffi (1999) is that firms in developing 
countries could engage in industrial upgrading by joining the global value chain and 
accessing learning opportunities available from global buyers. This argument drew 
from the lesson learnt from the East Asian industrial upgrading path. Gereffi 
observed the gradual upgrading process that occurred for many local firms.  The 
shifts started from a simple assembly of imported inputs, which led to gradually 
learning from global buyers about the technical know-how, and then to the design 
and full package brand manufacturing.  
This upgrading concept drew from the east Asian lessons, and was categorised by 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) as: (a) Process upgrading, which is increasing the 
efficiency of internal operations by rearranging production processes or introducing 
new technologies; (b) Product upgrading, developing new products or improving the 
quality that increases unit values; and (c) Functional (intra-chain) upgrading, 
acquiring new functions such as moving from production to design and marketing. 
In recognition of industrial cluster upgrading, Humphrey and Schmitz further 
complemented the concept with additional Inter-sectoral  upgrading, which applies 
the knowledge acquired from the previous function to a different sector. For 
example, the knowledge gained in producing desktop computers might be used to 
expand into new sector such as cellular phones. 
In addition to industrial upgrading, in the agricultural sector, Gibbon (2001) 
suggested three potential mechanisms that firms in developing countries might 
pursue. First, local companies focus on improving margins in existing commodities. 
The activity could include increasing volumes and consistency of supply. Second, 
generating improved types of current commodities; for example, new gene-
manipulated crops resistant to pests and diseases and minimum inputs required. 
Lastly, firms are conditioned to establish local commodity processing at the local 
level, as a learning process for entry to final processing. Some suggestions include, 
exercising state institutional support such as bans, restrictions or disincentives (e.g., 
taxes/tariffs) for exported commodities. 
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b) Social upgrading 
Recent discussions in the literature have evinced increasing interest in the notion of 
‘social upgrading’ in GVCs in an attempt to recognise that upgrading of firms does 
not necessarily translate into improved conditions for workers (Barrientos, Gereffi, 
et al., 2011; Barrientos, Mayer, et al., 2011; Knorringa & Pegler, 2006).  
Knorringa and Pegler (2006) argued that sustainable improvements in labour 
conditions will not arise as an inevitable consequence of firm upgrading in a GVC; 
rather, upgrading and industrialisation may be associated with immiserising growth 
in many developing countries. It is argued that outsourcing practices embedded in 
the strategic decisions made by many firms operating within contemporary GVCs 
follow the logic of looking for ever cheaper places to operate. At this logic, global 
buyers continuously search for low cost production areas, which in many cases are 
primarily shaped by the presence of low labour costs.  
To balance economic upgrading with a sharper focus on what benefits are accruing 
labour, two alternatives of upgrading trajectories were suggested by two different 
scholars in the literature. First, Knorringa and Pegler (2006) recommended four 
potential areas of upgrading. The first is at firm level, where firms offer learning 
opportunities for labour to acquire a higher level of knowledge. Second, upgrading 
labour through the value chain, in which responsibility is more mainstreamed as 
part of ethical sourcing. Third, country level; where political representation should 
be inclusive. Lastly, at the global level, a stronger unifying role of global union 
bodies in co-determining global standards. 
Another path of social upgrading was proposed by Barrientos, Gereffi, et al. (2011), 
where it was suggested the shift of upgrading in the context of decent work and 
improvement in working conditions. The upgrading path could go through three 
different situations for labour: small scale worker upgrading; labour intensive 
upgrading; and higher skill upgrading. Barrientos et.al elaborated that the small 
scale worker upgrading occurs when workers remain within home-based 
production, but are still able to enjoy improvements in their working conditions. 
Second, labour intensive upgrading occurs when workers move to better types of 
labour intensive work where they can obtain better working conditions.  Lastly, 
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higher skill upgrading occurs where workers move towards better types of paid 
employment associated with progressive social upgrading.  
The difference among the above two paths of social upgrading is that the first 
implies that institutional environments are significant factors driving better working 
conditions to gain positive impact from economic upgrading. While the second 
implies that social upgrading would materialize when the profit gained from such 
economic upgrading translates into better working conditions and increased wages. 
At this regard, the two suggested trajectories could be considered as 
complementary to each other. Social upgrading likely occurs when firms succeed to 
conduct economic upgrading and are supported by institutional environments 
simultaneously constructed at the local, national and global levels. 
2.4 Upgrading in GVCs and its application by upgrading agents 
In the literature, study about upgrading and its applications in the real world has 
tended to be interpreted as taking place through the actions of three key sets of 
agents: i) lead firms; ii) development agencies; and iii) states. The literature show 
how upgrading activities were adopted by various development agents and how 
upgrading mechanisms have changes industry dynamics. Thus, the following sub 
section will discussed the upgrading applications to understand how the concept is 
being implemented in the real world, so far.    
2.4.1 The lead firm 
Lead firms have been the central focus of the upgrading concept in the literature on 
GVCs. This is hardly surprising, given that the initial argument of the GVC concept 
was to introduce an organisational structure of global firms as one of the main 
factors that could shape firm upgrading in developing countries.  Studies discussing 
the lead firms and their roles in the upgrading activities of the GVC have been 
explicitly presented across various industries.  For example, the role of retailers in 
the UK in structuring the production and processing of fresh vegetables exported 
from Africa (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000); the role of global buyers in fostering 
upgrading in cluster levels in Latin American countries (Giuliani, Pietrobelli, & 
Rabellotti, 2005); and, lastly the role of lead firms strategies in upgrading 
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smallholder agro food production in Africa (Fold & Larsen, 2011). All of these studies 
indicate the prominence of lead firms in the shaping of their supplier networks in 
developing countries. 
Along with lead firm capacity to exercise power, scholars identified two side effects 
for local producers, both positive and negative. The positive impact was clearly 
identified as the ability of suppliers to improve their products’ quality to meet the 
market demand and to upgrade their business process in order to stay competitive 
in the export markets. For example, agricultural exporters in Africa, as evident in the 
case of the linkage between UK supermarkets and African horticulture producers  
(Dolan & Humphrey, 2000); the cluster of Small medium Entreprises (SMEs) in Latin 
Americas (Giuliani et al., 2005); and, the suppliers of IKEA in Asia (Ivarsson & 
Alvstam, 2010).  
On the other side, the negative impact is rising concern on the issue of potential 
exclusion of the weakest actors in the chain, e.g., smallholder producers; for 
example, the smallholder producers in Africa, who were excluded from the global 
value chains due to unmet stringent quality requirements of supermarkets (Dolan & 
Humphrey, 2000); and, the smallholders agri-food producers in Africa facing 
difficulties in supplying the European markets due to strict quality standards and  
food security standards (Fold & Larsen, 2011).   
The majority of the upgrading examples, as briefly suggested above, driven by lead 
firms, are related to the power exercised over their suppliers through standard and 
institutional mechanisms, but tend to engage directly with primary producers in a 
limited way. Chapter 6 of this thesis, therefore, will discuss how a lead firm drives 
upgrading through both engaging directly with primary producers, the smallholder 
farmers; and by exercising international standards and offering solutions to the 
potential exclusion from the value chains. 
2.4.2 The state  
On the state side, some scholars have discussed the role of the state in driving the 
upgrading process in global value chains, frequently building on the earlier work on 
the developmental states of East Asia.  For example, the importance of trade policy 
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to support the growth of domestically owned coffee chains in India ( Neilson & 
Pritchard, 2009); and the significance of state institutions in supporting the 
competitiveness of grape producers in Brazil (Selwyn, 2008). 
Neilson and Pritchard (2009) discussed functional upgrading in the coffee and tea 
industries of South India. It reveals that one of the main factors that facilitated the 
growth of domestically owned café chains in India was politically motivated 
protectionism, in the form of restriction of FDI in the retail industry that delayed 
international brands, such as ‘Starbucks’, from operating in India. This restriction 
effectively allowed domestic coffee plantations to develop and expand their retail 
café businesses, sell their local brand, such as “Barista” and ‘Coffee Day’, and 
become market leaders in India.  
In the study of export grape production in North East Brazil, Selwyn (2008) put 
similar emphasis on the importance of local and national institutions’ in facilitating 
of upgrading. It was found that state agencies systematically facilitated upgrading 
activities for large numbers of grape producers. Several state institutions 
simultaneously provide support for the grape producers, ranging from production to 
marketing activities. Regarding production, The Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Agency (Empressa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria or EMBRAPA) provided initial 
support for grape production through research into better farming methods, as well 
as offering training programs for Integrated Fruit Production (IFP) to grape 
producers. On the marketing side, research undertaken by The National Service for 
Industrial Learning assisted producers to overcome technical gaps, particularly fast-
changing market requirements for food safety standards. In addition, to supporting 
new entrants into the grape sector, the Brazilian Grape Marketing Board (BGMB) 
encouraged the establishment of producer associations, whereby the new entrants 
to the grape sector could quickly learn about industry dynamics and acquire the 
latest production technology.   
Both studies suggest the importance of states in creating supporting conditions for 
domestic firms to engage in upgrading activities. The Indian case shows that state 
intervention in trade policy supported the ability of domestic firms (a) to engage in 
functional upgrading; and, (b) to compete with foreign firms. The Brazilian case 
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demonstrates the significance of state institutions in nurturing the growth of grape 
producers through integrated support from production to marketing activities.  The 
two cases allowed firms in the developing countries to improve their 
competitiveness in the global value chain.    
2.4.3 Development Agencies 
Over the last decade, many international development agencies - both multilateral 
and bilateral donors - have increasingly adopted a GVC approach within their 
programming. The GVC approach seems to be considered not only as an efficient 
tool to address the issues of the persistently unfavourable conditions for the poor, 
but also it could accommodate the development agencies' missions, both 
multilateral and bilateral donor agencies.  
2.4.3.1 Multilateral donor agencies 
Among the prominent multilateral donor agencies, UNIDO, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the World Bank are organizations recognised as actively 
engaging and adopting the GVC approach to implement their development 
programs. UNIDO is an organization under the United Nations, which has a mission 
to alleviate poverty in developing countries through promoting and accelerating 
sustainable industrial development. The agency has two main functions. First, as a 
global forum, UNIDO generated and disseminated industry-related knowledge; and 
second as a technical cooperation agency, the agency provided technical support as 
well as implemented projects (UNIDO, 2012).  
Over ten years, UNIDO sought to employ the GVC concept into its development 
work.  For this purpose, the organization released three different documents, a 
theoretical concept of how the  GVC could help to understand the insertion of Small 
Medium Entreprises (SMEs) in to global markets (Kaplinsky & Readman, 2001), a 
diagnostic framework for policy interventions (Hartwich & Kormawa, 2009), and a 
technical handbook, a ‘pro-poor value chain development’, a guidance for 
practitioners to design a specific agriculture value chain project targeting poor 
farmers, marginalised groups and gender issues (UNIDO, 2011).  
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The ILO is another multilateral institution employing the GVC concept to formulate 
development policy. The organization has a mission to promote social justice and 
globally recognized human and labour rights. In more technical activities, the 
organization formulated international policies and programs to promote basic 
human rights, improve working and living conditions, and enhance employment 
opportunities; develop international labour standards, conduct technical 
cooperation with countries that will help implement the policies effectively; and 
deliver training, education and research activities to accelerate and advance all of 
these efforts (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2012).  
In line with the UNIDO, the ILO adopted the GVC approach to deliver its mission. 
The ILO recognised that to promote a good working environment, it requires not 
only upgrading in individual enterprises, but also supportive institutional approach 
that allows the promotion of decent work. In this regard, the ILO published two 
documents on GVCs. First, in 2005, a report with a title “Value Chain Analysis for 
Policy Makers and Practitioners”, was launched to provide insights on how GVC 
approach is useful for policy makers who promote decent working environment 
(Schmitz, 2005). Subsequently, in 2009, the organization launched a more 
comprehensive and detail guidance of GVC approach,  with title “Value Chain 
Development for Decent Work: a guide for development practitioners, government 
and private sector initiatives," (Herr & Muzira, 2009).  The difference between the 
first and the second report, is that the first is mostly discussion and case 
presentations of GVC in the descriptive ways, while the latter provides step by step 
guidance on how to analyse, develop and set up program interventions to improve 
working and living conditions of labours. In short, the GVC framework was 
developed and tailored to the mission of the ILO.   
At the same token with the above organizations, the World Bank group released 
two documents that became reference documents for the organization when 
applying the GVC concept into program interventions. The first report is a technical 
report, released by  The Foreign Investment Advisory Service  (FIAS) of the World 
Bank group, with a title “Moving toward competitiveness: a value chain approach," 
written by Subramanian, Paludetto, and Yee (2007). The report used the value chain 
concept to identify a specific policy reform, aiming at easing investors to do their 
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business in developing countries. In this report, the analysis emphasised measuring 
performance of business entities at a particular industry and comparing it with 
other countries performance or ‘international best practices’. 
The interesting point on the report approach is the emphasis on the ‘international 
best practices’, where this claim was frequently used to impose policies that 
promoted free markets and capital flows. This is slightly different from Gereffi and 
companion scholars who recognize the uniqueness of particular countries, including 
the institutional settings, either formal or non formal, that are embedded within the 
countries analysed. In short, even though this report recognizes the work by Gereffi 
and other scholars on GVCs, the approach adopted in this report was mostly 
influenced by the business school of supply-chain management. The second report 
was published by the World Bank with a title “Building competitiveness in African 
agriculture: a guide to value chain concepts and applications," authored by Webber 
and Labaste (2010).  This guidance is a somewhat extended version of the first 
documents released by FIAS. In the FIAS report, the report put weight on the gap 
performance analysis through benchmarking with international best practices. 
Whereas, the second document emphasised the methods and tools to design 
program intervention, implementation and monitoring activities.   
The major difference, between the reports released by UNIDO, ILO and the World 
Bank is the basic concept of value chains. UNIDO and ILO drew the concept from the 
GVC perspective, which referred to the work of Gereffi and affiliated scholars from 
the field of  economic geography, political economy and international economic 
sociology, meanwhile the World Bank report, mainly drew from the business and 
supply chain perspective, very much referred to the work of Porter (1990)  from the 
field of business studies.  
Overall, the multilateral donor agencies have been using the notion of ‘value chains’ 
as a framework of analysis, program design and implementation, as well as 
monitoring and evaluation purposes. However, the translation of value chain 
concept is differently tailored to the mission of each organization.  
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2.4.3.2 Bilateral donor agencies 
Besides the multilateral supported organisations, individual (bilateral) development 
agencies have also adopted the value chains concept for development (Neilson, 
2014). These agencies include the Netherlands Development Organizations, SNV 
(Baan & Janssen, 2006), the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) (Gammage, 2009; Goldmark & Barber, 2005; Kula et al., 2006; Steen, 
Magnani, & Goldmark, 2005; USAID, 2009), and the German Development 
Organization, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (German 
Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), 2008; Stamm, 2004). 
The SNV adopt the Value Chain Approach (VCA) in the context of pro-poor 
development. For SNV, the emphasis of its work was how to leverage linkages, 
strengthen the supporting services and enhance the supporting regulations or 
‘enabling environment’ with the aim to improve inclusion of small scale producers 
and entrepreneurs into global value chains. In this regard, the organization works in 
the area of pro-poor sustainable tourism, forest products and smallholder cash 
crops, mainly in Asia  (Baan & Janssen, 2006).  
USAID employed the VCA to translate its economic growth with poverty reduction 
mission into a practical strategy. For USAID, the capability to combine the ‘economic 
growth’ mission with the ‘poverty alleviation’ purpose was the main advantage of 
using the VCA, as the two purposes had been previously positioned as being in 
conflict (Kula et al., 2006). The USAID therefore published VCA guidance for 
program design and implementation, such as a guide to design and support the 
competitiveness of small-scale firms in a global value chain (Goldmark & Barber, 
2005; Kula et al., 2006); a guide to improve the productivity of MSEs (Micro and 
Small Entreprises) in the agriculture sector that could positively impact poor 
communities by integrating them into global value chains in the agriculture industry 
(Steen et al., 2005); as well as a guide to assess the gender and pro-poor program 
interventions (Gammage, 2009).  
Similarly to USAID, GTZ published a guide to design and implement a VCA for 
development, called ValueLinks manual (German Technical Cooperation Agency 
(GTZ), 2008). The manual was designed to provide guidance for the GTZ 
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implementer, putting a greater analysis towards the upgrading activities as a basis 
for program intervention and formulation. Prior to this manual, two documents 
were published, the concept study on how VCA is imperative towards trade policy 
and promotion of economic development (Stamm, 2004), and a study on how VCA 
is applied in agribusiness development (Humphrey, 2005). Both studies provide a 
thorough analysis of global market challenges, their impact towards poor 
communities, and changing approach of development interventions that emphasise 
broader economic and social dimensions. Thus, this study seems a ground 
foundation for the adoption of VCA by the GTZ and the publishing of ValueLinks 
manual. 
Looking at the major interventions of development agency organizations, the 
application of the VCA for development ranges from improving business climate and 
trade policy (Stamm, 2004; Subramanian et al., 2007), humanizing working 
conditions (Herr & Muzira, 2009), promoting gender equitability (Barrientos, Dolan, 
& Tallontire, 2003; USAID, 2009), facilitating the integration MSEs into global value 
chains (Kaplinsky & Readman, 2001; Kula et al., 2006), and supporting small-scale 
producers in the agricultural sector (Humphrey, 2005; Steen et al., 2005). All of 
these program design and interventions were developed tailored to their 
development strategies supporting economic growth and poverty alleviation in 
developing countries.  
2.5 Theoretical framework of analysis 
This thesis conducts a systematic examination of different upgrading initiatives by 
key players (the state, international development agencies, and lead firms) in the 
global value chain. The examination focuses on the points of intervention and the 
complex interaction between them. The thesis describes how the Indonesian cocoa 
industry is an integrated part of the global value chain for cocoa, and is embedded 
in the institutional framework of the involved chain actors. The aim is to explain 
how different combinations of governance forms and institutional frameworks 
mutually constitute these upgrading measures. 
To guide the writing of this research, a GVC analytical framework that comprises 
several dimensions was employed, include the input-output and territoriality, 
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upgrading concept, governance relationship, and institutional settings . The above 
analytical dimensions guided the data gathering, analysis, as well as the writing of 
this thesis. 
The input-output and territoriality dimension is important to set the scene of the 
three cases being investigated that are discussed in the following chapters. It 
provides descriptive analysis and situated the context of the following cases. It set 
out how the global industry dynamics influence the local industry dynamics.   In 
other words, the dimension guided to describe and situate how the Indonesian 
cocoa industry becomes a part of the global value chain. As such, the data gathered 
from archival records both from government, global institutions, and industry 
associations were very substantial as the source of data analysis.   
The analysis of the upgrading concept has shifted from a single major driver to 
multiple drivers of upgrading. The initial concept of upgrading suggested by Gereffi 
(1999) and Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) put  emphasis on the main role of lead 
firms in driving upgrading processes within the global value chains. Later research 
indicated that the state (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009; Selwyn, 2008), and development 
agencies (Subramanian et al., 2007; United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), 2011) acted as different agents driving upgrading.  This 
research brings those three different upgrading actors, as units of analysis, who are 
doing upgrading interventions in parallel work to support the upgrading process. 
This research, employing the upgrading concept in the GVC, explains what 
interventions have been taken by the state, firms and development agencies to 
promote upgrading in the Indonesia cocoa industry.  
Meanwhile, the institutional setting is generally used by geographers to investigate 
local economic outcomes that are shaped by the interaction of rules (institutional 
environment) and actors (institutional arrangement) in the economy (Martin, 2000). 
This dimension guided the researcher when examining how processes of value chain 
upgrading were facilitated and shaped in practice by the actions of the three 
different sets of development actors. A further examination between the 
interaction of institutional settings and the governance of the GVC was conducted.  
As Neilson and Pritchard (2009) suggested that the causal dimension between the 
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governance and institutional settings  is closely linked to the upgrading concept of 
the GVC.  
Bringing all the above analytical dimensions has helped this study to provide an 
overarching analysis (see Figure 2-1). They have guided the research question on 
how an improved understanding of upgrading processes can be usefully applied to 
ensure appropriate development strategies in developing countries. 
Figure 2–1 The research framework diagram 
    
 
Overall, this research reflects the need to elaborate on the underlying factors that 
drive the decision making of actors or organizations in driving upgrading process.  
Through this research I provide insight on how institutional interests of upgrading 
agents forms institutional settings in the GVC and influence the form of governance 
which in turn shape upgrading’s possibilities along the GVC. Ultimately, this 
research discusses ‘the political economy and rational behind the efforts of the 
three key drivers of upgrading’.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
Many developing countries develop industrial strategies to facilitate export oriented 
economic development. This orientation is expected to enlarge the marketing of 
products from developing countries. But, this raises a number of questions. How 
can firms in developing countries access global markets or developed countries? 
How will participation in the global value chain impact upon producers in the 
developing countries? And how can firms improve their competitiveness in the 
global competition?   
In line with this viewpoint, the upgrading concept in the global value chain offers 
both an analytical framework for understanding economic development and a 
practical approach to devising development strategies. The former mainly debates 
how to provide a framework to better describe potential activities that could 
improve the capability, profitability and competitiveness of firms in developing 
countries, while the latter puts emphasis on how the upgrading concept in the GVC 
could be translated into development strategies for developing countries. In this 
regard, the upgrading concept in the GVC offers two elements of upgrading: the 
economic and social upgrading.  In addition, the framework has also suggested 
three organisational drivers of upgrading activities (firms, the state and 
development agencies), although the implicit agency of these institutional actors 
has not been analysed in sufficient detail. 
With reference to the organisational drivers of upgrading, the most widely-
discussed in the literature emphasises the roles of lead firms as agents for 
upgrading, and consequently development. However, in some case studies, such as 
those presented in the latest section of this chapter, focuses upon the important 
role of the state in providing supporting environments in which to upgrade, and the 
equally important development agencies program in the developing countries is 
also acknowledged. 
This thesis attempts to demonstrate how different agencies drive upgrading 
activities simultaneously, working at the same sector or industry, and how their 
political agency shapes the likelihood of economic and social upgrading actually 
proceeding at various levels. In doing so, a case study of the cocoa industry in 
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Indonesia will be presented as the object of discussion. The main question is how 
the state, development agencies and lead firms, delivered value chain interventions 
to facilitate industrial upgrading and alleviate poverty. Chapters four, five and six 
will discuss these interventions enacted by, and from the perspective of the state, 
development agencies and the lead firm. To understand the context for those 
interventions, however, I will first undertake an analysis of the global value chain for 
Indonesian cocoa in Chapter Three. 
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3 THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS FOR COCOA
 74 
 75 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS FOR COCOA  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the dynamics of the global value chains for cocoa both at the 
global scale as well as at the national level within Indonesia. The primary aim is to 
understand the global dynamics of the cocoa industry; and how they might be 
relevant to upgrading activities in the Indonesian cocoa industry.  
Cocoa is a commodity traded globally. It has a trading value per annual crop of 
US$5.1 billion (World Cocoa Foundation (WCF), 2011), and is of significant value to 
the livelihoods of many poor farmers in some developing countries. The crop is in 
the main produced by approximately five to six million smallholder farmers across 
Africa, Asia and Latin America.  Combined with  the dependents of cocoa farmers, 
the crop provides a livelihood for between forty and fifty million people (WCF, 
2011). 
The major consumers of the product live in the developed countries, mostly in the 
European countries and in North America. The beans are traded by intermediaries 
from the various producing countries in accordance with various rules, regulations 
and trade policies. They are overwhelmingly ground by multinational companies, 
either in countries of origin or in consuming countries, depending on the incentives 
provided by host governments. The dominant use of ground cocoa products is for 
chocolate manufacturing, which is mostly located in the consuming countries. Given 
the interdependence of the various players along the chain, any changes, 
particularly in the global market, inevitably impact upon the smallholder farmers in 
the developing countries. 
This chapter will discuss the global cocoa industry to set up the scene for the 
following chapters’ discussion on cocoa industry upgrading in Indonesia. This 
chapter will identify the dynamics of production, market institutions, transnational 
cocoa players and the cocoa consumption at the global level. For the national 
context, this chapter will discuss the Indonesian practice of farming system, trading 
practices, and grinding activities that are specific to the Indonesian context. 
 76 
 
3.2 The global dynamics of cocoa industry 
3.2.1 Global production dynamics 
Cocoa supply and demand over the last forty years shows that the continued 
increase in both supply and demand has resulted in both cycles of surplus and 
deficit, as shown in Figure 3-1. The constant demand for cocoa from the traditional 
markets in the European and North American regions and the increasing demand 
from the new emerging markets, such as China and Brazil, can still be balanced by 
the continuous expansion of the major producing countries, especially Indonesia, 
the Ivory Coast and Ghana (see Figure 3-2). 
Figure ‎3–1 Global cocoa supply and demand (1960-2013) 
 
Nevertheless, we can identify three main issues shaping dynamics in the global 
cocoa industry:  (1) the increasing fear of future lack of supplies from lead firms in 
the global market, (2) the shifting importance of different producing countries and 
(3) the increasing concentration of producing countries in the African region. 
3.2.1.1 Increasing concern on future supplies 
In recent years, it has become common place for global chocolate manufacturers to 
express their concerns over supply, suggesting that the future threat of supply is 
prominent. Chocolate makers such as Mars Inc and Grinders such as Barry 
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Callebaut, have suggested that due to increased demand in 2013, global 
consumption exceeded by 70,000 tonnes what the world produced. They estimated 
that if the trend in demand continued while the problem in supply persisted, then 
the deficit could reach 1 million metric tons by 2010 and 2 million metric tons by 
2030 (Ferdman, 2014). This suggestion is perhaps unnecessarily alarmist. Figure 3-1 
suggested that supply kept up with demand historically, thus, we could expect it to 
continue (detail discussion in Chapter 6). 
Concerns over future cocoa shortages have been based on serious supply issues in 
some major producing countries over the last ten years, mainly related to declining 
yields due to pests and diseases, social and political unrest and poor returns relative 
to competing commodities.  
In Indonesia, for example, declining yields have become the major issue. Cocoa 
productivity was estimated to have declined from around 1100 kg /ha /year to 430 
kg/ha/year between 1996  and 2013 (FAOSTAT, 2015). This was caused by intense 
pests and diseases infestations, such as the Cocoa Pod Borer (CPB) and Vascular 
Streak Dieback (VSD); and aging cocoa trees.  
In the Ivory Coast and Ghana, besides the increasing prevalence of pests and 
diseases, competition for land for cocoa farms has led to ethnic clashes between 
migrant and indigenous communities (Woods, 2003). The social unrest that 
occurred in the early 2000s for example, resulted in these two most important 
cocoa producing countries recording a decline in production during the 2005/2006 
season i.e., 15.5% in Ivory Coast and 13% in Ghana.   
In Malaysia, formerly an important producing country, the issue was from 
competing commodities in terms of land, labour and other inputs. The country had 
been a major cocoa supplier in the 1980s, but production gradually declined due to 
increasing conversion from cocoa to palm oil.  
Given the above issues, it is not surprising if the global lead firms start flagging 
potential shortages in future supplies. Even though demand and supply are, so far 
relatively balanced, future supply shortages pose a real threat from the perspective 
of the cocoa and chocolate industries.  
Source: ICCO Quarterly Bulletin Volume XXXVII No.1 Cocoa year 2010/11 
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3.2.1.2 Shifting producing countries  
Another interesting dynamic in relation to global supply is the long-term shift away 
from Latin American regions to the West African countries. In a relatively short term 
focus, the rise of several major countries could be related to price triggering.  As of 
the mid 1970s, the world cocoa price was approximately US$ 3000 per tonne, 
triggering an expansion of production across Ivory Coast, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Meanwhile, in the Mid 1980s, new cocoa hybrids succeeded in reviving the Ghana 
production following earlier decline. Up to now, the expansion of cocoa farms has 
continued in the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Indonesia, while Malaysia stopped the 
expansion in the mid-1990s and gradually, but continuously decreased the 
production (Figure 3-2). 
Figure ‎3–2 Production trends in major producing countries (1975-2013) 
 
Based on pattern of global cocoa production viewed over the centuries, some 
scholars discuss this rise and fall of producing countries based on historical patterns   
through the perspective of ‘forest-rents’ and the labour dynamics and the 
consequence of state action or inaction in the particular countries. 
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The ‘Forest rent’ argument was introduced by Ruf (1995), as he indicated that the 
growth of national cocoa production in the cocoa producing countries could be 
explained through the life cycle of cocoa from planting to maturity and aging trees 
using the advantage of rich soil ingredients from the forest land. During the initial 
expansion of cocoa production, farmers enjoyed high productivity and profitability 
due to the humus-rich soil from the forest, and the ingredients were enough to 
support cocoa production. The farmers did not generally require high inputs, such 
as fertilisers, to support the crop during the early stages of production. Continuous 
expansion as new land became available kept up the national production growth. 
Once the land was depleted by diminished forest rent advantage, the cocoa 
production turn into a declining stage. Clarence-Smith and Ruf (1996) describe how 
the shift of cocoa production from the American region to the African region 
occurred through this forest rent argument.  
Generally, the cocoa producing countries rise and fall from one area to another 
following this cycle.  In the sixteenth century, the first region to became an 
important producing country was Central America, followed by Caribbean countries 
such as Trinidad; and, in the eighteenth century, Venezuela became the world’s 
leading cocoa producing country before it suffered decline at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  Subsequently, Ecuador  emerged as the top producer from the 
end of the nineteenth century into the 1920s, before Brazil and the African 
countries took top position when production in Ecuador collapsed (Ruf & Schroth, 
2004, p. 109).   
Leiter and Harding (2004), however, have suggested that explanations of production 
declines need to look beyond this conventional explanation of forest rent theory. 
Based on a study of declines in Trinidad, the largest cocoa producer in the 17th 
century, Brazil in the early 19th century, and in Ghana from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
they argue, using a ‘commodity system analysis’, for the centrality of labour and the 
role of the State in cocoa production decline.  Despite the commonality of requiring 
substantial labour for cocoa production, Leiter and Harding place emphasis on 
labour organisation. In Trinidad and Brazil, cocoa production was the domain of 
large plantations owners, not smallholder farmers. Slave labour in Trinidad and 
exploited labour in Brazil never motivated best practice. Lack of attention to the 
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fields encourages disease through poor pruning, weeding and irrigation practices. In 
the case of Ghana, a state controlled purchasing system suppressed cocoa 
production as the price paid to growers was very low, and this discouraged farm 
maintenance and further planting. The main distinction was the role of the State in 
production decline. In Trinidad, Spain’s monopolistic trade policy led to grower 
uncertainty regarding the business climate, which in turn proved a disincentive to 
produce good quality beans and gradually discouraged production. In Brazil, 
agricultural elites exploited the short-term boom in commodities; as a result, the 
export oriented state no longer placed emphasis on good quality cocoa production. 
In Ghana, the State’s subversion of incentives for smallholder farmers’ was the 
major issue. Price policies were designed only to extract surplus from the sector for 
the benefit of the bureaucrats and the non-agricultural sectors. The Ghana Cocoa 
Board, which was responsible for cocoa marketing and support services to cocoa 
farmers, ostensibly employed 100,000 people among whom one fourth were non-
existent or ‘ghost’ workers (Commander et al., 1989). Furthermore, trading 
company resistance in providing a premium price proved a disincentive to 
producing quality cocoa beans. 
As presented in Figure 3-2, Malaysia demonstrated the ‘boom and bust cycle’ both 
through the perspective of forest rent and through labour dynamics. The rapid 
increase in the early years was due to the advantage of fertile soil and low input and 
labour costs, which started in the mid-1970s up to the late 1980s. Then after almost 
20 years, cocoa production started to fall and continually declined to the level 
where there are currently no indications that it could be revived. The major cause of 
the decline was the high infestation of CPB and the high input cost to control it. 
Even though Ismail and Lee (2004) have suggested a strategy to revive the 
Malaysian cocoa industry, by presenting their case study on the capability of  a 
family of smallholders to manage  up to eight hectare of cocoa farm, this seems 
unlikely. The proposed farm management emphasises appropriate utilization of 
planting technology and farmer own-time allocation to care the farm without hiring 
external labour. The corporate plantations that dominated the Malaysian cocoa 
production, have moreover been converted from cocoa into other profitable crops 
with relatively lower labour requirements, such as palm oil and rubber.   
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Slightly different from the ‘forest rent’ argument, the revival of production in Ghana 
indicates a new pattern that could contribute to the revival of national production 
in other producing countries.  Ghana had initially experienced decline following the 
forest rent scenarios, but gradually revived its national cocoa production (Figure 3-
2). According to Ruf (2007), this revival materialized due to the adoption of new 
fertiliser and the capability of smallholders to change and adapt the productivity 
issues and rebuilding the ‘post forest-rent’. Vigneri (2007) further argued that the 
driver of remarkable growth was a combination of higher fertiliser usage, systematic 
mass spraying program, and subsidised inputs from the government. In this context, 
the state played an important role in reviving cocoa production in Ghana, in 
particular in rebuilding the ‘post forest-rent’. 
Figure ‎3–3 World cocoa production based on ICCO estimates 2013-14 
 
The continuous expansions of production in the Ivory Coast, and the revival of 
Ghana national production, ensure that the two countries are global major 
contributors of cocoa production (Figure 3-3).  On the other hand, the impressive 
growth of Indonesian cocoa production since 1980s, is only replacing the loss from 
Malaysian production. As result, the cocoa production in the Asian region has 
remained steady in recent decades at around 11 per cent of the global supply. 
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In short, production fluctuations across regions are not a new story. However, the 
challenge that lies ahead is; how can global production continue to satisfy world 
market demands. Limited land availability, scarce forest land for extracting forest 
rent for expansion, the availability of labour to maintain production at low cost, 
and, ultimately, the capability of growers to gain a reasonable profit from cocoa 
farming are issues central to cocoa supply. Neilson (2007) argued that maintaining 
the attractiveness of cocoa farming as a profitable business is the essence of cocoa 
supply. Lessons learned from the collapse of cocoa production in several producing 
countries suggests that labour shortages, a low international price, the end of forest 
rent, and the role of the State in cocoa marketing have all resulted in a struggle for 
profit. 
3.2.2 Cocoa market institutions 
Among the producing countries, two basic types of marketing systems are applied. 
The first is free market competition, which allows any buyers, including 
multinational firms, to buy beans at the producers’ level and sell them directly to 
chocolate manufacturers. The second is the Marketing Board system. The state 
controls the marketing chain, and the domestic price is determined by the board, 
thus providing a stable price in the domestic market despite the volatility of the 
international cocoa price.   
A study by Akiyama undertaken in 1997 indicates that the free market system, such 
as is applied in Indonesia, provides higher farm gate prices compared to the 
Marketing Board system then applied in the West African countries. It creates very 
tight competition among buyers, thus enabling farmers to attract higher price offers 
from buyers. On the other hand, the Marketing Board system allows the Board to 
exercise stringent quality controls; therefore, the beans produced in this region are 
recognised as high quality beans that are sold at a premium on the international 
market. 
Over the last two decades, a trend towards liberalisation is evident in the West 
African region, much of which was driven by the Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) of multilateral finance organisations operating under a Washington 
Consensus development model. This trend started in the mid-1980s. In 1986, 
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Nigeria started its liberalisation process with rapid disengagement from the 
commodity boards that controlled the buying and selling of agricultural 
commodities, including cocoa. Cameroon followed the move, starting in the 
1989/90 season and becoming fully dismantled by the 1994/95 season. Then the 
Ivory Coast followed in the 1994/95 season, with full liberalisation reached in 1999. 
In the 1992/93 season, Ghana selectively disengaged from the marketing board 
function, particularly from domestic purchasing activities, allowing licensed private 
players to purchase. However, domestic price, quality control and export activities 
continued to be maintained by the board in Ghana. Since 2001, 30 per cent of the 
volume of eligible companies was allowed to be exported directly (Musselli, 2008).   
Interestingly, according to Fold (2001), the intended positive impact of liberalization 
was to reduce the gap between the international price and domestic prices, by 
eliminating the high cost of state marketing operations. The adjustment program 
was expected to increase the producers’ prices. However, Fold further found that 
the shift towards a free market negatively affected the quality of the beans. One 
immediate example of quality deterioration was the increasing mouldiness at the 
port, a consequence of insufficient drying due to the eagerness of buyers to buy 
beans as quickly as possible in order to secure volume.   
The aggressiveness of buyers seems to have become a feature of liberalised cocoa 
markets. In the Indonesian context, due to the intense competition amongst local 
collectors to buy beans, the local collectors quite often buys beans without proper 
drying. The farmers’ need for quick cash also perpetuates the situation; hence, 
almost all cocoa beans sold by smallholder farmers in Indonesia are not properly 
fermented, or not fermented at all, which would otherwise require around five 
additional days on-farm to be effective. 
On the quality deterioration argument,  Fold (2001)  further argued that the decline 
was not only caused by the structural liberalisation process in West Africa, but also 
by industrial consumers failing to provide incentives for good quality beans. New 
processing technologies and cost savings in the logistical system enabled the 
grinders to compensate for the low-quality beans that were accepted by both local 
traders and exporters. Cocoa was often transported through bulk transportation 
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and placed in flat storage in European Warehouses. New technologies enabled 
some plants to grind their beans before roasting them, reducing the risk of burning 
any small beans or under-roasting relatively large beans. Under this situation, the 
consumers were able to adapt to the low quality of beans. Ultimately, quality 
deterioration resulted in a depreciation of the premium price.  
This situation led to a cycle of low quality production. The low price transmitted to 
African farmers translated into few incentives for the necessary farm maintenance 
(Fold, 2001). Farmers were not receiving a significant share of the export value, and 
so there were few resources available to be invested in farming activities such as 
buying fertilisers and pesticides to control pests and diseases.  
To summarise, the tendency towards market liberalisation, offered an opportunity 
for various market players to source beans directly from cocoa farmers. However, 
dismantling state control, particularly quality control, has led to quality 
deterioration, as evidenced in the West African countries, contrary to the objective 
of liberalisation, which was to improve the price received by cocoa farmers. 
Selective disengagement, aimed at ensuring both the profitability of the farmers 
and the quality control of beans, may have proven a better option to pursue in 
terms of ensuring long-term sustainable global supply. 
3.2.2.1 The International Cocoa Agreement (ICA) 
Efforts to stabilise the market had occurred not only in the domestic market, but 
also in the international arena. At one stage, the majority of producing and 
consuming countries agreed upon these efforts. In 1970, the ICA was signed, with 
the objective of maintaining the cocoa price within a specific range. To execute this 
agreement, the ICCO was established to coordinate global cocoa production and 
defend price bands through a buffer stock mechanism, which included buying and 
selling operations and production control. 
However, three decades after the agreement, the mechanism was not functioning 
sufficiently and effectively to stabilise prices. During the 1970s, there were no 
stocks that could be dropped into the market. In the early 1980s, the ICCO 
purchased all excess supplies and sold them when the prices were considered to be 
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too high. But, in the late 1980s, when the cocoa price declined, the buffer stocks 
met their recommended limit of 250,000 tons (representing roughly six weeks 
demand for grinding). Consequently, price stabilisation was abandoned. Starting in 
the early 1990s, prices were constantly at a low level and the organisations’ stocks 
had accumulated to an unsustainable level (Gilbert, 1996 in Fold, 2001). The 1993 
cocoa agreement dropped the provision for buffer stocks or price range completely  
(Haque, 2004, p. 7). Stocks were released in planned (monthly) sales and all were 
sold by March 1998 (Dand, 1999 in Fold, 2001).  
Two major causes underpinned the  ICAs’ ineffective maintenance of the price band; 
first, lack of adequate financing resulted in ineffective running in the first decade of 
the agreement; and second,  the largest cocoa producers and consuming countries, 
i.e.,  the Ivory Coast and  the US did not join the agreement (Haque, 2004, p. 15). In 
addition, Indonesia, the emerging cocoa producer in the 1980s, was not then a 
member of the organisation. During the decade 1980 to 1990, cocoa production  in 
the country increased dramatically from approximately 13,000 tonnes to 250,000 
tonnes per annum (Ditjenbun, 2011). The international price dropped to its lowest 
level in the early 1990s.  
The ICA of 2001 finally decided against a price stabilisation mechanism. From then 
on the ICCO  increasingly became a “development organisation" rather than a 
“market intervention organisation” (UNCTAD, 2010). The role of the organisation’s 
programs shifted from price guard to development agency. 
3.2.2.2 The terminal market and price fluctuations 
As a consequence of marketing system liberalisation, the cocoa price at the farm 
gate level was mostly determined by a highly fluctuating international price. These  
fluctuations mostly reflected changes in international supply and demand, domestic 
currency, and local market structures and conditions including taxation, 
competition, distance from port and quality (ICCO, 2010, p. 14). 
The importance of the international price of cocoa lay in the fact that it was based 
on a terminal market. Cocoa was traded on a futures market in the London Financial 
Future Exchange (LIFFE) and the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). The daily 
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transactions at the LIFFE and NYBOT were comparable to 0.2 million tonnes, while 
the number of outstanding future contracts was equivalent to 2.5 million tonnes of 
cocoa (ICCO, 2006, p. 4) 
The volatilities of price at these two terminal markets became a source of profit 
taking and counterbalance for financial investors. Speculators who did not produce 
or even use the commodity took risks to make a profit from price changes, while 
hedgers, the other type of market players on the terminal market, invested their 
money in the cocoa commodity as part of an investment portfolio, their aim being 
to avoid a loss on the financial market. Foreign exchange traders shifted from the 
US Dollar to the Pound Sterling and vice versa, in large part expecting returns to 
holding assets. As a result, the behaviour of a large group of investors in the 
financial market intensified price changes both at the LIFFE and NYBOT cocoa 
markets (ICCO, 2006). In this situation, volatility of price became the main way of 
gaining profit.  
Given the fact that the international price constantly fluctuates, it is inevitable that 
cocoa producers face sudden price drops, which impact upon their farming 
profitability. Brown and  Gibson (2006) suggest that better knowledge of market 
prices, future's contracts, and other market-based tools would hedge against 
potential price drops. This could work for producers who manage large-scale cocoa 
plantations. But in the case of smallholder farmers, it is unlikely that this would 
work, due to the lack of knowledge, small scale of business, and a lack of market 
infrastructures. Thousands of farmers lack the vital support they would need. 
Therefore, the constant volatility of the international price is an on-going problem 
for smallholders in producing countries. 
3.2.3 Cocoa Processing and Chocolate Manufacturing dynamics 
3.2.3.1 Global Cocoa Grindings 
Traditionally, cocoa grinding activities had been located in the major chocolate 
consuming countries, and the current top grinding country continues to be the 
Netherlands (see Figure 3-4). The domination of the Netherlands as the major 
grinder was related to the market as well as to the history of cocoa grinding 
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activities. This history dates back to the 18th century, when cocoa extraction tools, 
which converted cocoa beans into cocoa butter and cocoa powder, were invented 
and popularised by C.J. Van Houten in the Netherlands. The proximity of the cocoa 
market along with technological capability, established the Netherlands as the 
major grinding in the European region as well as in the World. 
Figure ‎3–4 Top grinding countries 2013/14 
 
Over the last two decades, the percentage of total grinding occurring in origin 
countries has increased (see figure 3-5).  This trend is caused by the firm-specific 
strategies of multinational grinders combined with trade policy imposed by major 
cocoa producing countries in an attempt to add value to raw cocoa beans before 
export. 
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Figure ‎3–5 Comparison trend between the percentage of origin and non-origin 
grindings 
 
The share of global grind occurring in origin countries has increased while non-origin 
grinding has stagnated, and the share has actually decreased (see Table 3-1).  
Table ‎3-1 Comparative grinding percentage between the year 1996/97 and 2013/14 
among the top origin and non-origin grinding countries. 
Countries 
1996/97 2013/14 
Volume % Volume % 
Origin Countries 
   
  
Ivory Coast 150 6.0 520 12.2 
Ghana 68 2.7 234 5.5 
Indonesia 70 2.8 322 7.5 
Malaysia 95 3.8 259 0.1 
Brazil 180 7.2 240 5.6 
Non Origin Countries 
  
  
Germany 240 9.6 410 9.6 
Netherland 402 16.1 530 12.4 
United States 394 15.8 430 10.1 
Source: ICCO, 2014 
3.2.3.1.1 The strategic decision of transnational primary grinders 
The establishing of grinding facilities in producing countries seems highly dependent 
upon the strategic decisions of the transnational primary processors (Fold, 2001, p. 
418).  The available data published in 2015 indicated that only a few multinational 
companies dominated the global grind, primarily Olam, Cargill, Petra, Barry 
Callebaut and Ecom, approximately ground 60-80% of all global output (Cocoa 
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Barometer, 2015). This concentration has in fact become even greater due to more 
recent acquisitions. 
This high concentration occurred as result of continuous acquisition activities over 
the last three decades, during which the largest traders and processors have 
increasingly integrated their operations to save costs and to expand their business 
scale. Take for example Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and Cargill. Both of these 
companies are involved in the trading business (not only of cocoa but of a wide 
spectrum of grains and other commodities) as well as in processing. ADM started its 
processing business when it took over W.R Grace & Company’s cocoa business 
(Grace Cocoa) in 1997. With 10% of the total semi-finished global output, it became 
the largest cocoa processor worldwide. The company has since significantly 
expanded its cocoa processing and trading activities, including in origin countries. Its 
then competitor, Cargill, has been a major producer of semi-finished cocoa products 
and a significant manufacturer of couverture3 since the 1980s.  In 1987, the 
acquisition by Cargill of the Generela Cocoa Company Holland B.V and its controlled 
companies, including Gerkens Cacao Industre B.V and Fennema B.V. saw the 
company became the leading cocoa processor and supplier to the European market. 
The further acquisition of the Nestlé cocoa processing facilities in York (United 
Kingdom) and Hamburg (German) in 2004 strengthened its position as a leading 
international cocoa processor and supplier (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 22). In Indonesia, 
both companies exist in Makassar and are among the top five cocoa beans 
exporters. The latest acquisition of ADM cocoa by Olam,  a leading agri-business 
operating across the value chains in 65 countries, establishes Olam as one of the top 
three cocoa processors in the world, integrating its cocoa trading  with the grinding 
business in the cocoa industry (Olam, 2014). 
These strategic acquisitions allowed enhanced capitalisation and increased scale. 
The largest processors exercise their scale and scope of business to reduce their 
operational costs in various ways. First, on the technological side, grinders of food 
                                                        
3 Couverture chocolate is a distinction given to chocolate that contains a very high percentage (at least 
30%) of cocoa butter (source: http://candy.about.com/od/candyglossary/g/def_couverture.htm) 
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ingredients (largest processors with a wide spectrum of processing operations) are 
able to utilise advanced technologies associated with their food ingredient business. 
Furthermore, separation of batch production and customised cocoa products again 
requires economies of scale and continued supply in large tonnage. Thus, huge 
capital is requiring supporting the operation. Finally, cost saving is achieved through 
logistical capacity. Instead of using containers, the largest grinders transport beans 
in bulk shipments of between 3,000 and 10,000 tonnes, a change that has 
reinforced the competitive power of the large grinding factories located near water 
fronts (Fold, 2002, p. 237).  
These strategic decisions delivered positive impacts for the big corporations already 
operating globally. On the other side, it also becomes a potential barrier to entry for 
new comers (UNCTAD, 2008), or even could diminish the competitiveness of local 
grinding companies who are not affiliated with global buyers.   
Looking at the context of Indonesia, domestic grinders could potentially be wiped 
out from international competition, due to several advantages enjoyed by 
transnational companies. Another example is the source of cheap finance.  The 
main source of funding for local companies comes from domestic banks, who in 
2015 were being charged a very high interest rate of around 11.25% per annum for 
corporate credit (Bank Ekonomi, 2015). The majority of multinational trading and 
grinding companies, on the other hand, obtain funding from institutional investors. 
Therefore, their cost of capital is very low (with interest accruing at a rate equal to 
an adjusted LIBOR rate plus a spread based on the company’s rating) (UNCTAD, 
2008, p. 20). In line with the above advantages, some of the largest trading 
companies have become leading processors, albeit at the same time driving a 
decline in the number of players in the segment.  
In brief, their capability to operate efficiently and to maximise their scale and scope 
of business has brought huge competitive advantage to the largest cocoa 
processors. This trend was also observed by Cappelle (2008) who stated that the 
growing number of supply agreements negotiated between the large cocoa grinders 
and the branded chocolate companies seems to confirm the trend towards  more 
concentrated players in the field. In this regard, Fold (2001) had already argued that 
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a national strategy to upgrade the cocoa  industry was highly dependent upon 
strategic decisions made by transnational players from the consuming countries. 
3.2.3.1.2 Industrial support through trade policy 
The increasing establishment of cocoa grinding facilities in producing countries was 
only partly explained by corporate restructuring and decisions internal to the 
transnational grinding companies. Importing countries’ trade policies played an 
important role in keeping the grinding activities in consuming countries in previous 
years, while trade policies of exporting countries have attracted transnational 
companies to invest in origin countries.  
In some countries, government policies have favoured the export of value added 
semi-finished products rather than raw cocoa beans (ICCO, 2010, p. 22). This has 
been commonly achieved through an export tax on raw beans.  The Ivory Coast tax 
on the export of cocoa powder (105 FCFA/kg) is less than that on the export of 
cocoa beans (220 FCFA/kg).  The Cocoa Board of Ghana offered the domestic 
grinding companies 20% stimuli in the purchase of smaller cocoa beans, thus 
providing business advantage for domestic processing activities (Cappelle, 2008, p. 
11). In Indonesia, the Ministrial Decree of Finance imposed a progressive export 
tariff based on the international cocoa market, when cocoa price above US$2000, 
tax was applied to export cocoa beans. 
Other stimuli that prompted investment in West African countries included the 
discriminatory import tariff imposed by the European Union (EU) on processed 
cocoa products (see Table 3.2). Major cocoa producers in the West African countries 
benefited from the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the least 
developed countries and the EU. The agreement essentially sanctioned a free trade 
agreement excluding arms (European Comission Trade, 2011). The signatory 
countries now enjoy market access to European markets without observing the 
import tariff applied to other countries. 
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Table ‎3-2 Import tariff imposed by the European Union on cocoa and cocoa 
preparations 
Product EPA Countries 
(Cameroon, Ghana 
and Ivory Coast) 
SPGL Countries 
(Brazil, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Nigeria) 
Third Countries 
(Ecuador) 
Cocoa beans 0% 0% 0% 
Cocoa butter 0% 4.2% 7.7% 
Cocoa paste 0% 6.2% 9.6% 
Cocoa powder 0% 2.8% 8.0% 
(Source: ICCO quarterly bulletin 2007/08 and Oxfam international research report (2008) “towards a 
sustainable cocoa chain”, as in (Tropical Commodity Coalition (TCC), 2009, p. 8)) 
As a result of its failure to sign an EPA, Nigerian cocoa processing faces unequal 
competition with its neighbouring countries; the import tariffs for the processed 
products lower the price received from buyers in the EU. In case of the butter 
products, for example, Nigerian processors’ receive only $5,840 per tonne while 
competitors who have signed EPAs receive $6,100 (Boyle, 2008). 
Evidence from the West African countries suggests that trade policy is promoting 
both incentive and disincentive for origin grindings. The duty free enjoyed by the 
EPA countries provides significant comparative advantage to non EPAs. Trade policy, 
whether it be export taxes in producing countries or import tariff imposed by 
importers such as the EU provides favourable choices for transnational companies 
to install processing facilities in the major producing countries in West Africa. 
3.2.3.2 Global Chocolate manufacturing 
As a response to increasing international competition, the outsourcing of parts of 
production has become a trend in chocolate manufacturing. Nestlé, Mars, Hershey, 
Cadbury, Kraft Jacobs Suchard, Ferrero and Cemoi used to be more highly 
integrated in upstream activities such as cocoa grinding. Currently, the majority 
have sold off their grinding operations to focus on their core activities. While most 
of the couverture is still produced internally for their own use, there is a trend to 
contract it to other suppliers as well. Even the production of finished products is 
outsourced to specialised suppliers (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 25). This trend represents a 
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shift from manufacturing raw materials to areas that define their selling points, such 
as branding, marketing and product innovation.  
In the interest of securing competition in both traditional and emerging markets, all 
of the major international manufacturers’ continuously develop global chocolate 
brands. Mars, for example, has  actively developed a tailored product based on 
specific local preferences with a global brand, such as Cocoavia brand  for health 
conscious customers in the US market (Mars, 2014a). Hershey has focused more 
upon the traditional American market, producing chocolate with a specific American 
flavour. Cadbury (now owned by Mondelez) has strengthened its presence in the 
USA, Australia and New Zealand, while at the same time expanding its market to the 
new emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(Tropical Commodity Coalition (TCC), 2009, p. 12). 
The tendency to open production facilities in several emerging markets suggests 
that international companies favour establishing manufacturing facilities in close 
proximity to end consumers. This could prove a good lesson for several producing 
countries, wherein the national strategy of the domestic industry is to move 
towards the manufacturing process. As regards Indonesia, in the event that the 
Indonesian people’s incomes increase, they may start eating more chocolate, and by 
extension, attract various multinational companies to install manufacturing 
facilities.  
Another factor that drives outsourcing is the capability to process low quality beans. 
Inferior quality requires flexible plants: grinding plants owned by chocolate 
manufacturers (particularly in Europe) are relatively fixed plants. On the other hand, 
dominant international grinders have advanced flexible equipment that allows them 
to process low quality beans (Fold, 2005, p. 232). From a business point of view, 
outsourcing seems a better choice. The capacity of businesses may increase without 
the need to invest in a new factory to meet the increasing demand of semi-
processed cocoa products.  
Notwithstanding these broad trends, a limited number of chocolate manufacturers 
are still sourcing raw materials from producing countries and continue to produce 
cocoa liquor for use in specific branded products. It may be that in order to protect 
 94 
 
recipes, cocoa processing may be kept in-house in some circumstances (Fold, 2001, 
p. 409). For example, Cadbury considers the flavour of cocoa from Ghana very 
important to their distinctive taste of Cadbury’s chocolate, at least for the chocolate 
sold on the major commonwealth countries, which is very familiar to their 
traditional consumers in the United Kingdom and in former overseas territories such 
as South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. For this reason, specific cocoa was still 
being purchased and transported in a specially designed bag to factories in the UK in 
2000 (Fold, 2001, p. 409). Another example is the Mars operation in Makassar, 
South Sulawesi, Indonesia, where Mars purchased a certain amount of special 
Sulawesi cocoa with specific post-harvest treatment at the farmers’ level. Wet 
beans were purchased from farmers, then washed in the villages before being 
ground in the Makassar factory or in other facilities. Thus, specific beans are 
processed in particular ways to produce ingredients for functional foods and health 
products.  
Besides outsourcing their low margin grinding operations, big manufacturers are 
increasingly taking over other chocolate producers. The take-over is a responsive 
move to the changing consumer markets, which are characterised by ‘the aging of 
traditional chocolate consumers, increasing health consciousness, and a trend 
towards functional foods’ (Fold & Neilson, 2016, p. 202). During the period 1970 to 
1990, more than 200 take overs occurred globally (Fold, 2001, p. 408), which saw a 
few players only grow in size and significance.  The takeover of Cadbury by Kraft 
(now known as Mondelez) in 2010 meant that only five companies produced almost  
50% of the entire confectionary market (TCC, 2010).  The top two producers are 
Kraft (14.9%)  and Mars (14.5%), followed by Nestlé (7.9%), Hershey (4.6%) and 
Ferrero (4.5%) (TCC, 2010, p. 5). This trend has seen a decline in the number of 
players who dominate the global market. 
The trend of chocolate manufacturers towards outsourcing part of their production 
provides an opportunity for suppliers to take over certain functions, particularly the 
processing operation.  
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3.2.4 Cocoa consumption and ethical consumer demand 
3.2.4.1 Global cocoa and chocolate consumption 
Attempts to trace the end consumers of cocoa products have proven somewhat 
complex due to the variety of final products into which cocoa is an ingredient. The 
final product of cocoa is mainly consumed in the form of chocolate confectionary, 
chocolate-coated products (biscuits, ice creams), or other food products containing 
cocoa powder, including beverages, cakes and snacks. A certain amount of cocoa 
butter is also used in cosmetic products (ICCO, 2010, p. 23).   
Some countries, which import cocoa beans for grinding domestically also import 
final chocolate products. Therefore, in order to measure actual cocoa consumption 
by country, the surest way is to calculate total grindings plus net imports of cocoa, 
chocolate and chocolate products, in bean equivalent terms. It is difficult to 
calculate total consumption, particularly of, for example, butter, when it is an 
ingredient of both imported foods and cosmetics, it does not fall into the chocolate 
product's category. The total consumption of cocoa, therefore, may not be in line 
with the total chocolate confectionary consumption (ICCO, 2010). 
Based on data from the (ICCO, 2012), an interesting fact from the global cocoa 
consumption indicated that traditional cocoa consumer regions have been declining 
in terms of their global share. Even though the European region retains the highest 
share of the global consumption, within ten years the share has declined from 51% 
in the 2002/03 season, to 48 % in the 2010/11 season. The American region also 
declined its share of global consumption from 34% to 33% in the same period. On 
the other side, the non-traditional region, slowly increased their share of global 
cocoa consumption. The Asian region for example, increased its share from 13% to 
15%, and Africa from to two per cent to three per cent (ICCO, 2012).  The increasing 
share of non-traditional cocoa consumption regions has been mainly due to the 
increasing demand of food products and beverage products containing cocoa 
powder, in addition to the increasing chocolate demand from emerging economies 
in the regions (ICCO, 2012).  
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In the chocolate market in the Asian region, China is the most dynamic and 
potentially lucrative market. The chocolate market in the country is experiencing 
high growth due to the increasing middle class of more than 300 million people.  
The current annual chocolate consumption is only around 100 grams per person 
compare to the Western Europeans average of 8 kilograms (Nieburg, 2013).  
In short, the emerging economies in the Asian and African regions have initiated 
new share compositions of global cocoa consumption. This trend could create 
opportunities for chocolate companies but also signals more fierce competition 
among the global players in the global value chains for cocoa. 
3.2.4.2 Ethical demands of consumers  
Increasing consumer demand for ethical products, particularly related to the 
wellbeing of producers, labour and environments has underpinned the requirement 
to source cocoa in a sustainable manner. Among issues related to cocoa production 
in rural areas, are the exploitation of child labour, the difficulty of gaining a decent 
income from cocoa farming, encroachment on forests and the wide usage of 
chemical inputs have generated environmental risk. 
In this regard, intense debate has erupted over who should be responsible for the 
ethical sourcing that occurs between chocolate manufacturers and transnational 
grinders. Chocolate companies maintain that grinders, who buy cocoa directly from 
producers, should start paying attention to the above issues, as they are directly in 
touch with the producers. Some manufacturers have imposed conditions banning 
the use of child labour in their supply contracts. The grinder on the other hand, 
keep stressing the strong power of the chocolate companies in the industry, urging 
the cocoa processors to keep their costs as low as possible (Cappelle, 2008, p. 18). 
However, compliance with cocoa certification, one of the instruments that support 
sustainable cocoa production, has become a new trend. In 2009, Mars announced 
that by 2020 it will have 100% certified cocoa, an estimated around 350,000 tonnes. 
Recent report shows that Kraft has certified around 50,000 tonnes (11,4%), Nestle 
around 30,000 tonnes (8,3%), and Mars 100,000 tonnes (28.6%) in 2012 (Cocoa 
Barometer, 2015). Fairtrade, Organic Certification, Rainforest Alliance, and UTZ are 
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among the most popular certification schemes involved in this trend. These various 
certification approaches, besides addressing consumers’ concerns regarding poor 
people and the environment, will in addition secure business interests by improving 
quality, production and corporate brand reputations.  
The challenge ahead for certification is how to impose it to actors in the value 
chains without burdening the cost to smallholder farmers.  The requirements to 
comply with the social, environmental and economic bring various indicators of 
measures that exacerbate complexity. The preparation, setting up internal control 
system and audits are costly, especially for the smallholder farmers. In addition, 
each system has its own certification cost, it represents a further burden for 
smallholder farmers.  Therefore, the challenge ahead is how to simplify the 
indicators (TCC, 2010, p. 20) and reduce the burden of certification costs, 
particularly for the smallholder farmers. 
3.3 The Value Chain for Indonesian cocoa 
Farming, trading and grinding cocoa beans are the major value chain activities in 
Indonesia. In this context, the following discussion will describe more detail about 
how the value chains activities are run by cocoa actors in Indonesia. 
3.3.1 The farming System  
Originally, the cocoa tree was an understory forest tree; but, currently it is 
cultivated in various farming systems, ranging from primary to secondary forest 
under the shade of other trees through to a monoculture system with full sun cocoa 
production.  In some areas in Indonesia, it’s very rare to find a complete 
monoculture system with full sun cocoa production. In Sulawesi for example, the 
SRTA survey found cocoa trees to be intercropped with at least one or two other 
types of trees, either fruit trees or shade trees with less density. While in Papua, 
more trees were intercropped with cocoa trees, and in many cases indigenous 
Papuan farmers did subsistence horticulture farming in the same cocoa plots. 
Each farming system has its own advantages and disadvantages. Shaded cocoa, 
which is often associated with preserving biodiversity, low agricultural input, and 
fewer weeds, is productive for many decades. While full sun cocoa production is 
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able to provide better yields and increase economic benefit for farmers in the short 
term, it is associated with high fertilizing and chemical inputs. Thus, in the long 
term, it stresses the trees, making them more susceptible to pests and diseases 
(Franzen & Borgerhoff Mulder, 2007; Obiri, Bright, McDonald, Anglaaere, & 
Cobbina, 2007; Ruf & Schroth, 2004; Shapiro & Rosenquist, 2004).  
The optimum rotation age of the cocoa tree (ie. requires replanting) varies in 
accordance with the system applied. A financial analysis of shaded cocoa in Ghana 
suggests that for the traditional variety of cocoa, produced using traditional farming 
practices (agroforestry system), the economic rotation age is 44 years. while the 
economic rotation age for unshaded hybrid cocoa is only 18 years, and 29 years for 
hybrid cocoa grown under shade (Obiri et al., 2007, p. 148).  
In long periods of low prices, cocoa growers find it difficult to maintain production. 
While smallholders are usually able to maintain their cocoa farms, maintenance and 
harvesting activities tend to be afforded low priority. Many large estate plantations 
have responded to low prices by converting their farms into alternative profitable 
commodities (Fold, 2001, p. 412),  such as is the case of cocoa plantations that had 
been converted into oil palm in Malaysia. On the other side, smallholder farmers are 
able to maintain production, as they do not need to recruit external labour. Family 
labour can cope with small-sized farms such as those  in West Africa (3-5 hectares) 
(TCC, 2011), and Indonesia (0.5-5 hectares)4. In comparison, large plantations, such 
as those mainly found in Brazil, range between 10 and 100 hectares (Haque, 2004, 
p. 3). 
Over the last decades, smallholder cocoa farms have grown rapidly across 
Indonesia. Based on the data released by the Directorate General of Estate Crops 
(2011), in 1980, smallholders farmers contributed only around 10 percent of total 
cocoa output; but, within three decades, the share increased to 92 percent of total 
Indonesia cocoa production. In terms of total area, the smallholders planted cocoa 
                                                        
4
 The survey was the Survey Rumah Tangga ACIAR (SRTA)- An ACIAR household survey 
Collaboratively conducted by the University of Sydney and BPTP and funded by ACIAR, my main 
role at this research is to analyse research data gathered from the field survey.  
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over an area of 13 thousand hectares in 1980: this figure grew to 1.4 million 
hectares over the next three decades (Barani, 2010). Latest data released by the 
Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board in 2015 shows that the total cocoa 
production areas in Indonesia has achieved 1.6 million across 29 provinces, and 
Sulawesi Island itself contributes approximately 60 per cent of the total Indonesian 
production. West Papua as the potential expansion areas only represents 1.4 per 
cent of the national production areas (Figure 3-6). 
Figure ‎3–6 Major cocoa producing areas in Indonesia 
 
Despite the fact that Indonesian smallholders’ cocoa production grew remarkably 
over the last thirty years, cocoa farm productivity is in decline (Figure 3-7). The Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), based on data supplied by the Government of 
Indonesia, suggests a yield drop of around 50%  between 2006 and  2013 (See figure 
3-7). 
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Figure ‎3–7 Indonesian cocoa productivity in the period 2000-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I will now take a closer look at the island of Sulawesi, the major producing island, 
and in Papua, which has enormous potential for future cocoa expansion. The SRTA 
survey in 2009 showed the productivity of cocoa farms in the main producing 
districts in Sulawesi and West Papua tended to be below the reported national 
average. For example, productivity in the major producing districts, e.g., Polman in 
West Sulawesi, North Luwu in South Sulawesi and North Kolaka in South East 
Sulawesi, was 290 kg, 351 kg and 640 kg respectively (Jeff Neilson, Palinrungi, 
Muhammad, & Fauziah, 2011).  In Manokwari, West Papua, considered a potentially 
new area for cocoa expansion, the SRTA survey found that the average productivity 
was slightly below the national average, at 761 kg per ha per year. Based on the 
observation from the field, the productivity decline was caused by two main factors, 
the aging trees and high infestation of pets and diseases. 
3.3.1.2 Aging trees 
The decline in cocoa farm productivity is hardly surprising given that the majority of 
cocoa trees are aging. They were mostly planted in the 1980s; so, when this 
research was conducted, the average age of a cocoa tree was between 20-30 years. 
Thus, they are entering a period of decline stage in the cocoa life cycle.  
The productive stage, as explained by Ruf and Yoddang (2001), is followed by the 
gradual decline of ‘forest rent’. As the majority of cocoa farms were initially forest 
areas, they contain rich soils, and low pest and disease infestation. As the cocoa 
tree grows, the soil ingredients gradually decrease and require more fertilizer to 
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cover the need for production. At the same time, the numbers of pests and diseases 
grow, infesting the cocoa farms.  
This research found that the majority of the cocoa trees planted in the main cocoa-
producing district in Sulawesi have entered the declining stage.  For example, 
regarding the aging trees, approximately 30 per cent in Polman, West Sulawesi, 41 
per cent in North Luwu districts, South Sulawesi, and 69 per cent in North Kolaka 
South East Sulawesi, are above 15 years old; in other words, they require high 
maintenance as they are in the declining productivity stage. 
3.3.1.2 Pests and diseases 
Pest and disease infestations are among the major causes of productivity and 
quality decline. The SRTA survey shows that there are four pests and diseases that 
generally infect cocoa farms in the major cocoa-producing districts in Sulawesi: CPB, 
VSD, Stem cancer and black pods. All of these pests and disease cause major 
problems for cocoa production.  
CPB infestation has been a major concern for cocoa stakeholders in Indonesia. In 
the mid-1990s, Akiyama dan Nishio (1997) saw CPB as a major threat to the future 
Indonesian cocoa industry. In the early 1990s, CPB was identified in central 
Sulawesi, Maluku and Kalimantan; by 2000, the pest has spread throughout all of 
the cocoa-producing areas in Indonesia. The SRTA survey found that in three major 
sites i.e., Polman in West Sulawesi, North Luwu in South Sulawesi, and North Kolaka 
in South East Sulawesi, almost 50 per cent of farmers in each district saw that CPB 
as the major threat to their farming activities.  
Yield losses caused by CPB  infestations in 2005, as reported by researchers from 
the Indonesian Coffee and  Cocoa Research Indonesia (Wairatta, 2007), are shown 
in Table 3-3, which suggests they were significant.  
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Table ‎3-3 Pest and diseases yield losses due to CPB 
Locations Infestation (%) Yield loss (%) 
Berambai,East Kalimantan 95.2 61.3 
NTT 87.74 50.9 
West Sumatera  94.1 58 
Ladongi, South East Sulawesi 95.03 69.56 
Kolaka, South East Sulawesi 95.87 56.24 
Jembrana,Bali 77.29 48.43 
Asahan, North Sumatera 67.35 29.4 
Source: Wairatta, 2007   
 
CPB decreases the yield of cocoa by taking the nutrition of the beans as their feed.  
The cocoa beans’ nutrition is in the pulp and placenta that surrounds the beans 
inside the cocoa pods. When the growth of beans is not fully developed, they 
become small and flat and ripen prematurely (Abdoellah, Sulistyowati, & 
Wiryadiputra, 2006). Consequently, only small part of the beans can be sold; the 
rests remain flat and are difficult to separate, and fall into the waste category. It 
came as a surprise when the World Bank (2005) estimated that due to CPB 
infestation, production losses in 2005 totalled approximately 240,000 tons of dry 
bean valued at $250 million USD.  
In sum, cocoa farming systems in Indonesia range from low density to high density 
intercropping, with a general tendency towards higher-input, more cocoa intense 
systems. In comparison with the larger plantations, smallholders are more resilient, 
particularly in maintaining cocoa farms during lower prices. This is primarily due to 
the advantages of family labour. However, the aging trees, rampant pest and 
disease infestations have impacted productivity, which has become a real threat for 
smallholder cocoa production in Indonesia. 
3.3.2 The trading practices 
An important aspect of trading practices is to standardise cocoa beans under the 
Indonesian national cocoa standard (SNI). Moisture, bean counts and waste level 
are the three major quality indicators used, where traders “add value” into the 
beans through ensuring that quality standards are met.  
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Cocoa actors involved at this stage of the value chain range from village collectors, 
as lower hierarchy players in the supply chain, up to large traders and exporters.  In 
Indonesia, some village collectors act individually and some others are part of 
multinational traders’ network. The collectors usually buy cocoa beans from 
farmers, by visiting the farmers (home or drying site) and buying cocoa beans 
directly in the village (usually in small amounts). Once up to about a tonne of beans 
are accumulated, this allows hiring a mini truck, and the local collectors sell it to 
larger traders in the district level. The last journey for the beans involves being 
transported to an exporters' warehouse or processor, usually located in a provincial 
city, such as Makassar. 
In relation to the moisture level, in many cases, cocoa beans supplied by farmers are 
not fully dried at the required at 7% moisture level. Therefore, local collectors and 
traders at the district level perform further drying to achieve the standard level. 
Even if it is not very often, exporters also conduct drying, particularly in the rainy 
season and harvest season.  This is the first stage when traders start discounting the 
cocoa price they pay, such that it becomes an area of ‘profit taking’ due to the 
unmet moisture level requirements.  
The second activity is sorting and grading, which is commonly performed by traders 
and exporters.  During this activity, a combined grader machine and wind blower is 
utilized to separate beans from waste, and to divide between small and large beans. 
These are then put into a standardized bag (62.5 kg jute sacks) and categorized as 
ready to export beans. Those sorted beans are mixed to meet the maximum bean 
count of 110 beans per 100 grams, and waste is standardized to meet the 2.5% 
waste level.   This is another important stage for the traders to maximize profit 
margin. Almost all traders are doing the mixing strategy; small and large beans 
coming from different suppliers are combined to achieve the minimum bean count 
standard. Meanwhile, the waste level is maintained at the rigid point of 2.5% to 
maximize profits.  
It is important to note that the cocoa-trading activity in Indonesia is an open 
market. Consequently, the farm gate price is based on the New York Board of 
Terminal (NYBOT) market and international buyers maintain a presence ‘up-country’ 
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within the cocoa producing districts themselves. The existence of the international 
buyers ‘up-country’ is either by establishing buying stations or by upgrading their 
local supplier as an extended branch. The differential price or the amount of 
deduction from NYBOT is a daily reference between one trader to another. A rough 
calculation from an ASKINDO member indicates that the local collectors gain higher 
margins (7-13%), followed by district traders, including international buyers at 
district level (8-8.5%) and lastly, the buyers in Makassar, which includes big traders 
and exporters (2-6%). This is commensurate with the increasing importance of large 
volume turnover as the cocoa moves downstream.  
Overall, the main activities and treatment along this part of the trading chain (local 
collectors, district traders, and exporters) is to ensure the quality of cocoa beans 
meet quality standards in the international market. Therefore, quality control is 
performed mainly through grading and drying activities not only to safeguard that 
the beans are qualified and acceptable in the processing factory, but also to ensure 
that profit margin is carefully maximized through meeting the minimum 
requirement of export standard. 
3.3.3 The grinding activities 
Cocoa bean processing is a value added activity involving bean cleaning, roasting, 
winnowing, grinding the cocoa nibs, cocoa pressing, milling cocoa cake and 
alkalising. Butter, as a final product and the main valuable content extracted from 
the beans, is used as the main ingredient in chocolate making, confectionary, and 
the baking industry.  Besides butter, this process also yields cocoa cake, a residue 
containing fat ranging from 10% to 22% (Beckett, 2000). The cake is sold on the 
generic cocoa market for further milling to produce cocoa powder (Musselli, 2008, 
p. 7), which is commonly used for drinking chocolate and as a cake ingredient.  
In this processing stage, profit maximisation occurs  three ways; first, processing 
efficiency . The price of both raw materials (the beans) and outputs (cocoa butter) is 
essentially determined by the world market, i.e., by the NYBOT.  A grinder can 
choose where to sell their product but market determines the price. Second, 
product-loss minimization. This is particularly important at the winnowing stage, 
when nibs are potentially lost when they stick to the shell and are thrown away 
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during the process. For example, this occurs when a factory estimates the value 
content of beans at 84% before processing, but the result is only 80%.  In such 
cases, there is a 4% loss of nibs, a valuable part of the beans (Yusianto, T.Wahyudi, 
& Sulistyowati, 2008, p. 254). Third, producing marketable cocoa powder. Cocoa 
powder is a less generic commodity. Thus, it needs good international marketing 
capabilities to achieve a good market and price. It is important to note that end 
users value colour and flavour; so, at this point, the fermented beans (raw material) 
and alkalisation have their role to play. Generally, it is estimated that the margin 
acquired from this business ranges from 8-17%, depending on the factors as 
identified above. In fact, the most challenging aspect for the Indonesian grinders is 
the sale of cocoa powder. Since the majority of Indonesian beans are not 
fermented, than the cocoa flavour expected to come out from the cocoa powder is 
not as strong as fermented cocoa.  
Yields derived from the grinding vary depending upon the quality of raw material. In 
the case of Indonesian cocoa beans, an industry source calculated that one tonne of 
beans processed in a factory produced 33% of cocoa butter and 44% of cocoa 
powder. Other materials, which are generally considered as waste, consist of 12% 
shell, 6% water, and 5% of other non-bean material. When beans are severely 
infected by pests and diseases, the yield is lower. The end outcome is that the 
profitability of a factory is affected. 
In sum, cocoa processing is a very competitive, value adding business. Staying 
competitive in the business internally requires highly competent human resources, 
for buying high quality inputs, running the factory as efficiently as possible, 
developing marketable products, and, seeking and maintaining relationships with 
buyers in the international market. In this regard, having strong linkages with 
international buyers or operating a grinding factory in Indonesia as part of a parent 
company operating globally, would be an advantage, as international companies 
may have superior marketing capabilities. 
  
 106 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to explicate the general issues on the Global Value 
Chain for cocoa both at the global level and at the national level. The main objective 
of this chapter has been to discuss the general issues that drive the global dynamics 
of cocoa industry and to present the local context of major Indonesian cocoa 
industry activities, mainly the farming, trading and grinding operations and the 
issues that surround those operations. 
Section 3.2 discussed and laid out the scene of the global dynamics of the cocoa 
industry ranging from production, market institutions, the restructuring of global 
grinders, and the trend of global cocoa consumption. In the global production, this 
chapter discussed more detail on how production has shifted from one region to 
another, and how particular countries have risen and fallen such that eventually the 
concentration of cocoa production is now in the African region. In the market 
institutions, this chapter discussed how the global market was initially set up to be 
regulated, but has become increasingly loose and liberalised. The impact of 
liberalisation that resulted negative impact on the quality of cocoa beans in the 
West African countries was also discussed. This sub section further discussed the 
increasing trend of origin grindings, which was mainly driven by the strategic 
decision of transnational companies as well as the trade policy imposed by nation 
states. Finally, the sub-section discussed global cocoa consumption, which is still 
dominated by the traditional Northern markets. New increasing global consumption 
trends from emerging countries such as China was also discussed to flag the 
potential future demand of cocoa in the global market. 
Section 3.3 Discussed the Indonesian context of value adding activities, which was 
mainly dominated by farming, trading and grinding activities. In the farming 
activities, the sub section discussed the smallholder farming activities in Indonesia, 
situating the discussion in the context of the growth of smallholder farming over the 
last three decades and the productivity decline over the last ten years. Issues of 
aging trees and high infestation of pest and disease were identified as major causes 
of the decline. The following sub-section discussed the trading practices in 
Indonesia; and how traders derived profit margins from their mixing strategy and 
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discounted price for wet beans. The last sub-section discussed how domestic cocoa 
grinders operated to stay competitive amidst very tight competition. Areas of 
efficiency and potential loss from the operation were identified and discussed to 
provide a general picture of the value adding activities.  
In summary, this chapter laid out the scene for the global value chain for cocoa at 
the global and national levels. The global dynamics in the production, markets, and 
institutional settings are flagged to provide a nuanced understanding of how it 
might or could impact the efforts of upgrading in the Indonesian context, at the 
same time discussing some important features of the Indonesian farming, trading 
and grinding  issues. 
Finally, this chapter is a precursor to a more detailed discussion of the Global Value 
Chain dimensions of the cocoa industry in Indonesia. Interaction between 
governance of the chain, institutional settings and upgrading activities will be 
discussed in the following three chapters. These dimensions are presented under 
specific topics emphasising the national debate surrounding the state (Chapter 4), 
the Development agencies (Chapter 5), and lead firms’ role (Chapter 6) in driving 
upgrading in the Indonesian cocoa industry.  
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4 STATE DRIVEN UPGRADING 
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CHAPTER 4: STATE DRIVEN UPGRADING  
4.1 Introduction 
In the GVC literature, it is widely suggested that if the business actors in the 
developing countries are to engage in upgrading, the actors need to position 
themselves advantageously within the global value chain (Gereffi, 1999; Gibbon, 
2001; Kaplinsky & Readman, 2001). Within this context, incorporating an 
understanding of the global value chain is very important not only for business 
actors, but for policy makers within the government as well. The question remains 
therefore: has the government incorporated an understanding of the global value 
chain in its programs and policies approach? 
From the year 2000 onwards, sustaining the growth of cocoa production and value 
adding activities have been major issues for the Government of Indonesia, industry 
associations, and often Development Agencies. In the late 1990s, smallholder cocoa 
farms experienced a period of declining productivity, particularly for cocoa farms 
that were planted in the early 1980s. Other actors in the value chain, for example 
cocoa processors, have demanded government intervention to regulate the trading 
of cocoa beans that would support domestic value-adding activities. The central 
question for the government is: how can cocoa industry development in Indonesia 
continue to develop and produce maximum benefit for all actors within the chain? 
In this chapter, the central focus is on the ways in which the government has 
shaped programs and policies in order to support upgrading amongst both 
smallholders and processors. I argue that not only has the state played an important 
role in promoting upgrading, but that it continues to perform a contributing role in 
shaping cocoa upgrading in Indonesia.  
Contemporary cocoa industry policies and programs in Indonesia have been moving 
away from a market competitive and hands-off policy towards hands-on policy that 
increases the government’s role in upgrading activities of Indonesia’s cocoa 
processors. This is particularly the case with regards to marketing and trading of 
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cocoa in Indonesia. The chapter examines the following set of closely related 
questions. What factors have driven the increasing state involvement in supporting 
production upgrading? What factors influence the shift of policy in the areas of 
marketing and trading? How are programs and policies being shaped and developed 
by the government? What has been the impact of the increasing number of state 
programs and policies on the various actors within the value chain? The overall aim 
of the chapter is to understand the role performed by the state, and its 
effectiveness in achieving its purported objectives. In order to achieve this aim, it is 
first necessary to understand some of the key features of the contemporary 
Indonesian state. In the following section, I will concisely delineate how the 
Indonesian state has been transformed from an authoritarian regime into a more 
constrained actor operating within a relatively democratic political system. This is 
followed by close examination of institutional settings and the socio-political 
aspects of the upgrading process. 
4.2 The Indonesian state 
Indonesian economic development has been marked by an historical transition from 
an authoritarian regime to a democratic and decentralized country. Throughout this 
political transition, a predatory oligarchy, marked by rent-seeking behaviour and 
extractive institutions, has continued to operate in Indonesia, effectively co-opting 
the new political system.  
4.2.1 Democratization and decentralization 
The economic crisis of 1997 was the historical marker for Indonesian democratic 
development. Less than one year after the crisis commenced, Soeharto, who had 
been the country’s authoritarian president for the preceding three decades, 
stepped down from the presidency.  
That moment witnessed the beginnings of a political shift from authoritarian to a 
mostly democratized political system within the next seven years. During this 
transition process, Indonesians had to contend with changes in the highly political 
presidential dynamics. But, they were fully committed to democratization of their 
  113 
country. President Habibie, in his role of transitional president, reified the 
democratic process by conducting a democratic general election in only one year 
after his appointment in 1999. Another milestone was the direct presidential 
election delivered by President Megawati in 2004: she was subsequently defeated 
by Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who continued the democratic process by 
successfully safe guarding a series of elections for regional heads of local 
governments including governors, majors, and regents (Ananta & Riyanto, 2006). 
The changes in the political system to a more democratic electoral system was 
accompanied by the transfer of authority from the central government to local 
governments that had been mandated by the parliament in 1999. The laws 
mandated the decentralisation of government authority and fiscal policies. This 
gave local governments much more power, i.e., stronger and wider authority in 
almost all fields with the exception of foreign policy, security and defence, justice, 
fiscal and monitory policies, and religion. At the same time, regional parliaments’ 
power became stronger as well. They now had the authority to replace regents 
(Ananta & Riyanto, 2006). 
4.2.2 The re-emergence of predatory capitalism 
Democratization and decentralization in Indonesia, however, has emerged without 
significantly altering some of the underlying rent seeking institutions. The 
democratic system in Indonesia does not completely eliminate ‘the patron-client 
relationship’, which remains strong (Soesastro & Basri, 2005, p. 10). According to 
Robinson and Hadiz (2005), the existing democratic system employed by the 
Indonesian state tolerates business players and politicians forming alliances which, 
backed by parliamentary forces, compete to attain control of state institutions. And, 
in many cases, these alliances work to consolidate authoritarian politics and 
predatory economic relationships. 
Democratization and decentralization, together with the strong relationships 
between business players and parties, or patron client-relationships, have facilitated 
the ‘reorganization of the old predatory power relations within a new system of 
parties, parliaments and elections that has been the central dynamic of politics in 
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the post-Suharto era’ (Robinson & Hadiz, 2005, p. 231). Thus, it is not surprising that 
within the current system, various interest groups have emerged to organize 
lobbying and trade protection (Soesastro & Basri, 2005). These groups are 
associated with bestowing privileges for particular groups of people (Ananta & 
Riyanto, 2006). 
A pivotal point here is the increasing importance of the socio-political 
understanding of the economic development process in Indonesia (Ananta & 
Riyanto, 2006). The mutual relationships between bureaucrats, politicians and 
business players or oligarchies that defined predatory capitalism and characterized 
the legacy of the authoritarian regime, have continued to re-emerge within the 
current political context in Indonesia (Robison & Hadiz, 2005). This reality signifies 
the importance of examining the institutional and socio-political aspects of the 
economic development context. 
The upgrading activities pertinent to Indonesia’s cocoa industry, which are 
discussed in the following sections, put strong emphasis on how these institutional 
settings shaped state-driven upgrading. I will further discuss this issue in section 4.4. 
4.3 State upgrading activities 
Over the last three decades, the Indonesian state has performed an important role 
in accelerating cocoa production and triggering upgrading activities in the industry. 
Not only has the Indonesian state played a dominant role in providing technical 
support to smallholder farmers, but it has increasingly adopted a ‘hands-on’ policy 
in trading activities through exercising policy and regulations. This hands-on policy is 
one of the historical shifts that has accelerated the functional upgrading of the 
cocoa industry in Indonesia. The following discussion will describe in more detail the 
trajectory of the state’s role in upgrading the country’s cocoa industry.  
4.3.1 Direct Technical interventions 
State interventions attempting to support national production upgrading at the 
farm-level could be categorised into two phases: (1) the earlier stage characterised 
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by support for smallholders’ expansion activities, which occurred mainly before the 
economic crisis of 1997; And (2), more recent interventions characterised by 
support for intensification with a specific focus on the GERNAS program. It should 
be emphasised that I am interested in interventions by the government to support 
cocoa upgrading, irrespective of whether these programs were actually successful in 
achieving their purported intention, which remains contestable. 
4.3.1.1 The earlier stage: Upgrading through area expansions 
Some form of state involvement in supporting the cocoa industry in Indonesia has 
been evident since the early development of the cocoa industry, in particular in 
accelerating smallholder cocoa expansion. During the 1980s, various government 
programs were introduced to accelerate smallholder cocoa expansion (for details, 
see table 4.1). The various government programs were briefly described in a book 
written by the former Directorate general of Estate Crops, Yusuf Mangga Barani 
(Barani, 2010), which outlines a vision of how Indonesia could become the largest 
cocoa producer in the world. For example, the PRPTE (Peremajaan, Rehabilitasi dan 
Perluasan Tanaman Ekspor) project focused on the regeneration and expansion of 
export commodities. Other examples include the SADP project (Sustainable 
Agriculture Development Project); and the SRADP (Sulawesi Rainfed Agriculture 
Development Project) project. Most of these projects were implemented in the field 
by a local project implementation unit or Unit Pelaksana Proyek (UPP). The UPP 
method mainly involved farmers as implementers of the project. Farmers received 
technology packages which included planting material, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
labourers to help develop their farms. All of those projects, however, only covered 
13,200 hectares spread across seventeen provinces (Barani, 2010, pp. 20-21). In line 
with the PRPTE project, cocoa seed was supplied to farmers by large estate crops 
including government and privates estates (Akiyama & Nishio, 1997). However, the 
scale of the project is insignificant compare to the expansion  of areas that 
exponentially increased up to 300,000 hectares in mid 1990s (Direktorat Jenderal 
Perkebunan (Ditjenbun), 2011). 
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Similar to the UPP approach, the Government of Indonesia also developed estate 
crops commodity expansion through the Proyek Pengembangan Wilayah Khusus 
(P2WK), which was jointly funded by the state and the Sector Programme Loan 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (SPL-OECF), lent by Japan. The main 
difference between the projects was the duration of support from the projects to 
the smallholder farmers. Unlike  the UPP approach, which claimed to cover all costs 
associated with the planting of cocoa until production, the P2WK and SPL-OECF 
projects only covered the first planting year (Barani, 2010, pp. 20-24). 
After the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1998, the central government’s limited 
budget was insufficient to fund estate crops expansion. However, the Minister of 
Agriculture continued to support cocoa expansion by channelling its budget through 
the provincial and district governments and by providing superior planting material. 
The area of activities was narrowed to the core cocoa producing districts, the 
border areas, and conflict affected areas (Barani, 2010, pp. 20-24). 
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Table ‎4-1 Government programs supporting cocoa smallholder production in 
Indonesia 
No Year Project 
Area 
(ha) 
Provinces 
1 1980-1981 PRPTE 8,999           Aceh, North Sumatera, Riau, 
Jambi, South Sumatera, 
Bengkulu, Lampung, West 
Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, 
South Sulawesi, South East 
Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara Timur, 
and Papua 
2 1981-1982 SADP 3,000           Papua 
3 1981-1982 SRADP 1,203           Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, 
South Sulawesi and South East 
Sulawesi 
4 1990-1994 SPL OECF 1,545           Aceh, West Java, South 
Sulawesi 
5 1990-1994 P2WK 3,415      Aceh, Sumbar, Bengkulu, D.I 
Yogyakarta 
6 2007-2010 Selective 
intervention 
programs (Non 
Revitalisasi)   
10,142 Aceh, North Sumatera, West 
Sumatera, Bengkulu, Lampung, 
Banten, West Java, Central 
Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, 
West Kalimantan, East 
Kalimantan, East Nusa 
Tenggara, North Sulawesi, 
Central Sulawesi, West 
Sulawesi, South East Sulawesi, 
South Sulawesi, Papua, West 
Papua 
Source: Barani, 2010 
The above projects illuminate the role of the state in attempting to support 
production upgrading activities in Indonesia, especially in the period before 
Indonesia was impacted by the economic crisis of 1997. What is important to note 
here is that prior to 1997, the state provided intermittent support for cocoa 
producers. State support was selective in terms of its coverage and was only 
provided for a relatively short time.  
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4.3.1.2 Contemporary interventions: Upgrading through intensification and 
rehabilitation 
GERNAS was initially designed as a three year program spanning the period 2009-
2011, and aimed to upgrade the national cocoa production across Indonesia (it was 
subsequently extended until 2013). The state adopted a similar model to the 
development programs of 1980s, including technical support, and subsidized agro-
input materials and labour compensation. Its implementation was ostensibly driven 
by significant industry losses attributable to the decline in national productivity 
from approximately 1.5 tonnes  per hectare per year in the 1990s to an estimated 
approximately 0.7 tonnes per hectare per year in the 2000s (Departemen Pertanian, 
2008).  
GERNAS was designed as a response to the perceived weaknesses of several 
previous smaller programs that had been delivered by the state in the period 
between 2000 and 2007. These programs included Sekolah Lapang Pengendalian 
Hama Terpadu (SL-PHT)-Farmer training for integrated pest and diseases 
management, and the Cocoa Revitalisation program (a credit program). The SL-PHT 
was well known as a regular and annual training program intended to improve the 
capacity of smallholder farmers to manage the spread of pests and diseases. 
However, the program was very limited in its coverage; it only focused on a few 
farmer groups in each district.  
In the meantime, the revitalisation program was designed to support smallholder 
farmers in need of working capital for the rehabilitation of aging cocoa trees. This 
program, which was a government-subsidized credit program, provided working 
capital for smallholder farmers channelled through State-owned banks. Under the 
program, the interest on the initial five year loan was paid by the government and 
farmers were expected to pay the interest when the cocoa trees started full 
production. However, before farmers could access this credit, they (a) had to 
provide a land title certificate, and (b) had to have a business partner, who would 
guarantee to buy the cocoa and ensure credit repayment.  
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In reality, only a few farmers possessed land title. Furthermore, farmers faced 
difficulties meeting other requirements for loan application, such as having a 
guarantor. This made it difficult for farmers to access the credit. Guarantors were 
also hesitant to support farmers as the guarantor did not have full control of the 
farmers’ marketing activities. In short, the buyers or guarantors did not have the 
control capacity to ensure that the farmers would sell their beans to the guarantor, 
given the fierce competition between traders on the ground that triggered the side 
selling of activities. As such, the state-owned bank only financed a meagre 1.094 
hectares cocoa farms throughout Indonesia (Surabaya Pagi, 2011). 
The GERNAS program was promoted as providing direct and comprehensive 
solutions to the problems encountered by earlier programs. The state decided that 
in order to accelerate a revitalisation of cocoa production, it would cover almost all 
of the costs associated with production improvement. The GERNAS program 
provided integrated support, e.g., programs for the regeneration and replanting of 
old trees, farming intensification, farmer empowerment, providing technical 
facilitators, controlling pest and disease infestations, and providing infrastructure 
for quality improvement. Almost entirely, the program was subsidized by the 
government with a total budget of 300 million USD. The expected total area 
coverage was 450,000 ha (Departemen Pertanian, 2008), which included nine 
provinces in Eastern Indonesia (See Table 4-2), making it easily the most ambitious 
government support program ever for Indonesian cocoa production.  
Table ‎4-2 Coverage areas of the GERNAS program 
Province Areas (ha) 
West Sulawesi 125,600 
South Sulawesi 141,000 
South East Sulawesi 99,900 
Central Sulawesi 40,500 
East Nusa Tenggara  10,000 
Bali 8,000 
Maluku 10,000 
West Papua 5,000 
Papua 10,000 
Source: Departemen Pertanian (2008) 
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The GERNAS Program was delivered by the central government and implemented 
by the Estate Crops Department at the district level. The state subsidised all planting 
material, inputs, and compensated labour for replanting and rehabilitation. In 
addition, the government recruited 365 technicians to assist farmers during the 
project, established one new field laboratory and strengthened 6 existing field 
laboratories, and distributed tools to improve post-harvest handling activities (see 
details, Table 4-3). 
Table ‎4-3 The main activities of the GERNAS program 
No Main Activities Amount Units 
1 Regeneration  70,000 ha 
  - Providing high quality seeds 70,000 ha 
  - Providing fertilizers 7,000 tonnes 
  - Pesticides 7,000 tonnes 
  - Supporting working capital per ha 1,000,000 Rupiah 
  - Providing chainsaws 700 units 
  - Hand sprayers 14,000 units 
2 Rehabilitation  235,000 ha 
  - Side grafting 235,000,000 trees 
  - Providing fertilizers 47,000 tonnes 
  - Pesticides 705,000 litres 
  - Chainsaws 2,350 units 
  - Hand sprayers 47,000 units 
3 Intensification  145,000 ha 
  - Providing fertilizers 29,000 tonnes 
  - Pesticides  435,000 litres 
  - Farming scissors 145,000 units 
  - Hand sprayers 29,000 units 
  - Supporting working capital per ha 1,000,000 Rupiah 
4 Farmer Empowerment     
  - Training (cultivation and post-harvest handling) 450,000 Farmers 
5 Quality improvements     
  - Socialisation and publications     
  - Providing fermentation boxes 450,000 Units 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 2010 
The scale of GERNAS suggests the state’s effort to increase national cocoa 
production. Five years after the project, however, national cocoa production had 
actually continuously declined. According to the ICCO, national cocoa production 
  121 
declined from 490 thousand tonnes in 2008 to 425 thousand tonnes in 2013 (ICCO, 
2011; ICCO, 2014a).   
Two major issues were suspected of being the cause of the result: (1) likely 
corruption during implementation; and, (2) technical issues. After the project ended 
in 2013, many corruption allegations related to the project were found. These 
occurred within Indonesia’s major cocoa producing districts, such as Mamuju in 
West Sulawesi, Luwu in South Sulawesi, Bone in South Sulawesi and Toli-Toli in 
Central Sulawesi. These allegations not only involved local staff at district level, but 
also central government staff, as part of the money for the program was suspected 
of being funnelled from local government offices to central government offices in 
Jakarta (Infokorupsi, 2011; Lengkong, 2014; Luwurayanet, 2011; Politik Indonesia, 
2010). 
Regarding the technical issues, the main issue was low performance of seedlings 
that were used for replanting; especially those produced using Somatic 
Embryogenesis (SE) technology. A survey conducted by Hasanuddin University 
(Gusli, 2013) indicated that the SE cocoa seeds had a fundamental problem 
associated with poor root structure and development. This led to falling and dead 
trees. The survey also found that all of the observed areas where these seedlings 
were planted in Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara showed the same results. 
Consequently, less than 50% of the cocoa trees grown from SE seedlings were 
considered healthy. In addition, the survey also identified disease that developed 
following use of the SE method. This includes Vascular-Streak Dieback (VSD) disease 
that infected the cocoa trees that produced green coloured pods (Gusli, 2013).   
Irrespective to the fact that GERNAS did not reach its intended production target, 
the state has clearly shown its apparent intention to upgrade national cocoa 
production through farm-level interventions. As demonstrated by the example of 
GERNAS, the state was able to garner massive support in terms of resources to roll-
out a program that supported smallholder production. However, the example of 
GERNAS also demonstrates that lack of accountability, strong vested interests, and 
rent-seeking behaviour shrouded the overall effectiveness of the project. I will 
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return to these issues in the third section of this chapter, where it examines the 
institutional settings that shaped the upgrading activities in the cocoa sector in 
Indonesia. 
4.3.2 Enacting trade policy support 
The government used trade policies to support the domestic cocoa processors’ 
upgrading activities. In particular, the government revoked the Value Added Tax 
(VAT) and the imposed a sliding tariff on raw bean exports to encourage value-
adding processes to take place within Indonesia. 
4.3.2.1 VAT 
The VAT was introduced in Indonesia in 1995 on selected agricultural commodities, 
e.g., cocoa, coffee, rubber and tea. Under this system, cocoa processors were 
required to pay a 10% tax on their output. Later, the state would pay back the 10% 
of VAT paid on their inputs. The problem for the processors was that it was 
approximately one year before they received their credit of 10%; and then, they 
often only received approximately 80% of the correct amount (Marks, Paryadi, 
Anas, Wicaksono, & Bird, 2007). So, it was hardly surprising that the majority of 
cocoa beans were exported.  
Marks et al.,(2007) identify three additional distortions generated by the VAT that 
made it difficult for Indonesian cocoa processors to compete with exporters of 
cocoa beans. First, Government Regulation 46 (2003) stipulated that farmer and 
farmer groups were exempted from the VAT system. This meant that exporters 
could purchase cocoa beans directly from farmer and farmer groups without paying 
any VAT at all. The case was similar for the estate plantations that produced 
fermented beans. They opted not to sell to domestic processors in order to avoid 
the complexity of VAT pay back. The second problem was that local processors 
claimed to be more vulnerable to demands from tax officials than some of the 
foreign companies. Finally, Indonesian companies had higher cost of capital 
compared to the foreign companies; thus, delaying the tax rebate (restitution) and 
placed the Indonesia companies at a competitive disadvantage. 
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The long standing regulation that disadvantaged local grinders was abolished in 
2007 under the Government regulation No.7/2007 (Awaluddin, 2007). The new 
regulation revoked VAT being applied to several commodities across estate crops, 
horticulture, fisheries, and non-timber products. This was largely driven by AIKI’s 
lobbying of the government to remove barriers for domestic value-adding 
processes. It is important to note that the VAT abolition had been suggested by 
several other industry players across several commodities. However, within the 
cocoa industry in Indonesia, AIKI had been the most proactive association 
persuading the government to revoke the policy.   
4.3.2.2 Export tariff 
The export tariff was introduced by the Indonesian state with the main objective to 
accelerate value adding activities in the country (Barani, 2010). Indonesia had been 
the raw materials source for cocoa processors in neighbouring countries.  
Ministerial Decree No. 67/PMK.011/2010 was issued to promote domestic 
processing of agricultural commodities including cocoa. In the case of cocoa, the 
decree adopted a progressive tariff based on the international cocoa market. When 
the international cocoa price fell below US$2000, no tax was applied to export 
cocoa beans. If the market price of the cocoa was between US$2000 and US$2750, 
the tariff was set at 5%: for market price of cocoa between US2750 and US$3500, 
the tariff was set at 10%; and, when the market price exceeded US$3500, the tariff 
was set at 15% (Menteri Keuangan, 2010). 
Such a progressive export tariff was aimed to encourage value adding within 
Indonesia and to promote local processors through the use of policy rents. In fact, 
this strategy is not a novel strategy; it has been applied by several producing 
countries, including Ghana (Media Perkebunan, 2010), and had already been 
applied in the Indonesian palm oil industry (Menteri Keuangan, 2010). 
The case for having value added activities located in Indonesia has been at the 
forefront of this argument.  The Directorate General of Estate Crops explained that 
neighbouring countries such as Malaysia (with its processing capacity of 300 
thousand tonnes) and Singapore (with its capacity of 100 thousand tonnes) were 
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benefitting from value addition using raw materials from Indonesia. Indeed, neither 
Malaysia or Singapore were significant cocoa producers (Arifenie, 2009).  
The number of cocoa processing factories in Indonesia had already increased during 
the period 1995-2004. The AIKI recorded that the installed annual capacity of cocoa 
processing factories grew from 70,000 tonnes in 1995 to 345,000 tonnes in 2004. 
But, the increased capacity of the processing facilities did not reflect the actual 
volume of beans processed. Based on the data released by the ICCO (2011), the 
highest volume of processed beans in Indonesia before the imposition of a trade 
policy was 160,000 tonnes in 2006, approximately  40% of the total installed 
capacity. 
It is interesting to note that the installed capacity to process cocoa in Indonesia is 
similar to that of Malaysia, but Malaysian factories were operating near full capacity 
levels while Indonesian factors are operating below the capacity. According to AIKI, 
among the major factors contributing to this poor result were restrictive 
government regulations. These regulations included the VAT, and the absence of an 
industry incentive for domestic processors (an export tariff, for example).  
State interventions are shaped by the various factors that underpin decisions made 
by state bureaucrats. In the following sub sections, I will further discuss the 
institutionally embedded factors that influence the upgrading process. 
4.4 Institutional Interests within the Indonesian state upgrading interventions 
The Indonesian state’s subsequent support for upgrading activities was the result of 
lobbying by the very strong vested interests of various stakeholders in the cocoa 
industry. These interests have continuously influenced decision-makers in the 
Indonesian state, and therefore require further examination. These interests 
intersect with other interests within the state including national stability, political 
interests, access to project funding, and rent-seeking by bureaucratic capitalists, to 
further influence the ways in which state programs and policies are delivered. 
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4.4.1 National Stability and political interest 
4.4.1.1 National stability interest 
Cocoa industry development in Indonesia through the expansion of cocoa 
smallholders on the Island of Sulawesi in the 1980s was initially supported by the 
government to maintain the security and stability of the Island. Many ethnic Bugis 
ex-rebels of the Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia (Darul Islam-Tentara Islam 
Indonesia (DI-TII)), were domiciled in the northern parts of South Sulawesi and 
South-East Sulawesi, which became the major cocoa producing areas in Indonesia.    
The state used the cocoa program as a means to provide source of incomes for the 
ex-rebels. According to Ruf, Ehret, and Yoddang (1996), historically, the DI-TII rebels 
planned to use cocoa as a source of financial support for their guerrilla war, using 
the forest as their base camp. Cocoa pods were brought from Sabah and planted in 
North Mamuju in 1959. However, just as the trees started to produce, the revolt 
declined. During the period 1965-1975, the ex-rebels opted not to grow cocoa so as 
to avoid any sign of uprising vis-á-vis the National government. But, as soon as the 
government encouraged planting cocoa as a source of income, in 1975, the farmers 
commenced planting cocoa in Mamuju, West Sulawesi and Kolaka, and South-East 
Sulawesi, using seeds from former DI-TII plots. YAMINAS (Yayasan Minasae- 
Minasae Foundation, established 1969 in Nolling Village, Luwu district) was an ex-
rebels foundation, which was granted 1000 ha of land in 1969 by the government in 
an attempt to both appease the fighters and to localize them. It was also intended 
as a way for the government to facilitate surveillance of the group ( Neilson, Gusli, 
Palinrungi, & Tenrisau, 2005, pp. 11-12). YAMINAS secured a commercial plantation 
lease of the area and managed the entire area through a cooperative of its 
membership (Neilson et al., 2005). 
Regarding the period of initial smallholder expansion during the 1980s, the state 
program in Sulawesi was delivered through projects such as PRPTE and SADP (see 
Table 4.1). In case of the PRPTE projects, the main program involved regeneration, 
rehabilitation and expansion.  The project was delivered mainly to continue the 
existing cocoa cultivation that had been initiated by smallholder farmers. As Ruf et 
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al. (1996) suggest, the majority of the smallholders who cultivated cocoa prior to 
the 1980s period was believed to have supported the  rebellion of DI-TII. Thus, state 
support for cocoa expansion seemed motivated by political reasons. 
Thirty years later, in Aceh Province, support for cocoa expansion occurred for 
similar reasons and was adopted by Development Agencies such as the World Bank 
and USAID in collaboration with the Indonesian government (World Bank, 2012). 
Even though the goal of the program was to develop the cocoa industry, 
government policy to expand cocoa in the Province aimed at providing jobs for the 
ex-fighters of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)-Aceh Freedom Movement.  
In short, viewed from a political perspective, there were clear indications that the 
Indonesian government used cocoa as a means to support the livelihood for  the ex-
rebels in post-conflict areas, by providing a source of income. This approach not 
only contributed in maintaining the security of the impacted provinces, but also 
hastened expansion of cocoa cultivation. Government support in the early 1980s 
seemed to provide a green light for the ex-rebels. They were now allowed to engage 
in cocoa cultivation, crops previously planted to support the of DI-TII revolt in 
Sulawesi. A similar move was also adopted in Aceh Province. After the peace 
agreement was sign with the GAM, the government promoted cocoa expansion 
mainly to provide income and jobs to ex-fighters. Thus, regardless the size of 
coverage areas, which was considered limited compared to the total smallholder 
expansion through informal social networks; cocoa upgrading activities driven by 
the state reflected its interest in political and security factors.   
4.4.1.2 Political interests  
The political interest of the state in supporting upgrading of smallholder production 
capacity could be explored at three different scales: national, provincial and district 
levels. Following the introduction of a decentralization regime that entailed direct 
elections, all of the above three spaces became areas for political interest, e.g., 
electoral votes and privileged policies strongly influenced state support for the 
economic development process, including upgrading within the cocoa industry.    
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a) National 
The majority of the people engaged in cocoa cultivation are operating smallholder 
farm in eastern Indonesia, mainly on Sulawesi Island. This positions cocoa as a key 
political issue, especially for politicians from the producing regions to show their 
concern and support for their electorate base. Politicians from the district level to 
the central level have been keen to focus on the export tax that threatened to 
reduce the main incomes of the smallholder farmers, and problems pertaining to 
declining productivity and the quality of the beans from the Island of Sulawesi.  
The Vice President of Indonesia for the period 2004-2009 (Yusuf Kalla), for example, 
came from South Sulawesi; but, his broader electorate support was across Eastern 
Indonesia. He raised the issue of declining cocoa production and quality of cocoa 
beans from these regions as the main political concern. In an effort to support 
smallholder cocoa farmers to increase their cocoa production and to improve the 
quality of their cocoa, on 6 August, 2008 the Vice President launched the GERNAS 
for cocoa industry upgrading (Barani, 2010). The launch was conducted in the centre 
of the cocoa producing areas, in Mamuju, West Sulawesi province. The purported 
aim of GERNAS was (a) to upgrade the production of cocoa farming activities; and 
(b) to upgrade the quality of the cocoa beans. 
In this context, the Vice President devised the GERNAS program not only for 
technical reasons, that is, to provide solutions for smallholder farmers, but also to 
garner political support from his electoral base.  
In 2007, the Deputy Director of Estate Crops, discussed a national plan for cocoa 
during a consultative meeting with the World Bank FEATI (Farmer Empowerment 
through Agricultural Technology and Information) team (in which, I was a part of the 
team) where the Deputy Director indicated that the upcoming cocoa project had 
been designed only for cocoa expansion in new areas such as West Sumatera and 
Aceh (Western-region of Indonesia). It did not include South and South-east 
Sulawesi as part of the project. However, in the GERNAS program, Sulawesi was 
positioned as the main target area of the project, covering 90 per cent of the total 
project areas of 450,000 thousand hectares. According to the Head of the Estate 
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Crops Department in South Sulawesi (personal communication, 6 August, 2010), the 
GERNAS program was personally endorsed by the Vice President, supporting the 
Ministry of Agriculture to provide a national program that improved the livelihoods 
of the rural poor in the eastern region of Indonesia. The region was not only the 
area in which the greater part of cocoa was grown: it was also the area in which the 
Vice President had many political constituents. As will become clear later in this 
thesis, being seen to support farmers and offering ‘projects’ to lower levels of the 
bureaucracy was more important for securing political support, than achieving 
successful delivery of programs. Ensuring the support of provincial and district level 
bureaucrats is critical within the context of Indonesia’s patronage-based political 
system.  
b) Provincial level 
At the provincial level, the Governors of West, South and Central Sulawesi also cited 
issues regarding cocoa as their political concern. The governor of West Sulawesi, for 
example, put cocoa development at the centre of the area’s provincial development 
programs, to deliver his promise he made during his political campaign. Cocoa was 
positioned as the economic engine of provincial development; thus, every 
department under the administration of the West Sulawesi Governor supported the 
development of the province’s cocoa industry.  The proposal to build infrastructure, 
such as bridges and roads, were all focused in the cocoa producing areas. A similar 
approach was also adopted for training and human resources capacity building. 
Furthermore, provincial staff were required to have a basic understanding of cocoa 
cultivation. To this end, the basic technical training of cocoa farming was made 
available to smallholder farmers, not only from cocoa extension services, but from 
administration staff at the village and sub-districts levels. To oversee all of the 
programs under the West Sulawesi Administration, the governor recruited a team of 
experts from the University of Hasanuddin in Makassar.  
The Governors of South and Central Sulawesi particularly showed their concern 
regarding the export tax applied by the central government. The Governor of South 
Sulawesi, for example, voiced his opposition to the central government vis-á-vis its 
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export tax policy when the president conducted a coordination meeting of 
governors in Tampaksiring palace, Bali, on April 2010. The governor explained to the 
voters using Ujung Pandang Express (2010), a local South Sulawesi media, about his 
opposition by saying: ‘saya teriak kencang masalah edaran Menteri Keuangan 
terkait pungutan pada coklat. Saya sempat bersitegang terkait masalah itu’,(I was 
shouting loudly in relation to the letter of the Finance Minister about the imposition 
of tariff on cocoa. It was quite tense in relation to that matter). Furthermore, the 
governor expressed that while he opposed the central government on the issue of 
export tax, it was the domain of the central government (Ujung Pandang Express, 
2010). The Governor’s opposition to the policy was calculated to show that he was 
concernedwith decreasing income of cocoa farmers. However, the governor did not 
initiate follow up activities, such as writing a formal letter to the central 
government; or demanding follow up meetings with the central government.  
In contrast, the governor of Central Sulawesi responded to the Finance Minister’s 
letter by sending a letter to the President opposing the export tariff policy, and 
particularly stressing that it would reduce cocoa farmers’ incomes. The letter 
supported a strike conducted by cocoa farmers and traders in the governor’s office 
on 6 April 2010 (Inilahcom, 2010). However, opposition to the export tariff was not 
widespread and was never really able to mobilise mass farmer support in the 
province. 
c) District Level 
At the district level, particularly in the major cocoa producing areas, cocoa 
development that supported smallholder farmers had been the major agenda for 
the heads of districts and legislators. The Head of North Luwu district (one of the 
largest cocoa producing areas in Sulawesi, constituting approximately 56,000 
hectares in 2008), for example, had promised to initiate development activities 
targeting cocoa smallholder farmers as his main agenda. After he was elected for 
the second time-for the period 2005-2010, his vision for the district was to achieve 
the best cocoa producers at the national level by 2010 and become the pilot project 
for cocoa development in the Eastern Part of Indonesia. In a bid to achieve his 
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vision, he launched a program called GERMAS TAKWA (Gerakan Rehabilitasi Massal 
Kakao Berkualitas-Massive rehabilitation movement for cocoa quality), a program 
that emphasised rehabilitation activities as its main project. This program required 
1000 agricultural graduates to assist farmers in the rehabilitation process (Shaleh, 
2008). 
The local legislators of North Luwu tried to showcase their roles to their electorate 
constituents by defending the interests of the cocoa smallholders. They seized their 
chance when the export tax on cocoa was imposed by the central government. 
Some of the local legislators conducted press releases and conferences indicating 
their concern about the policy. The following statement appeared in Seputar 
Indonesia, a national newspaper: 
“Petani sudah susah atas kenaikan harga pupuk, justru pemerintah menambah 
penderitaan petani dengan kebijakannya yang menerapkan bea ekspor kakao. 
Jadi, kami mengharapkan Permenkeu dicabut, apalagi sebelumnya tidak ada 
sosialisasi”. 
(Farmers are already facing difficulties due to the increase of fertiliser price, and 
then the (central) government wants to compound their suffering by imposing a 
tax on exports. Thus, we expect the Ministerial Decree of Finance Minister to be 
withdrawn, as the decree also was imposed without any previous socialisation) 
(SINDO, 2010). 
 
The major concern of the legislator was that the central government policy would 
result in a low incomes and low profitability for the smallholder farmers. Prior to the 
introduction of its export policy, the government had reduced the fertiliser subsidy. 
As a result, the price increased by approximately 30 per cent. It was argued by some 
that the additional progressive export tax would reduce the farm gate price by 
approximately 5 per cent.  
In short, political interests have been shaping the dynamics of institutional settings, 
either at the national, provincial and or district levels. Farmer support activities in 
the cocoa industry, which have targeted the smallholder farmers, have become 
political issues, tools to attract massive votes for politicians on Sulawesi Island, 
reflecting the large numbers of smallholders engaged in the sector.  
  131 
4.4.2 Economic nationalism rhetoric 
The strong desire to upgrade the cocoa industry in Indonesia was also driven by 
views pertaining to nationalism and by geopolitical considerations. Economic 
nationalism, in particular, stressed the need to add value to domestic natural 
resources including the agricultural sector, before exporting them. The geopolitical 
consideration underpinning the argument vis-á-vis the need to add value to 
Indonesian natural resources was further triggered by the discriminative policy of 
importing countries that was considered to undermine the growth of domestic 
cocoa industry development.     
An interesting quote by the former Director General of Estate Crops, Ahmad 
Mangga Barani suggested the need to upgrade Indonesia’s cocoa industry from raw 
material producers to semi-processed cocoa product producers, justifying the 
export tariff. His statement (originally in Bahasa and translated by the author) 
appears below: 
By having an export tariff policy, surely, it will attract new investments and 
therefore, cocoa beans that have been produced can be absorbed by 
domestic processors. As a result, possibly almost all Indonesian cocoa beans 
can be processed domestically and can be exported in the forms of 
processed cocoa products, which have added value. If this happened, then 
the government’s expectation to create additional value from the primary 
commodity will be achieved. Thus, we are not fettered in the same way as 
the VOC colonial period, when Indonesia only produced raw material 
(Barani, 2010, p. 116). 
Justification for the export tariff was associated with the past colonial era, when the 
VOC (the United Dutch East Indies Company) dominated Indonesia’s trading 
activities and exported raw materials to Europe to be processed with higher value 
added. This implied that exporting raw materials from Indonesia for processing in 
the developed countries was a neo-colonial trap in the modern era.  Within this 
context, ‘economic nationalism’ was the reason given to justify the policy. 
This economic nationalist mindset was shared by the majority of government 
officials at various levels, particularly when discussing value added activities. A more 
argumentative way of supporting the agro industrialization of the cocoa sector was 
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voiced by the Vice Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Bayu Krisnamurthi.  According to Dr. 
Krisnamurthi, supporting the domestic industry through a market distortion such as 
an export tariff was a common practice, and had wide community support (personal 
communication, 19 August 2010). This practice was intended to advantage the 
industry’s domestic buyers with a lower price compared to the international 
market.  
But, for the Vice Minister, this reason was insufficient to justify the policy being 
implemented in the cocoa sector.  According to him, two main events that occurred 
in 2008-2009 made the export tariff more relevant. First, Singapore and Malaysia 
imposed a discriminative import tariff on processed Indonesian cocoa products to 
protect their domestic processing companies. The import tariff on cocoa beans was 
zero percent; but, they applied a tariff on cocoa products to boost the competitive 
advantage of their processors. As a result, these countries gained higher benefit 
from the Indonesian cocoa beans through value added application. Concerning this 
development, according to the Vice Minister, the Government had profound 
reasons for supporting the domestic agro-industrialisation through the application 
of an export tariff on Indonesian cocoa beans.  
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Figure ‎4–1 Indonesian cocoa beans exported to Malaysia, and Malaysian cocoa 
processing development 
 
The second reason was the perceived need to boost the domestic processors in 
anticipation of an increase in national cocoa production, which was apparently 
believed would occur as a consequence of the GERNAS program.  According to the 
Vice Minister, with reference to the government’s 2010 production figures, 
Indonesia’s cocoa production was approximately 600 thousand tonnes and was 
expected to double within 4-5 years. It was feared that such production increases 
would reduce Indonesia’s bargaining position. Therefore, Indonesia needed to 
diversify its product output and this could only be done by developing its agro-
industry. The Vice Minister further stated that in this context, Indonesia realized 
that it was difficult to acquire markets for end products; intermediate products 
were more realistic, e.g., cocoa butter, cocoa powder and cocoa cake. Based on this 
realization, the government decided to focus on developing the industry and 
providing support for the cocoa processors. 
But, this economic nationalism view was rejected by members of ASKINDO, whose 
members are mainly exporters, who argued that such economic nationalism was 
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entirely inappropriate given that applying the tariff would only benefit a small 
number of industrialists. Furthermore, ASKINDO members emphasised that while 
individual companies benefited from the export tax, to date none had a mechanism 
in place to provide field support for cocoa farmers. In fact, the private players who 
were currently active in supporting the smallholder farmers were mainly ASKINDO 
members.   
Furthermore, from a geopolitical perspective, ASKINDO members emphasised that 
the government should focus their efforts on improving infrastructure, such as 
electricity generation, roads and ports that rivalled or at least were similar to those 
of the neighbouring countries. 
However, the Vice Minister argued that putting internationally competitive 
infrastructure into place as a condition to attract investors would take quite a long 
time. According to him, while improving Indonesia’s infrastructure, the Indonesian 
government also needed to provide an incentive for the investors to provide 
comparative advantage for investors. Looking at the policy side, the neighbouring 
countries also had more favourable policies for corporate tax for investors as well as 
lower rates of interest (see Table 4-4). Taken together, they seemed to compensate 
the investors. The Indonesian governments took a short cut, simply providing an 
export tariff for cocoa beans. The above protectionist policies implied that the 
government was preserving the inefficient factors of the industry (Soesastro & Basri, 
2005).  
In short, economic nationalism and economic geopolitical considerations became an 
important factor for the Indonesian state to driving cocoa industry development in 
Indonesia. Exporting natural resources without additional domestic value adding 
policies was considered a neo-colonial practice in the modern era. In addition, the 
rapid growth of the neighbouring countries’ cocoa industries, which depended upon 
Indonesian cocoa production strengthened the argument surrounding the need to 
support the domestic cocoa processing companies. These two views were widely 
accepted by Indonesia’s state bureaucrats and indeed by the broader community.     
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4.4.3 ‘Project’ mentality 
The ‘project’ mentality of Indonesia’s state bureaucrats resulted in many programs 
and projects being driven by ‘supply’ activities rather than by ‘demand’ driven 
activities. Supply driven projects eventuate when governments decide what project 
is to be established, and where the project will be located. This has become a 
common feature of the upgrading activities driven by the state.  
In an effort to support the cocoa industry in South Sulawesi, and to improve the 
value adding activities, in order that the producers of raw material could become 
producers of chocolate products, the Industry Minister collaborated with the 
Government of South Sulawesi to establish a ‘cocoa industrial cluster’, the idea 
being to provide comprehensive solutions to the multi-faceted issues in the industry 
(BPTP, 2009). What is important to note about this project was the actual role of the 
Industry Minister, which was mainly related to manufacturing activities. Therefore, 
the cocoa industrial cluster, that was initiated and supported by the Industry 
Minister, would constitute a public investment in a single state-owned chocolate 
manufacturing factory.  
In 2009, the central government and the South Sulawesi province agreed to co-fund 
the establishment of the facility. The Industry Minister covered the buying of the 
manufacturing equipment that cost Rp. 14 billion (approximately US$ 1.16 million) 
while the provincial government covered the cost of land and building properties 
Rp. three billion (US$250 thousand) (Antara News, 2012a). In the same year, the 
facility was built in a new industrial zone, the Gowa Industrial Estate, in Gowa 
district, approximately 40 kilometres from the much larger and better integrated 
Makassar Industrial Estate. 
However, a number of years after establishment, the facility has yet to commence 
operation. One of the reasons given by the head of the Cocoa Industry Association 
in South Sulawesi was that were was a mistake in the planning stage. According to 
him, the facility was built in the wrong location. It was the first manufacturing 
facility established in the new Industrial Estate in Gowa district, and it was intended 
to attract other investors to locate their business facilities in the industrial zone 
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(Antara News, 2012c). But, after three years, no investors had located their 
businesses in the zone due to lack of infrastructural support, e.g., lack of water and 
electricity which was supposed to have been provided by the Government of Gowa 
district. The existing electricity was supplied using individual diesel generators 
(Prasetyo, 2012).    
The other reason was the unavailability of operational costs to cover the day-to-day 
activities including buying raw material. As stated by the current Head of the 
Industrial and Trade Department of South Sulawesi, the facility required operational 
costs per day between Rp.500 million (USD 52,631) and Rp.700 million (USD 73,684) 
only to manufacture two tonnes of cocoa liquor as inputs. These operational costs 
were to have been covered by the provincial government, the operator of the 
facility. However, due to the high operational costs, the provincial government 
decided to abandon operation of the facility (Ilham, 2012).   
Despite this lack of infrastructural support, the Department of Industry and Trade of 
Gowa district proposed that a new processing facility should be established in order 
to produce intermediate cocoa products. The processing facility’s products were 
intended to supply the still disused chocolate manufacturing facility.  Furthermore, 
he argued, one of the main reasons why the existing manufacturing facility 
remained inoperative was the lack of raw materials such as cocoa powder (BBIHP, 
2012). 
Allegations of corruption and purchasing collusion have been associated with the 
establishment of cocoa manufacturing facilities in Gowa, with demands that it be 
investigated by the Anti-Corruption Commission (Antara News, 2012b). Irrespective 
of the veracity of corruption allegations, it seems that the case of the cocoa industry 
cluster in South Sulawesi can still be explained by an understanding of a supply-
driven ‘project’ mentality. The ultimate inability of the state to run the chocolate 
manufacturing facility, which was due to various reasons such as lack of 
management and operational capacity, minimum infrastructure facilities and 
unclear linkage between suppliers and market targets, was compounded by a new 
proposal to establish a new facility through further government supply.  
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However, this was clearly neglecting the fact that proper business principles and 
feasibility projects were never followed. The provincial government could not 
provide operational funding from the provincial budget to support the facility given 
the high cost manufacturing process.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this example is that the government is eager 
to supply infrastructure through ‘projects’ with sometimes considerable budgets as 
they can be potentially lucrative for the bureaucrats involved. Undeveloped systems 
of accountability mean that eventual outcomes are often unimportant. This project 
mentality was an important factor in the cocoa industrial upgrading activities, and 
indeed can also explain the relatively poor outcomes of farm-level support 
programs, such as GERNAS. This form of mentality is commonly exercised by 
government staff to extract rents from cocoa projects, e.g., building facilities.  It 
keeps cocoa projects rolling by only measuring the direct inputs used in the 
projects; but, it lacks consideration of the long-term impact and sustainability of the 
project.  
4.4.4 Industry lobbyists 
Lobbying government to ease and support cocoa industry upgrading with 
favourable regulations for cocoa processors is a common feature in Indonesia’s 
temporary cocoa industrial upgrading activities. These lobbying activities not only 
aim to enact a regulation that lowers the competitiveness of cocoa processors in 
Indonesia, but also to install new regulations that provide new advantages for 
domestic processors.   
In 2002, the owners of cocoa processing companies in Indonesia started voicing 
their concerns over the above disadvantageous policies through ASKINDO. Two 
main policies were proposed to the Minister of Industry and Trade, designed to 
improve the competitiveness of the domestic processors: (a) the abolition of VAT on 
cocoa commodities; and, (b) the addition of a new policy that would drive upgrading 
activities, i.e., an export tax on raw materials. However, among the members of 
ASKINDO, the majority of exporters failed to agree on the second policy. This was 
hardly surprising since the majority of ASKINDO members were bean exporters. 
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[The operation of the association was paid based on a levy of Rp 50 per kilogram, 
thus making bean exporter the associations’ major contributors].   
PT. Bumi Tangerang (a cocoa grinding company) pointed out that at the time it was 
very difficult for ASKINDO members to unite to present their proposed policy to the 
government (personal communication, August 11, 2010). This vexed situation drove 
PT. Bumi Tangerang, a key proponent of the export tax, to cease his membership of 
the association in 2003, and to establish the AIKI, a new association that would 
represent processor interests. 
The following year, just prior to the Indonesian presidential election,  Piter Jasmin, a 
representative of AIKI and owner of PT (Perseroan Terbatas-Limited Company) Bumi 
Tangerang, had a chance to meet one of the presidential candidates, Susilo 
Bambang Yudoyono (President of the Republic of Indonesia  for the period 2004-
2014), with whom he discussed the various problems that hindered the upgrading 
activities of the country’s cocoa processors (personal communication, Sindra 
Wijaya, 11August, 2010). Subsequent to this meeting, five issues were considered 
very important to improving cocoa processing in Indonesia. The proposed policies 
included: (1) abolition of the VAT; (2) the need to increase the import tariff on 
processed cocoa products; (3) the importance of lobbying importing countries to 
abolish their import tariffs on Indonesian cocoa products; (4) the need to implement 
obligatory farm-level fermentation of  beans; and, (5) the need to apply an export 
tariff on cocoa beans (personal communication, Sindra Wijaya, 11August, 2010). 
In contrast, their competitors in the neighbouring countries enjoyed advantages 
derived from their state policies (see Table 4-4). 
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Table ‎4-4 Policies comparison in the cocoa industry between Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore before 2005 
No Policies Indonesia Malaysia  Singapore 
1 Value added tax 10% 0% 0% 
2 Import tariff on cocoa beans 5% 0% 0% 
3 Import tariff on processed cocoa beans 5% 25-30% 5% 
4 Interest rate 14% 4% 4% 
5 Corporate Tax 25% Tax 
holiday 10 
years 
10% 
Source: ASKINDO, 2010  
Among the proposed policies, the export tariff was the most debated policy among 
cocoa stakeholders in Indonesia. It came as no surprise that this policy seemed to 
benefit the cocoa processors at the expense of the smallholder farmers. The export 
tariff, it was believed, would improve the competitiveness of the domestic cocoa 
processors relative to their competitors in the other countries, in particular in the 
neighbouring countries which were highly dependent on Indonesian cocoa supplies, 
e.g., Malaysian and Singaporean-based companies. However, on the contra side, it 
was believed that the policy would reduce the farm gate price of the smallholder 
farmers. This contra view was widely supported by the farmers associations and 
ASKINDO members.     
4.4.4.1 Support for an Export tax 
The Chairman of AIKI observed that the major cause of the under-performance of 
the cocoa processors in Indonesia was the non-competitive disadvantage of policies, 
either of the importing countries or the Indonesian government (personal 
communication, August 11, 2010). Apropos of AIKI, there were several policies that 
put Indonesian processors in a disadvantaged position as a result of importing 
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countries’ discriminating tariffs on Indonesian exports, such as the preferential 
treatment of African processed products into the European market (Misnawi & 
Wahyudi, 2007, p. 58).  At the regional level, it was argued that China applied a 15 
per cent import tariff on Indonesian semi-processed cocoa (cocoa butter, powder 
and cake) but zero per cent on Singaporean and Malaysian products (Barani, 2010, 
p. 86). In addition, their competitors in the neighbouring countries enjoyed 
advantages derived from their state policies (see Table 4-5).  
Piter Jasman, chairman of the AIKI , and the owner of P.T  Bumi Tangerang, when 
interviewed by the Perkebunan Magazine5, stated that the example of Ghana in 
cocoa producers could be a lesson for the Indonesian government: 
Ghana experience are expected to be happen in Indonesia. Ghana obliged 
their farmers to ferment their beans and then applies export tax for their 
beans. European who are highly dependent with Ghana beans thus come to 
Ghana to develop cocoa industries…” (Media Perkebunan, 2010, p. 44) 
Piter Jasman further suggested that taking this as an example, the Indonesian 
government could expect a similar situation with cocoa processors in Malaysia, 
Singapore and China. All of those Asian countries were highly dependent upon 
Indonesian beans supply. Clearly, a similar logic was used to maximize ‘trade policy 
rents’, and, by extension, to invite investors from the above countries to invest in 
Indonesia.  
Jasman stressed that the major challenge facing the cocoa industry (processing) 
development was the discriminative import tariff placed on Indonesia’s cocoa 
processed products by European Union.   
The main constraint of national cocoa industry (processing) development is 
the discriminative import tariff of processed cocoa products in some 
importing countries, such as European Union, while the cocoa beans free 
from import tariff (Media Perkebunan, 2010, p. 44). 
According to Jasman, the implementation of an export tariff on cocoa beans in 
Indonesia balances the discriminative treatment of Indonesia’s processed cocoa 
                                                        
5 A magazine circulated in the state crops department  under the Minister of Agriculture. 
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exports. The AIKI views highlighted the significance of the government’s driving of 
the cocoa industry in Indonesia as appearing in the official magazine of the Minister 
of Agriculture. 
4.4.4.2 Concerns over an export tax 
APKAI sent a strong statement to the government and other cocoa stakeholders on 
10 April 2010 stating that the Finance Minister’s Ministerial Decree would make the 
poor smallholder farmers poorer, on the assumption that the export tariff at the 
exporter level would be transferred to the cocoa smallholder farmers. As KOMPAS, 
the country’s largest national newspaper framed in its editorial (own translation): 
The total need of the domestic cocoa processors is only 250,000 tons while the total 
national cocoa beans production is approximately 500,000 tonnes. We, therefore, 
question: does the government aim to protect the interests of the poor smallholder 
farmers or the interests of the capitalist? ("Tajuk Rencana: Jangan pinggirkan petani 
", 2010, p. 2) 
Expressing its opposition to the export tariff policy, prior to the imposition of the 
policy, ASKINDO sent a letter to the President of the Republic of Indonesia 
emphasising that the export tariff would only hurt the smallholder farmers. 
According to ASKINDO, the real problem actually lay with the processors 
themselves. The majority of cocoa processors, who were running at idle capacity, 
were not able to compete to buy raw materials due to various reasons; for example, 
the global market for cocoa products was solely dominated by six global buyers. The 
domestic processors, who competed with these players, had high costs of capital 
(high interest rates of domestic banks) and limited working capital that cocoa 
processors needed to buy stock in the harvest season. 
In fact, two government documents upon which the export tariff policy was 
supposedly based suggested that the export tariff would have a negative impact on 
the smallholder farmers. The first research into the impact of the export tax or tariff 
was undertaken in 2007 by the Ministry of Trade in collaboration with USAID 
through a GIAT (Growth Through Investment, Agriculture and Trade) project and the 
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies). The result clearly suggested 
that the export tariff would lower smallholder farmers’ incomes. Various agencies 
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calculated that a 10 per cent export  tax would reduce the aggregate incomes of 
farmers by as much as Rp 305 billion (Rp. 1 million per year per farming family) and 
increase the number of cocoa farming households experiencing poverty by at least 
26 per cent (Marks et al., 2007, p. 21). Furthermore, the percentage decrease in the 
farm gate price would be higher, more in the order of 11 per cent, since the farm-
gate price was less than the export price (Marks et al., 2007, p. 21).  
The second document, a policy brief provided by LRPI (Lembaga Riset Perkebunan 
Indonesia) and PPSEKP (Pusat Penelitian Sosial Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Perkebunan), 
both of which were research institutes under the Minister of Agriculture, also 
concluded that the export tariff would hurt farmers. In the long run, it would de-
motivate them from undertaking cocoa farming and would see them changing from 
cocoa production to other commodities. However, the document provided two 
options for the government: (1) to maintain the status quo, meaning that import 
tariff protection for cocoa products and the abolition of the VAT would be sufficient 
to support the domestic cocoa processors; and, (2) to impose an export tariff at a 
moderate level of 3 per cent, over a short period of time in order to provide 
incentives and opportunities for several companies to achieve their maximum 
production. Regarding the option, the government should return the 3 per cent tax 
to the farmers, and, at the same time, encourage inefficient companies to learn 
from other more successful companies (Drajat, Hadi, & Kustiari, 2009, p. 8) . 
However, the latest report released by the Indonesian government prepared by the 
Directorate for International Marketing and the Directorate General for the 
Processing and Marketing of Agricultural Products in collaboration with the LRPI, 
seems to have justified the export tariff. The document, recommended that the 
tariff might be imposed after considering the existing ‘abnormal conditions’ for 
cocoa processors. Indonesia’s domestic cocoa processors were considered to be in a 
‘collapsed’ situation; therefore, ‘steps to rescue’ the cocoa processors were 
imperative. Interestingly, the first part of this document was essentially a brief 
policy provided by the LRPI, while the second part, the discussion surrounding the 
cocoa processors seemed to be a report provided by the Directorate General for 
Processing and Marketing of Agricultural Products. Justification for the export tariff 
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seemed to have been negotiated by framing the first part of the document which 
presented similar strong arguments for both sides, i.e., the pros and cons. As a 
result, the decision fell into the policy domain. It is difficult to assume a position 
wherein every side benefits, or at least is ‘first best’ choice, where one side benefits 
and the other is not disadvantaged. At the end, the document recommended the 
‘second best’ option wherein one side would benefit and the other would be 
disadvantaged but compensated. It was recommended that compensation of 30 per 
cent should go back to the farmers, and that the rest should be channelled into 
wider cocoa industry development, e.g.,  research (10%), infrastructure 
development (7,5%), promotion to international markets (7,5%) and general 
development (45%).  However, the recommendation stressed that the export tariff 
was only for a temporary period (Departemen Pertanian, 2009, p. 32). 
4.4.4.3 The lobbying outcomes 
An important fact to note regarding the state effort to upgrade the cocoa industry 
in Indonesia, regardless of the pros and cons of several policies, was the consistent 
lobbying exercised by the domestic processors.  AIKI had consistently sought 
concessions from the government to provide support for the regulations and 
business environment that favoured the growth of cocoa processing companies in 
Indonesia.  
The first meeting between AIKI and then presidential candidate Susilo Bambang 
Yudoyono in 2004 saw the former influence the latter.  Five months after the 
election, the President of the Republic of Indonesia sent a letter to the Ministry of 
Finance (dated March 17th, 2005 No. B.168/M.Sesneg/03/2005) pointing out the 
need to support and upgrade the country’s cocoa industry. The president 
specifically outlined the five issues that had been proposed by AIKI.  This letter 
became a point of reference for related ministers, e.g., the Finance, Agriculture, 
Industry and Trade Ministers to take the necessary action to support the domestic 
cocoa processors.  
Following this letter, the government conducted extensive discussions involving 
cocoa industry players, including ASKINDO, AIKI, APKAI, and APIKCI (Asosiasi 
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Perusahaan Industri Kakao Coklat Indonesia-Indonesian cocoa-chocolate industry 
associations). In 2007, the government finally abolished the VAT, succeeded in 
decreasing the import tariff on cocoa products from China to zero per cent, and 
adjusted the import tariff on cocoa products to 5 per cent.  
The second meeting between AIKI and President Yudhoyono occurred just before 
the president stood for re-election for the second period in 2009. At this meeting IKI 
raised the topic of the remaining proposed regulations that had not as yet been 
delivered by the government, i.e., the export tax. Six months after the election, 
which saw Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono elected for a second term, the export tariff 
on cocoa beans was imposed by the Ministerial Decree of Finance Minister (dated 
01 April 2010 No.67/2010).  
In short, upgrading activities in Indonesia’s cocoa industry were highly influenced by 
consistent lobbying activities conducted by industry players seeking rent-seeking 
opportunities from that state. These activities succeeded in influencing the 
government to institute regulations that favoured cocoa processing companies, 
although we can only speculate as to what benefits, if any, flowed to those policy-
makers within the government.   
4.5 Impacts of state programs on different actors 
This final sub section of this chapter, explores the impact of increasing numbers of 
state programs and policies on various actors in the chains, with a focus on the 
farmers and Indonesia’s cocoa industry.  
4.5.1 Farmers 
The government approach to addressing technical issues directly seemed to provide 
a cure for the national production problems. But, in fact, the solutions only cured 
some of the problems at best. In order to achieve long term and sustainable cocoa 
production, the farmers required continuous support and technical assistance. 
Unfortunately, the GERNAS program was funded based upon the project term, 
which was three years duration. The question, therefore, was: could the 
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government maintain continuous technical assistance when the project fund had 
finished?  One of the findings vis-a-vis Manokwari, West Papua showed that 
program intensification and technical assistance were translated as inputs to 
smallholder farmers. Field technicians, who were recruited as temporary staff to 
provide technical assistance, only worked for the duration of the project.  As a 
result, the program intensification that was intended to improve the cocoa farms 
was only effective during the first year the project was implemented. In addition, 
the sustainability of smallholder production lay in the farmers’ capability to earn 
profit from their cocoa farms (Neilson, 2007).  
Another issue that was equally important to highlight is the project mentality that 
leads to the ‘supply driven’ approach of GERNAS program. Some observation in the 
field shows that SE planting material and post-harvest handling equipment did not 
meet the need of farmers. SE planting material was poorly adapted in new 
locations, while the drying machines and the fermentation boxes were generally too 
big for smallholder farmers.  As a result, the benefit of GERNAS for farmers, as 
observed from the field, is considered minimum. In many instance, farmers 
themselves who strove to improve their farming conditions, proactively sought local 
planting material to replace the SE planting material from the GERNAS project. 
Therefore, while the GERNAS program’s provision of solutions to technical issues 
was important, the absence of continuous supports and the strong project 
mentality likely reduced the GERNAS benefit to smallholder farmers.  
4.5.2 Cocoa industry 
4.5.2.1 Impact at the national level 
Government commitment to support trade policies that favoured cocoa processing 
companies in Indonesia successfully attracted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the 
cocoa industry and also triggered expansion of the processing facilities of some 
domestic processors. FDI came in two ways: first, through establishing completely 
new cocoa processing facilities which accounted for approximately 240,000 tonnes 
installed capacity (PT Asia Cocoa Indonesia, JB Cocoa and Cargill); and, second, 
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through acquisition of domestic processors and expanding the installed processing 
capacity at the same time. For example, Barry Callebaut’s acquisition of General 
Food Industries, which was previously owned by Petra Food Indonesia. The second 
form of FDI expansion required the establishing of joint venture companies between 
foreign companies and local traders, e.g., PT. Barry Callebaut Comextra Indonesia 
(BCCI). Some domestic processors pursued expansion facilities such as Bumi 
Tangerang Mesindotama. In 2013, subsequent to the introduction of the export 
tariff, the total new installed capacity of cocoa processing facilities reached 304,000 
tonnes (see Table 4-5). 
What is interesting in the data (Table 4-5) is that all of the domestic companies that 
upgraded their production facilities have emerged as the biggest players in the 
Indonesian cocoa industry; and have established marketing networks at the global 
level or with strong global buyers. Today, three companies are owned or partially 
owned by foreign companies, e.g., PT. Mars Indonesia a subsidiary company of Mars 
Inc. The other two, PT. Barry Callebaut-Comextra Indonesia and PT. Papandayan 
cocoa industries are affiliated with international Barry Callebaut International. The 
only domestically-owned company that upgraded its facilities is PT. Bumi Tangerang 
Mesindotama, which is an important supplier to Nestlé.  
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Table ‎4-5 Comparison of total grinding facilities before and after the introduction of 
export 
NO Companies 
Installed Capacity (tonnes/year)  
2006-2007 
2013 
Operated Not operated 
1 PT. General Food Industries 
(Becoming PT. Papandayan Cocoa 
Industries-Barry Callebaut) 
70,000 120,000   
2 PT. Bumi Tangerang Mesindotama 40,000      
100,000.0  
  
3 PT. Effem Indonesia 
New name: PT. Mars Indonesia 
(the same owner, Mars company) 
17,000 30000   
4 PT. Kakao Mas Gemilang 6,000 6000   
5 PT. Mas Ganda 6,000 5000   
6 PT. Cocoa Ventures Indonesia 12,000 14000   
7 PT. TejaSekawan 12,000 24000   
8 PT. DavomasAbadi ,Tbk 20,000   20,000 
9 PT. Budidayakakao Lestari 8,000   15,000 
10 PT. Unicom makassar 15,000   15,000 
11 PT. Poleco 4,000   4000 
12 PT. MajuBersama 25,000   25000 
  NEW INVESTMENTS       
13 PT. Asia Cocoa Indonesia   120,000   
14 JB Cocoa   30,000   
15 Barry Callebaut-Comextra 
Indonesia 
  30,000   
16 Cargill   60,000   
  Total Grinding Capacity 235,000 539,000 79,000 
Source: ASKINDO, 2013 
4.5.2.2 Impact at the regional level 
At the regional and global levels, the upgrading process that occurred in Indonesia 
has changed the landscape of cocoa grinding countries. At the regional level, i.e., 
Asia and Oceania, the share of Indonesian grinding has doubled within four years 
(see Table 4-6), becoming the largest cocoa grinding country in the region. Globally, 
Indonesia’s contribution increased from 3.4 per cent to 7.4 per cent. 
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Table ‎4-6 Grinding of cocoa beans: regional producers (2010-2014)  
Asia & 
Oceania 
2010/11 2011/12 
Estimates 
2012/2013 
Forecast 
2013/14 
(000) 
Tonnes % 
(000) 
Tonnes % 
(000) 
Tonnes % 
(000) 
Tonnes % 
Indonesi
a 130 17.9 270 30.9 255 
29.
9 315 35.6 
Malaysia 315 43.4 297 34.0 293 
34.
4 260 29.4 
Others 280 38.6 307 35.2 304 
35.
7 310 35.0 
Total  725   873   852   885   
Source: ICCO, 2014 
The increasing presence of global processors and their networks in Indonesia has 
negatively impacted on small processors. The new processors have engaged in 
fierce competition to source their cocoa beans in Indonesia. While the current 
installed capacity is in excess of six hundred thousand tonnes per year (see Table 4-
5), total national production in 2013/14 was far below the installed capacity at 425 
thousand tonnes per year. At the same time, this total production is also shared by 
global exporters who are affiliated with sizable global chocolate manufacturers 
operating overseas. The latest forecast data in 2013/14 showed that the potential 
for total processed cocoa beans for that year was only 310 thousand tonnes,   
approximately around fifty per cent of Indonesia’s entire installed processing 
capacity.    
In short, the Indonesian government’s support for cocoa processing upgrading 
activities in Indonesia could be considered significant, as Indonesia’s trade policy 
has attracted FDI. However, apropos of the existing domestic processors, only those 
big companies that have established strong networks with global buyers are capable 
of maximizing this opportunity. Smaller processing companies are struggling to 
maintain their operations. Given that the products are considered commodities, the 
profit margin would be very thin: profitability relies upon the operation’s degree of 
efficiency. The larger the installed capacity, the most likely the companies will 
achieve a more efficient operation. In addition, linking to global buyers is extremely 
important given that processers need first to secure contracts to be able to plan 
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their production in advance. This reinforces the central role played by lead firms in 
facilitating the upgrading process within the value chain, and indeed, the abject 
failure of the Gowa chocolate factory serves as a warning of the perils of attempting 
supply-side upgrading without considering value chain dynamics. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the state’s role in driving cocoa industry upgrading 
through programs and trade policies. A detailed discussion has been presented vis-
a-vis (a) what factors have driven increasing state involvement in supporting 
production upgrading; (b) what factors have influenced the shift of policy in the 
areas of marketing and trading; (c) how programs and policies are being shaped and 
developed by the government; and (d) what has been the impact of the increasing 
number of state programs and policies on the various actors within the chain. 
Section 4.2 provides an explanation of socio-political economic development in 
Indonesia and how it has been influenced by state democratisation and the 
government’s decentralization process. In this section, I have described the 
democratization process, and how decentralization in Indonesia is paradoxically 
reviving the authoritarian state legacy of predatory capitalism. The increasing 
authority of local governments in the sphere of fiscal development, together with 
the increasing power of local parliaments, has revitalized rent seeking activities and 
collusion between bureaucrats and politicians. This sub-section has shown the 
importance of understanding economic development in Indonesia, not in isolation 
from the socio-political institutions embedded within the state. This analytical 
perspective was employed to provide an understanding of the state-driven 
upgrading activities that have been discussed in the sub sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
In section 4.3, I discussed the factors that have motivated the state to upgrade 
national production, both the earlier stages of cocoa industry development as well 
as the latest programs. As in the earlier stages, in the 1980s, government support 
was driven by the effort to expand cocoa production. The commodity is a cash crop, 
a perfect source of income for the rural poor. The majority of the programs were 
either loan-aid projects supported by international development agencies or from 
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the developed countries. Two decades later, state intervention to upgrade 
smallholder farmers has mainly been driven by its intention to maintain and 
improve production through intensification. Cocoa trees have not only been aging: 
most of them have been infested by pests and ravaged by disease. Some of the 
trees need to be replanted using completely new seeds: others require 
rehabilitation and proper maintenance.  
Section 4.4 has explored and discussed the embedded socio-political factors that 
drive state upgrading interventions both in cocoa production and cocoa processing. 
On the production side, investigation established that the state effort to provide 
income through cash crops for the majority of poor people in Indonesia’s rural areas 
was the major factor. In addition, security reasons and political interests have been 
factors influencing the state to support upgrading. Regarding security reasons, in 
the 1980s, many ex-rebels emerged from the forests wherein cocoa farming had 
been a familiar commodity for them. Subsequently, state support was mainly tied to 
political reasons, such as the need to sure up electoral votes. Politicians utilized the 
cocoa programs to show the voters, and influential local bureaucrats, their degree 
of concern regarding the smallholders’ livelihoods and their cocoa farming.  
On the processing side, state support was exercised through trade policies. The VAT 
and the export tariff were the instruments used by the state to facilitate domestic 
upgrading. Important findings were that the nationalist rhetoric and constant 
industry lobbyists’ appeals to the government heavily influenced the government’s 
decision to pursue its trade policies. Whereas the rhetoric of economic nationalism 
emphasised the need for value-added activities in the country, and promoted the 
processing of raw materials domestically for ostensibly geopolitical reasons, the 
notion that neighbouring countries enjoyed the value-added aspect of the cocoa 
beans was widely disseminated by state bureaucrats. An argument mounted by the 
government claimed that by imposing the export tariff, for example, domestic 
investment would accelerate, and compensate for the inefficiency of the country’s 
logistical infrastructures. In the interim, the government would, it was claimed, 
continue to improve its infrastructure facilities. The other factor that highly 
influenced the state to exercise trade policies was the constant effort by the 
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processors’ association to advocate trade policies as a vital instrument for national 
industry upgrading. Since the implementation of VAT in 2001, the cocoa processors 
had been delineating the negative impact of the policy to the government, 
advocating two policies at the same time: (1) enacting the VAT; and (2) imposing the 
export tariff to accelerate the upgrading process. Constant lobbying through various 
approaches to the state bureaucrats succeeded in enacting the VAT in 2007, and the 
imposition of an export tariff in 2010.  It took longer for the export tariff to be 
endorsed, since this policy had been fiercely contested by cocoa traders and 
exporters who argued that the export tariff would reduce the farmers’ incomes. 
Section 4.5 explains the impact of government upgrading on the actors in the value 
chains. There were two main actors that were directly impacted on the state’s 
upgrading interventions: the farmers and the cocoa processors. The government 
support for production upgrading was mostly on a relatively short term basis; and 
tended to selectively ignore the more dynamic aspects of private sector 
involvement in providing farmer support services. In fact, any provision of 
sustainable income and profit for the smallholder farmers required consistent 
support, either from the government or from the private sector. On the other hand, 
the impact of government support for the upgrading of cocoa processors was highly 
significant. After three years of export tariff implementation, the installed capacity 
of processing facilities had doubled their investment, mainly as FDI. However, it was 
only the big companies that could maximize the opportunity, given that most of 
these companies were strongly linked to global buyers. Smaller companies that 
operated below 20,000 tonnes per year struggled to maintain their operations for 
various reasons, mainly related to raw materials competition and securing contracts 
for their products.  Thus, despite the advantage they had gained from the export 
tariff, linking up with the global buyers became a critical factor when tapping for 
opportunities.   
In the main, this chapter has discussed how the state supported the upgrading 
process, and increasingly shifted its trade and marketing policy to a ‘hands-on’ 
policy. It became clear that in order to understand the economic development 
process in this context, the upgrading process in the cocoa industry required wider 
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perspective in the institutional settings wherein the upgrading process takes place. 
This chapter has shown that the socio-political context embedded in the upgrading 
process had strong influential factors that shaped the process and outcome of the 
upgrading activities.  
The following two chapters will draw upon case studies of how development 
agencies and lead firms exercised their upgrading activities by a employing the 
Value Chain approach. In particular, they will show how the development strategies 
of Development Agencies that were oriented towards neo-liberal institutions 
interplayed with the Value Chain Approach (Chapter 5), and how lead firms 
strategized their upgrading interventions and integrated their support for poor 
smallholder farmers in the global value chains of the cocoa industry (Chapter 6). 
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5 DEVELOPMENT AGENCY-DRIVEN 
UPGRADING  
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CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPMENT AGENCY DRIVEN UPGRADING  
5.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, I will discuss development agency-driven upgrading activities in the 
cocoa sector in Indonesia, and the intersection between development programs and 
the concept of upgrading in the Value Chain Approach (VCA). I will discuss the 
increasing role of lead firms in the development agencies program, and how 
agencies that tend towards a neo-liberal paradigm adjusted their program 
interventions for poverty reduction, making them more inclusive and tailored to the 
needs of the poor.  
I will argue that the intersection between the development intervention program 
and the VCA was in the area of tactical approach to poverty alleviation through the 
upgrading concept of the GVC, the increasing role of lead firms in driving the 
upgrading process,  and in the institutional interests of donor agencies.  
This chapter will start by discussing the increasing adoption of VCA by global 
development agencies: then it will explore upgrading cases driven by development 
agencies. Finally, it will discuss the interplay between the development agencies’ 
program and the VCA for development interventions. 
5.2 Development strategies and Value Chain Applications (VCA) in the context 
of development programs 
5.2.1 Reflection on development strategies 
Neo-classical economics nurtures a longstanding pro-growth paradigm supported by 
free market competition. This can be referred to by the well-known “Washington 
Consensus”, reflecting the policy position of the IMF, World Bank, and US Federal 
Treasury in the 1990s. The Washington Consensus was treated as a general policy 
guideline for economic development by the IMF and the World Bank, and set out 
essentially a neoliberal development strategy for developing countries, as explained 
earlier in Chapter 2.  
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The paradigm and the approach, however, invited criticism due to a general 
ignorance of the ground conditions in the developing countries, e.g., the inability to 
cope with the poor and their social conditions. Particular concerns focused on the 
endorsement of free market competition that failed to recognise the imperfect 
situation and institutional environments of the poor. A prominent example of this 
imperfect situation for rural farmers in developing countries was their inability to 
access financial support from banks due to lack of collateral, and their inability to 
deal with global buyers due to the complexity of market requirements. 
After attempting to cope with the reality on the ground, dominant development 
agencies such as the World Bank increasingly recognised the weakness of the 
approach, and proposed a more comprehensive approach that would not only 
incorporate local social conditions and institutions, but also acknowledged the 
existence of imperfect markets. This is reflected in the various proposed approaches 
discussed in Chapter two, and referred to as the ‘Post Washington Consensus’. It 
was argued that the focus of the World Bank began to change under the 
“presidency of James Wolfenson with funding projects that had a more direct effect 
on poverty” (Lancaster, 2007, p. 50).  
This chapter will explore how the Development Agency organizations which leaned 
towards a free market paradigm, such as the World Bank groups and USAID, began 
promoting their pro-poor development strategies through a sectoral approach that 
embraced the discourse of value chains. 
5.2.2 VCA application by development agencies 
The VCA approach seemed to provide a bridge between the consistent holding of a 
neo-liberal economic paradigm and the need to directly address the issue of 
persistently imperfect market conditions for the poor. Over the last few decades, 
many international development agencies, both multilateral and bilateral donor 
agencies, have increasingly adopted the VCA approach (Neilson, 2014). 
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5.2.2.1 Multilateral donor agencies 
Multilateral donor agencies include the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the World 
Bank (Subramanian et al., 2007; Webber & Labaste, 2010). UNIDO adopted the VCA 
approach mainly to support small-scale producers’ (SMEs) general industrial 
development, and to support small-scale farmers vis-á-vis agro-industry 
improvement in developing countries. For example, in India, VCA was introduced by 
UNIDO to support SMEs in the automotive industry component. UNIDO endorsed 
the partnership program to upgrade the SMEs and to integrate them into the global 
automotive industry (Kaplinsky & Readman, 2001).  In the case of the small-scale 
farmers interventions for agro-industry development, UNIDO oriented its support 
towards publishing strategic documents on how to design and implement a pro-
poor value chain for development that incorporates the technical and social 
dimensions (UNIDO, 2011). As well, it focused on how to assess value chain 
interventions that were more engaged with poverty, gender and the environment 
(Henriksen, Riisgaard, Ponte, Hartwich, & Kormawa, 2010). In short, the VCA was 
adopted as a key strategy to translate its support to the weakest producers in global 
value chains. 
Another major development organisation that employed VCA within the last 
decades was the World Bank, which published a guidance document on how to 
employ the VCA to support agriculture and rural development (Webber & Labaste, 
2010). The joint facility of the World Bank groups, i.e., The Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service (FIAS), published guidance in the form of how to use VCA to 
improve the Business Enabling Environment (BEE) (Subramanian et al., 2007). 
Apropos of this VCA, the World Bank combined the competitiveness concept from a 
management perspective (Porter, 1990) with the value chains upgrading concept 
from a development perspective (Gereffi et al., 2001). 
5.2.2.2 Bilateral donor agencies 
Along with the multilateral organisations, individual (bilateral) development 
agencies adopted the value chains concept of development such as the SNV (Baan & 
Janssen, 2006),  USAID (Gammage, 2009; Goldmark & Barber, 2005; Kula et al., 
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2006; Steen et al., 2005; USAID, 2009), and the GTZ (GTZ, 2008; Humphrey, 2005; 
Stamm, 2004). 
The SNV justified its adoption of the Value Chain Approach (VCA) as pro-poor 
development, claiming that the method offered a market-based solution to 
supporting the poor. Furthermore, it claimed the VCA could be used as a strategy to 
improve inclusion of small-scale producers into the global market that in turn would 
provide opportunities for the poor to improve their productivity, increase their 
incomes, and provide new employment opportunities.  The SNV demonstrated the 
application of the VCA in various development programs, such as empowering 
Nepal’s cardamom farmers, improving market linkages, facilitating tea farmer 
groups’ entry into green tea global value chains, and supporting poor local 
communities via a community-based tourism project (Baan & Janssen, 2006).  
USAID employed the VCA to translate its economic growth with poverty reduction 
into a practical strategy. For this organization, the capability to combine an 
‘economic growth’ mission with a ‘poverty alleviation’ purpose was the main 
advantage of using the VCA, two purposes that had previously been seen as 
separate in the donors’ perception (Kula et al., 2006). USAID subsequently published 
VCA guidance for program design and implementation: (a) to design and support 
the competitiveness of small-scale firms in a global value chains (Goldmark & 
Barber, 2005; Kula et al., 2006); and (b) to improve the productivity of MSEs (Micro 
and Small Entreprises) in the agriculture sector that had implications for the 
prosperity of poor communities, and integrate them into global value chains in the 
agricultural industry (Steen et al., 2005). As well, there was as a guide to assessing 
the gender and pro-poor aspects of program interventions (Gammage, 2009).  
Similar to USAID, GTZ published a guide on how to design and implement a VCA for 
development (titled a ValueLinks manual (GTZ, 2008)). The manual, which was 
designed to provide guidance for GTZ implementers, put great emphasis on 
upgrading activities as a basis for program intervention and formulation. Prior to 
this manual, two documents were published; a concept study of how a VCA was 
imperative for trade policy and the promotion of economic development (Stamm, 
2004), and a study of how a VCA could enhance agribusiness development in 
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developing countries (Humphrey, 2005). Both studies provide a thorough analysis of 
the global market challenges, their impact on the poor communities, and the 
changing approach of development interventions that emphasised broader 
economic and social dimensions. Thus, this study seemed to provide the foundation 
for the adoption of a VCA by the GTZ, and the publishing of the ValueLinks manual. 
Looking at the major interventions, the application of the VCA for development has 
ranged from improving the business climate and trade policies (Stamm, 2004; 
Subramanian et al., 2007), humanizing working conditions (Herr & Muzira, 2009), 
promoting gender equity (Barrientos et al., 2003; USAID, 2009), facilitating the 
integration of MSEs into global value chains (Kaplinsky & Readman, 2001; Kula et al., 
2006), and supporting small-scale producers in the agricultural sector (Humphrey, 
2005; Steen et al., 2005). All of these program designs and interventions were 
tailored to development strategies supporting economic growth and poverty 
alleviation in developing countries.  
In terms of agriculture, the idea of linking small-scale producers, such as smallholder 
farmers, to global buyers or lead firms has been considered a significant 
contribution of the value chain approach. It has been credited with reducing the 
numbers of the poor in developing countries. Through this linkage, small-scale 
farmers gain access to global markets that could provide a better price for their 
products; and, they can access the technologies commonly provided by lead firms. It 
was assumed that linking smallholder farmers to global buyers could benefit the 
smallholder farmers; for example, linkages could facilitate product upgrading, which 
meant better quality or/and higher volume, and on-farm efficiency improvements. 
The following case studies will investigate more deeply how development agencies 
such as USAID and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) used the VCA as an 
intervention approach to support poor smallholder farmers in Indonesia. 
5.3 Development agencies’ upgrading activities 
Both USAID and the IFC, as private sector arm of the World Bank, are considered 
among the biggest drivers of upgrading interventions in the cocoa sector in 
Indonesia. Both organizations have closely associated with or tended towards the 
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neo-liberal policy prescription, hoping that free and open markets will boost 
economic growth. 
Both organizations’ work in the cocoa sector has aimed to improve the economic 
conditions of the rural poor by supporting productivity improvements for 
smallholder farmers. But, during the period 2000-2010, their approach to upgrading 
activities shifted from highly technical solutions towards market and financial 
support. This approach also heralded a shift from direct support for smallholder 
farmers to greater support for lead firms in the Indonesian cocoa industry. In the 
following sub-section, I delineate how this strategy shift occurred and its 
implications for the upgrading process. 
5.3.1 Upgrading farming activities 
5.3.1.1 Finding technical solutions 
The identification of Cocoa Pod Borer (CPB) infestations on the island of Sulawesi in 
the early-mid 1990s was considered a major threat to cocoa production in 
Indonesia. The majority of cocoa farmers at the time were still enjoying ‘forest rent’, 
with relatively few agricultural inputs. Thus, in anticipation of a massive infestation, 
a research project was conducted to find low cost practical solutions that would 
enable farmers to control CPB.   
To this end, a project funded by USDA in collaboration with the Indonesian Coffee 
and Cocoa Research Institute (ICCRI) and the ASKINDO was conducted in Sulawesi 
between 1995 and 1998, known as the CPB Management Project (personal 
communication with ASKINDO, 18 August 2010). The project was initiated to 
identify a method of controlling CPB. The result was the introduction of four main 
farming activities: frequent harvesting (Panen sering); pruning (Pemangkasan); 
sanitation of pod husks and litter (Sanitasi); and, fertilising (Pemupukan), activities 
commonly recognised by the Indonesian acronym PsPSP’ (Agricultural Cooperative 
Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance 
(ACDI VOCA), 2005, pp. 18-19).   
The method was promoted as a low cost practice to control CPB that would ensure 
productivity improvement of the cocoa trees. It was considered low cost, given that 
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the major practice relied on mechanical prevention rather than using high cost 
pesticides and other chemical inputs, although it did require increased allocation of 
labour.  In order to prevent the CPB inside the pods from multiplying, infested pods 
were regularly removed from gardens. The second practice involved pruning 
activities. Pruning not only creates better air circulation, but allows more sunlight 
into the gardens, a practice that impacts unfavorably on the adult CPB moth 
environment. The third practice, sanitation, cuts into the life cycle of the CPB. Larvas 
living in the pod husks are killed either by burying them or covering them with 
plastic for several days. The last practice is fertilizing. Cocoa plants rendered healthy 
through better soil fertility and nutrition, cab better resist CPB Infection. However, 
farmers were advised to compost and use organic fertilisers rather than chemical 
fertilisers (ACDI VOCA, 2005). 
Contrasting with the above argument of introducing supposedly low cost practices, 
Ruf6 observed two major points about standard practices resulting from the project. 
First, a hidden aim of USDA funded research was to eliminate the use of pesticides 
in CPB management, since there were concerns over pesticide residues in cocoa 
shipments to the US. In fact, pesticides had been used as an effective control of CPB 
in the mind 1990s, mainly in the Island of Sulawesi and in Sabah (Ruf & Yoddang, 
2004, p. 156). Secondly, frequent harvesting had been widespread during the high 
yield-forest rent period, but had been progressively abandoned due to declining 
yields.   
In any ways, the research project succeeded in combined low material input 
practices that had been expected to control CPB with increased labour allocation. 
The recommended practices were, therefore, promoted to become a minimum 
standard practice in cocoa farming activities. 
5.3.1.2 Technology transfer 
In order to disseminate the method, the USDA funded a project called the 
Sustainable Cocoa Enterprise Solutions (SUCCESS) project, which was launched in 
2000 in Sulawesi. The main aim of the project was to develop and disseminate the 
                                                        
6 This view was observed as a part of examiner feedbacks for this thesis. 
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PsPSP techniques among cocoa farmers. Farming practice techniques that 
emphasised non-pesticide usage were promoted using the Farmers Field School 
(FFS) method. The information was then passed on to those cocoa farmers who 
were considered lacking in technical knowledge using various project interventions, 
the main aim being to disseminate technical knowledge. 
At the end of the three year program, in 2003, ACDI VOCA, the implementer of the 
project reported successful dissemination using the FFS method.  The project 
reportedly trained approximately 35,000 farmers and disseminated a Video 
Compact Disc (VCD) containing the CPB control method. Ultimately, it was 
estimated to reach 59,000 farmers (ACDI VOCA 2005, pp. 11-12) 
Building upon the SUCCESS project, and the dissemination of PsPSP farming 
methods, USAID Indonesia, Mars Inc, and the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) 
formed the SUCCESS Alliance Project. The alliance reflected the increasing 
involvement of global buyers, such as Mars Inc and the numerous international 
buyers represented through the WCF, as partners in development interventions. 
The project was established to achieve two main objectives (ACDI VOCA, 2005, p. 
13):   
(1) Improve the quantity and quality of smallholder farmer-grown cocoa in 
Indonesia through the adoption of good crop husbandry methods and 
effective integrated pest management practices and maintain a regular 
source of income for cocoa farmers 
(2) Strengthen the partnership between the local governments, universities 
and farmer groups and the US private sector to better utilize resources to 
support the sustainable development of the cocoa industry while ensuring 
the conservation of the forest base.  
The main three distinctions from the previous SUCCESS project were: (1) additional 
bio-control methods as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and the promotion of a 
side grafting method to rehabilitate the aging cocoa trees; (2) the support of farmer 
groups and the establishment of a business development service that was prepared 
to continue to serve cocoa farmers; and, (3) wider coverage areas. This SUCCESS 
Alliance project, extended the coverage areas, not only in Sulawesi and Papua, but 
also in North Sumatera, and Bali.  
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The SUCCESS Alliance project succeeded in training 30,665 farmers using the FFS 
method, including trained farmers in side-grafting and in business management. The 
project formed and trained 31 farmer groups, disseminated VCDs containing 
standard farming practice among 69,439 farmers, and estimated approximately 
271,000 beneficiaries of communication programs through this media. The project 
claimed to have increased individual farmers’ savings of $435 as a result of their 
participation in the FFS during the three year implementation period (ACDI VOCA, 
2005, p. 16). 
It seems that the SUCCESS and the SUCCESS Alliance projects emphasized reaching 
targets for the number of farmers trained.  This approach reflected the USAID 
Result-Based Management approach that was embraced during the 1990s. 
According to Lancaster (2007), Result-Based Management was a tool that was 
created to manage public programs and expenditure. It was adopted by the private 
sector, where a project was measured based on measurable results expected within 
a given time period. But, as Lancaster points out, there were limitations to this kind 
of approach wherein data used for indicators was sometimes unreliable; and, 
attributing changes to the indicators to aid interventions was problematic.  In 
addition, Lancaster highlighted that this approach only emphasised the 
dissemination of technology: it poorly incorporated any understanding of the 
complex social conditions of aid beneficiaries.  
In the final year of the SUCCESS Alliance project, my interviews with several field 
technicians identified the various economic and social factors that  hindered 
farmers’ implementation of the full practices of the recommended method. These 
included economic factors such as lack of motivation due to the unavailability of 
price incentives for better quality, lack of cash to buy fertilisers, and competing 
crops and income generation which divided the time they spent in the cocoa 
gardens. The social factors were mainly rooted in a ‘zero maintenance’ mindset 
derived from the advantages of ‘forest rent’, uncertainty of land ownership due to 
historical land opening (which was either owned by the government or by local 
ethnic groups as a part of customary land), and from the local practice of short-term 
share cropping arrangements. Share croppers focused more on harvesting pods and 
avoided re-investing in the next harvest seasons (ACDI VOCA, 2005). 
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The Success Alliance project ended in 2005. It had tried to resolve as many main 
economic issues as possible in a relatively short period of time, including market 
linkages for a better price. An initial partner was PT. Mitra Celebes, a subsidiary of 
Continaf and a supplier of Blommer Chocolate USA.  Blommer were traditional 
buyers of Sulawesi cocoa beans; but, since the CPB outbreak, Bloomer’s supply from 
Sulawesi had declined. The partnership involving three organisations - Bloomer, 
SUCCESS and Continaf (BSC) - was intended to increase the flow of quality cocoa to 
Blommer USA by increasing the linkages between SUCCESS Alumni farmers, 
intermediate traders and Continaf/PT. Mitra Celebes. It was reported that by 
October 2005, Blommer had purchased close to nine million US dollars worth of 
cocoa beans through the program  (ACDI VOCA, 2005, p. 61). 
Even though some farmers succeeded in accessing the market, this market linkage 
program only existed during the last several months of the project, and in response 
to farmers’ requests regarding incentives to provide good quality beans. It was clear 
that the project was not directly designed to conduct a market linkage program, but 
mainly to provide a technical solution to addressing pest and disease infestations. 
In summary, the three projects applied a ‘supply driven’ intervention approach to 
upgrade the technical capacity of Indonesia’s cocoa farmers. The PsPSP method was 
promoted intensively and disseminated among the cocoa farmers, the main target 
being to train as many cocoa farmers as possible. This dissemination project was 
conducted from one particular area to another during the whole year of the project 
intervention. In effect, this was the main weaknesses of the ‘supply driven’ 
approach. The approach was founded on a project basis: everybody got a similar 
package of knowledge (Berry, 2012), whereas the fact was that the farmers had 
different demands relevant to solving their varied farming issues. 
5.3.1.3 Integration of market linkage and technical support 
After three consecutive projects aimed to support cocoa farmers through 
technological means, USAID then supported a project that was specifically designed 
to apply a Value Chain Linkage approach (known as the Agribusiness Market and 
Support Activity (AMARTA) program). AMARTA built on the market linkages that 
were being formed during the latter stages of the SUCCESS Alliance program 
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(Badcock, Matlick, & Baon, 2007, p. 15). The design document claimed that the main 
reason driving the approach involved: 
Utilizing ‘market pull’ as a catalyst for improvements to smallholder cocoa 
production and quality, farmers have been slow to adopt interventions that 
control CPB because there has been an absence of market linkages. 
AMARTA will develop and implement models that connect farmer groups 
with exporters and processors. The result expected is that the quality 
premium paid by processors will reach the farmer, encouraging the farmer 
to adopt measures that will improve the quality (Badcock et al., 2007, p. 15) 
This happened because the premium price paid by the exporters was only enjoyed 
by some traders and collectors.  
Generally speaking, collectors and traders were maximizing profit by combining 
high-quality beans with sub-standard beans. This resulted in average export 
standard beans by combining cocoa waste to reach a maximum 2.5 per cent, the 
highest waste limit of the Indonesian national standard. At the exporter level, 
sometimes this waste was separated again before exporting to international buyers. 
For the grading and cleaning activities conducted by exporters, the international 
buyers paid a premium price to the exporters. Thus, this premium price did not filter 
through to the smallholder farmers. The ultimate outcome was that the farmers 
were discouraged from producing good quality beans, due to lack of incentive to do 
so. 
For this reason, the AMARTA project was delivered to improve the adoption of the 
recommended farming method by integrating technical assistance into the supply 
chain. Price incentives would be delivered through local collectors and traders in the 
traditional supply chain of cocoa beans. AMARTA supported a cocoa exporter to 
establish buying stations in major producing districts, and to recruit the new field 
staff required for each buying station. By supporting and incorporating technical 
support through the supply chain, it was expected that technical support would 
continuously be available to  smallholder farmers (Badcock et al., 2007).  
At this point, USAID’s support became integrated within the supply chain of global 
buyers. AMARTA decided to work with Blommer Chocolate and one of its suppliers, 
and international exporter, PT. Olam Indonesia.   
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According to an internal evaluation of the program (AMARTA, 2010), it was reported 
that during the technical assistance period 2007-2008, the assisted cocoa farmers 
increased their production by 44 per cent in West Sulawesi, 37 per cent in South 
Sulawesi, and 27 per cent in South East Sulawesi. In terms of quality improvement, 
48 per cent of farmers reached appropriate bean size, 35 per cent fulfilled the 
standard moisture content, 47 per cent got full price due to meeting the waste 
standard, and 40 per cent delivered mould-free beans. Over all, farmers received a 
20-26 per cent higher price when selling to international buyers (Agribusiness 
Market and Support Activity (AMARTA), 2010).  
The USAID projects were a long standing effort to upgrade smallholder cocoa 
farmers. Over the 10 year period, USAID changed its tactical approach from capacity 
development through to providing support for direct training to market linkage 
programs with embedded technical support, in collaboration with large buyers.  
5.3.2 Improving access to finance  
Financial access is one of the critical conditions required to support smallholder 
cocoa farmers in Indonesia. The majority of smallholder cocoa farmers are required 
to buy inputs, and to pay additional labour during farm maintenance and 
harvesting. Without having working capital to improve farming conditions, it seems 
likely that cocoa farmers will be unable to upgrade in sustainable ways. 
5.3.2.1 Imperfect markets for smallholder financing 
The major issues contributing to poor access to finance are related to the absence 
of collateral, farmer’s informal status, their lack of credit history, and, to some 
extent, discrimination by the loan officer due to farmers being illiterate or poorly 
educated (Goldmark & Barber, 2005, p. 16). In addition, from the banking 
perspective, financing small-scale farmers is considered to have high transaction 
costs that will require high interest rate application to enable banks to recover or to 
gain profit from providing financing (Adams, 1992). Combinations of strict loan 
conditions and relatively unattractive consumers have resulted in only a few 
smallholder farmer’s accessing credit from formal banks. 
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A traditional practice involves smallholders accessing finance from their immediate 
buyers. The main advantage of this system is the buyer’s willingness to provide 
credit without requiring formal collateral such as land title. However, local collectors 
charge credit ‘interest’ through a discount price on saleable cocoa beans. Farmers 
are bound to sell their beans to cocoa collectors and to become ‘price takers’, a 
practice that reduces a significant portion of their incomes. By having to rely on 
local collectors as suppliers of financial support for smallholder farmers, ‘profit 
extraction’ practices keep the farmers poor. 
USAID program interventions in the AMARTA II program 2006-2011 tried to provide 
support for micro enterprise by attempting to solve the collateral requirement and 
by supporting a loan guarantee program.  Through this program, access to finance 
was delivered through cooperation with financial institutions such as Bank 
Danamon under USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan guarantee 
program (SEGIR Global Business, 2009) and the IFC through its client bank BTPN. 
As part of the DCA programs, USAID and Danamon Bank agreed to support micro 
and small borrowers through the ‘Danamon Simpan Pinjam (DSP) micro-finance arm 
of Danamon Bank. This cooperation, which commenced in 2005, generally targeted 
small scale enterprises that had a monthly income between Rp. 500,000 and Rp. 
5,000,000 (approximately US$50-US$530). This credit scheme, which was developed 
to provide loans from one to five years lending duration, started with  a very small 
loan, approximately between Rp.100,000 and Rp. 500,000 (US$11-53), and 
gradually expanded subject to borrower consistency and a timely repayment 
history. Danamon disbursed approximately $16 million the form of approximately 
9,348 small business loans,  (SEGIR Global Business, 2009). 
The guarantee programs seemed only to work when a guarantor was available 
related to a project. With reference to lessons learned from various lending 
programs for small-scale farmers and financed by the World Bank, Adams (1992) 
observed that inducing commercial banks to disburse lend guarantee programs for 
small-scale farmers only works for short term periods and has limited impacts. 
Commercial banks involved in this loan guarantee program commonly served a 
limited number of farmers over a short period of time, only to satisfy their public 
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obligations. Furthermore, Adams claims, serving small-scale farmers and micro 
enterprises involved high transaction costs; thus, by extension, high interest rates 
were required for the sustainability of the financial institutions.    
The credit scheme offered by USAID guaranteed the lending program offered by 
Danamon Bank: it provided opportunities for micro enterprise that earned income 
on both a daily and monthly basis. Through the guarantee program, the bank was 
able to expand its customer base since the loans had been secured. However, this 
credit scheme was not adopted by cocoa farmers, as their income cycle was only on 
a seasonal basis. This indicated the most common gap in the credit scheme in 
Indonesia that had been provided commercially by the country’s national banks.  
Inevitably, for the smallholder farmers, this became a burden, as their incomes only 
materialized during the harvest season. In many cases, farmers obtained loans from 
the bank by incorporating their payment several months ahead into the loan 
agreement. This meant that farmers borrowed additional money on top of their 
working capital needs as a reserve from which to pay their monthly payment before 
the harvest season. This became a huge burden for the smallholder farmers, who in 
some cases took out loans much bigger than they needed. 
In short, the characteristic needs of small businesses earning regular monthly 
incomes are different from those of the cocoa farmers who function on a seasonal 
basis. Thus, the credit scheme that was developed for smallholder farmers was 
poorly adapted to the demands of cocoa farming. 
5.3.2.2 Developing inclusive financing 
Based on an effort to understand the smallholder financing environment, the IFC 
opted to provide some pilot projects supporting the smallholder farmers in agri-
financing. Indeed, the core business of IFC was to provide loans to private investors, 
as it was established to serve the financial needs of non-government organisations 
and businesses. As well as running commercial activities, the IFC also provided 
technical assistance and advisory services that worked to upgrade the various 
industrial sectors, including the cocoa sector. 
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For the IFC, the upgrading of smallholder farmers through improving their access to 
financial support had been the main program proposed for the cocoa sector.  It was 
not only driven by its recognition of the failures of the banking industry to serve 
small-scale producers, but was also part of the organisation’s vision to alleviate 
poverty through its strategy of supporting local financial markets (International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), 2013). 
The IFC engaged in the cocoa sector through two main projects: (1) the Agribusiness 
Linkage Program that came under the major umbrella program for Eastern 
Indonesia, known as the SME (PENSA) Assistance, during the period 2003-2008, and 
the SADI programs in the period 2008-2012.  
In 2003, the IFC was granted a multilateral fund to manage the PENSA program, 
with the main purpose of supporting business development. The ultimate goal was 
to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth in Indonesia. PENSA consisted of 
programs in agribusiness linkage, access to finance, oil, gas and mining industry 
linkages, a business enabling environment, and a handicrafts export promotion 
activity. This grant was funded by multilateral donor countries including Australia, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, and Switzerland (IFC, 2003). 
The IFC’s engagement in the cocoa sector was conducted through the agribusiness 
linkage programs (alongside seaweed, maize and poultry programs). The IFC 
strategy to upgrade the cocoa sector would be implemented through lead firms, 
which was expected to drive changes in industry practices. As clearly stated in the 
IFC cocoa report:  
‘...it is important to continue engagement with the cocoa sector with the 
objective of attracting major investments involving large commercial players 
and international financial institutions. Such investments are needed to 
achieve fundamental changes in farming practices, rationalisation of the 
supply chain, and fair trade practices. This will help to realize the 
considerable potential for increased production of higher quality cocoa 
which will encourage further investments in the downstream processing and 
value adding” (IFC, 2003, p. 6). 
The IFC’s direct engagement with small farmers, therefore, was designed only to 
conduct specific small-scale pilot projects, which had the potential to be developed 
further by private lead firms, including through market and financial linkages.  The 
  170 
pilot projects only covered approximately 400 farmers (based on the author’s 
internal report during engagement with the IFC). 
Based on the IFC experience during the PENSA project, the IFC found that the major 
impediment for access to finance programs was the absence of land titles, which 
could otherwise be used as collateral with commercial banks in Indonesia. In 
particular, in the cocoa-producing districts in Sulawesi, our research found that a 
minority of farmers held land titles in the three major cocoa producing districts in 
Sulawesi: Polman (16%), North Kolaka (41%), and North  Luwu (33%)  (Neilson et al., 
2011). 
  
Land titling in Indonesia continues to be an exhausting process which requires 
government official approval at various levels and in different government agencies. 
Formal and ‘informal’ facilitation costs were estimated to be approximately $400 
(Personal communication, with IFC program officer, 20 August 2010). Those farmers 
who did not have land title were generally excluded from subsidized agricultural 
lending programs. 
The following lessons were learnt from the IFC PENSA experience: the scheme 
should exclude the land title requirement; transaction costs should be minimized 
through a farmer group screening process; ensuring that definite buyers are ready 
to buy farmers products, providing field staff who continuously assist farmers; and, 
monitoring the usage of credit by farmers. Lastly, there is a need to design a credit 
disbursement and loan payment system that meets the seasonal cycle of 
commodities being financed (Personal communication, with IFC program officer, 20 
August 2010). 
5.3.2.3 Establishing a commercial agri-finance model 
Building on its IFC PENSA experience, the IFC developed a pilot project of a credit 
scheme to support smallholder farmers under the SADI program through its 
investee client the BTPN Bank. The IFC provided technical assistance to BTPN Bank 
in designing the credit for smallholder farmers on a commercial basis.  
What is new and important in the IFC pilot agri-financing scheme is a reliable 
mechanism and data base for each individual farmer. This helped the banks to 
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obtain comprehensive information about their consumers. In order to meet this 
need, the IFC relies upon a data base provided by a lead firm. In the context of the 
pilot project, Armajaro, another investee client of IFC, saw an opportunity to 
exercise leverage and to utilize the increasing amount of voluntarily certified cocoa 
beans (UTZ certification and Rainforest Alliance) as the platform for data screening. 
Through this certification process, detailed demographic and production data on 
individual farmers are collected and audited.  In this regard, the requirement for 
land title is replaced by ‘voluntary certification’ by an international agency, which is 
paid for by the buyers.  
The above credit scheme had three requirement: i) proof of residence (KTP); ii) to 
be a member of a farmer group; and, iii) be recommended by a lead firm. The last 
condition was essential, given that credit worthiness relied upon certification. Thus, 
certified farmers were seen as low risk due to the certification premium they could 
obtain by selling through Armajaro. To operate this new credit scheme, the BPTN 
bank recruited field staff who had agricultural backgrounds and were capable of 
administering and monitoring the loans.  
In terms of disbursements and loan payments, the loan package was developed and 
tailored to the seasonal cocoa cycle. The loan package consisted of working capital 
for labour to conduct pruning and harvesting, and for fertilizers.  The total loan 
amounted to six million rupiah for one hectare of cocoa farm. Even though the total 
credit duration was for one year, the farmers were expected to pay the first cycle of 
the credit soon after the harvest season arrived (See Table 5.1 for more detail). 
Farmers were required to sell their cocoa beans to the lead firm through farmer 
groups. And, Armajaro, as the lead firm, would deduct the loan payment and pay it 
into the BTPN bank, as the financial providers. 
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Table ‎5-1 Agri-finance package for smallholder cocoa farmers, developed by the IFC 
and the BTPN Bank 
Credit 
Cycle 
Credit Disbursement Loan Repayment 
Month 
Type of 
loan 
Value (Rp) Month Value (Rp) 
Cycle 1 
(Decembe
r-June) 
December 
Cash 
907,000 April (harvest 
1) 
         
763,600  
Fertilizer 
1,428,000 May (harvest 
2) 
      
1,718,100  
February 
Cash 
955,000 June (harvest 
3) 
      
1,336,300  
Cycle 2 
(July-
Novembe
r) 
July 
Cash 
790,000 September 
(harvest 1) 
         
602,400  
Fertilizer 
1,278,000 October 
(harvest 2) 
      
1,355,400  
August 
Cash 
642,000 November 
(harvest 3) 
      
1,054,200  
Total Credit 6,000,000 
Total 
Repayment 
      
6,830,000  
Source: Author, based on raw data provided by the IFC, 2014 
Through this loan package, farmers gained some benefits from increased farm 
inputs and cash loans, loan collection during the selling of produce, and insurance 
for the loan recipient. If a loan recipient died, the loan was settled automatically. In 
addition to the benefits, some capacity building services were provided including an 
interactive learning process and training in Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) via 
demonstration plots and discussions. 
The AMARTA program then attempted to scale-up this model into a commercial 
pilot project expected to cover 6000 smallholder farmers.  This new financing model 
was hoped to increase farmer output by at least 20 per cent if farmers correctly 
applied input and good agricultural practice (Personal communication with IFC 
program officer, 20 January 2014).  
5.3.2.3.1 Disbursement, productivity and net income result 
After three cycles of loan disbursement (from mid-2011 to the end of 2012) the 
program succeeded in disbursing 588 agri-finance packages, including 441 farmers 
(1st cycle, 40 farmers; 2nd cycle, 99 farmers; 3rd cycle 302 farmers) in Polman District, 
West Sulawesi, and 147 farmers in North Luwu district, South Sulawesi (the 
program’s 3rd cycle only).  According to the IFC evaluation, which was based upon 
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the farmers’ survey, in all cycles, the agri finance package seemed to improve cocoa 
production, productivity and net income of the participating farmers, compared to 
non-participating farmers (Table 5.2). 
Table ‎5-2 Economic data comparison of cocoa farmers, between participant and 
non-participant farmers of Agri-Finance program, supported by the IFC 
Items Polman District North Luwu District 
Participant 
Non-
Participant Participant 
Non-
Participant 
Loan (Rp) 
              
2,056,856  
                 
798,525  
                 
2,615,551  
               
1,244,432  
Fertilizer use (kg) 302 241 336 479 
Yield (kg) 810 651 1403 968 
Revenues (Rp) 
           
16,190,308  
           
13,013,419  
              
28,056,684  
             
19,350,329  
Costs (Rp) 
              
4,590,841  
             
2,383,842  
                         
5,176,547 
               
2,962,956  
Net Income (Rp) 
           
11,599,465  
           
10,629,577  
              
22,880,137  
             
16,387,373  
Source: Gusli, 2014 
5.3.2.3.2 Loan outcome efficiency 
In terms of agri-finance package efficiency, the results were mixed. Participant 
farmers in the Polman district showed an unimpressive result. Even though their 
yields and incomes increased, the participant farmers’ efficiency was far from 
impressive when compared to their non-participants, since their costs were also 
considerably higher. 
One of the causes underpinning the high cost was the high price of fertilizer. The 
recommended fertilizers, a premium brand on the market, were not subsidized by 
the government, whereas non-participants were using subsidized fertilizers. 
Furthermore, according to the survey, even though the overall result indicated 
improvement, the revenues and the production costs were imperfectly correlated 
with fertilizer use. This means that several other factors contributed to the farmers’ 
performance, apparently due to a combination of Good Agricultural Practices, such 
as timely pruning, frequent harvesting, good sanitation, and safe pesticide usage, 
together with appropriate fertiliser usage (Gusli, 2014). 
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5.3.2.3.3 The role of buyers 
An important feature of the Agri-Finance project was the important role of 
Armajaro as the off taker. According to an evaluation survey conducted by by Gusli 
(2014) approximately 60 per cent of participant farmers considered that Armajaro 
played a significant role in upgrading farmers’ production and income performance, 
given that the company was providing training packages and paying premium prices.  
However, the involvement of Armajaro did not necessarily ensure loyalty, with only 
36 percent of farmers in Polewali and 72 percent in North Luwu selling their beans 
to the company. It became very clear that side selling occurred in both places; but, 
the percentage in Polman district was much higher, such that , it could easily be 
predicted that the loan payment rate (through deducted payments) in Polman 
district was correspondingly low. 
According to the evaluation survey, two main factors affected this mixed result: the 
farmers’ perceptions of the off-taker, and the social contexts of the farmers. 
Farmers claimed that they did not sell their beans to Armajaro to avoid automatic 
repayments and, the price offered by other buyers was better. In fact, many of the 
participant farmers in the program had a strong relationship with the local buyers. 
In this social context, in Polman, quick cash was a factor with which most farmers 
were concerned, while in North Luwu, price was the primary factor. 
Based on my own experience of the IFC pilot project of linking farmers to banks, 
poor adaptation to crop seasonality remained a key challenge. Furthermore, any 
credit should embed a mechanism to deal with failed seasons, one that resulted in 
the continuity of the loan repayment. Through the Agri-Finance program, the first 
issue of the cycle of credit on a seasonal basis was addressed; but, the second issue 
dealing with crop failure did not satisfy the farmers. In contrast, traditional 
collectors would collect their farmer loans after the harvest, but would be willing to 
postpone repayment following a failed harvest. 
Regardless of the mixed result, the Agri-Finance package for the smallholder 
farmers was an innovative effort to encounter the market failure of Agri-Finance for 
poor people. The IFC, in collaboration with its investee Bank BPTN, together with 
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Armajaro as the off-taker and national Agro input providers, indicated that this 
innovative credit scheme required further adjustment. In particular, it needed to 
reduce the transaction costs, offer cheaper agro inputs, and to have stronger farmer 
groups as the bridging institution between individual farmers and other players in 
the scheme. 
5.4 The intersection of Development Agency programs and the GVC approach 
The stated mission of the development agencies, both USAID and IFC, has been to 
create opportunities for poor people to escape poverty and improve their lives. 
Both institutions agreed that in order to pursue that mission, the private sector 
should be the forefront driver of the development. The above two cases of 
smallholder upgrading of productivity and quality of cocoa beans produced by 
smallholder farmers clearly describe the increasing role of private players or lead 
firms in development agency programs. These programs not only respond to the 
farmers need to have a committed buyer for high quality products, but are also 
driven by the intention to develop sustainable support that would be carried out by 
lead firms.  
In this regard, it is obvious that development programs delivered by agencies were 
embedded with strong economic interests for the participants involved. These 
included the economic interests of: i) the poor; ii) the development agencies 
themselves; and lead firms. The question, therefore, is: how did the economic 
interest stimulated by foreign aid interplay with the value chain development 
approach? Based on the above cases, it seems that there were three main spheres 
in which the interests of development agencies intersected with the VCA. They 
included: (1) the mission of the agencies vis-á-vis poverty alleviation, which was 
implemented through the tactical approach of the GVC’s upgrading concept, (2) the 
establishment of a viable business case for the upgrading process; and, (3) the 
politico-economic interests of the development agencies. 
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5.4.1 Poverty alleviation and the tactical approach to the upgrading concept 
The mission to alleviate poverty, and to provide better income opportunities for the 
people, well resonated with the upgrading concept of GVC. The common premise to 
improve the poor people’s incomes was by improving their productivity, their 
quality product, and linking them to big buyers that valued quality beans. By doing 
so, it was expected to open the path to better livelihoods and an escape from 
poverty. Based on these premises, the development agencies’ mission on poverty 
reduction resonated tactically by employing the upgrading concept of the GVC 
approach.  
Since low-income smallholder farmers contribute approximately 90 per cent of the 
national production, upstream upgrading activities mainly target these 
smallholders. The program mainly provides and disseminates the latest technology 
on GAP and assists those farmers to establish market linkage to global buyers, to be 
able to get a premium price for their products. In short, poverty alleviation is the 
main area in which the development agencies and the GVC approach intersect, 
particularly when translating the poverty reduction program into action.   
5.4.2 Lead firm engagement in sustainable business development 
The effort to establish scalable and viable businesses by engaging with lead firms is 
another area in which the development agencies and the GVC approach intersect. In 
their efforts to build a sustainable business case, both USAID and the IFC 
increasingly engaged with lead firms not only in the design phase, but also in the 
implementation stage.   
Apropos of the USAID program, for example, the objective to improve the adoption 
of the recommended farming methods was designed in a way that integrated 
technical assistance into the supply chain activities. This approach was 
commonplace in the mid-2000s. The agencies shifted their program approach from 
disseminating technical support for cocoa cultivation towards a more market-
oriented approach which emphasised their method of ‘market pull’ strategies; that 
is promoting incentives to encourage the cocoa farmers to adopt the technology 
needed to improve their cocoa farms. Cocoa buyers were integrated into 
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development programs, their main role being to provide a price incentive for the 
best quality cocoa, and, to position buyers as key players in the development 
interventions. The AMARTA project, for example, supported an international cocoa 
exporter linked to US-based cocoa processors, the goal being to establish buying 
stations at the centre of cocoa production and to recruit field staff who had 
technical skills on the GAP that was embedded in each buying station.  In fact, the 
shift of strategy that emphasised market access and incentives was the result of 
previous program assessments and a recommended design that adopted  the value 
chain approach to poverty reduction in the cocoa sector (Kula et al., 2006; 
Panlibuton & Meyer, 2004). 
For the IFC, lead firm arrangements were not new business, since its clients have 
always been lead firms in their respective industries. What was new was its 
approach to investment that promoted ‘inclusive businesses’. As well as being 
commercially viable and scalable, the basic nature of the business model required 
its investees to expand access to goods, services, and income generating 
opportunities for poor people (Jenkins, et al. 2011).  
In the context of the cocoa industry in Indonesia, this approach required lead firms 
to establish close supply arrangements with smallholder suppliers.  It also required 
lead firm field staff to deliver services for smallholder farmers including “buy back” 
arrangements (guaranteed purchase of farmers’ products in return for provision of 
inputs), technical advice, dissemination of best practices, access to credit facilities 
and quality incentives. The IFC agreed to support lead firms in providing these 
services in order to enable the smallholders to achieve success and to be a role 
model for the broader industry (Personal communication with IFC program officer, 
20 January 2014).  This approach was clearly demonstrated in the Agri-Finance 
program (as explained in the previous section).  
As regards the existing scalability outcome of the development agencies’ programs, 
in both cases it became clear that the lead firms were becoming increasingly 
involved in the development agencies program activities in the cocoa sector in 
Indonesia. In particular, they played a role in the effort to improve the livelihoods of 
poor smallholder farmers. 
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5.4.3 Economic interests in value chain upgrading 
Important issues associated with the development agencies’ programs included the 
politico-economic interests of both USAID and the IFC. For USAID, the rationale to 
support the upgrading of activities in the cocoa industry was rooted in its strategic 
goal in Indonesia. The Department of State-USAID strategic goal for Indonesia was 
clearly stated in USAID documents  as follows: to ‘strengthen world economic 
growth, development, and stability while expanding opportunities for United States 
(US) businesses and ensuring economic security for the nation’ (USAID, 2004, p. 41). 
In the context of the US’s economic interest in the cocoa sector, cocoa beans 
produced by smallholder farmers in Sulawesi had been the major raw material for 
chocolate companies in the US. US chocolate manufacturers were the largest 
international buyers of processed cocoa products from Sulawesi, purchasing 
approximately 40 per cent of total cocoa exported from Sulawesi in 2000. The 
importance of the Indonesian cocoa industry reflected future US demand for 
Sulawesi cocoa. US manufacturers were able to process cocoa from Sulawesi as a 
mix of chocolate products7, the assumption being that the beans’ quality would not 
further deteriorate (Badcock et al., 2007).  
As a result of the increasing onset of pests and diseases in Sulawesi in the late 
1990s, the US faced an increasing shortage of supplies from Indonesia. This seems 
to have been one of the driving factors propelling USDA to start its project for 
finding the solution to manage the spread of the CPB, and for subsequent 
interventions by USAID through the Success Alliance and AMARTA programs. 
The adoption of the VCA by USAID in the AMARTA program seems not to have been 
coincidental, given the fact that the share of cocoa beans exported to the US from 
Indonesia continuously declined. The requirement to establish market linkage with 
Blommer, a US-based cocoa processor, through its exporter partner PT Olam 
                                                        
7
Sulawesi beans are well known for their high melting point of their butter; but, they have 
reduced aroma. They are mixed with African or Brazilian chocolate with high aroma but a low 
melting point. 
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Indonesia in the AMARTA program seems to validate this economic interest. Thus, 
USAID’s support for poverty reduction, seemed steeped in political and economic 
interests. 
In the IFC case, it was unique in as much as the institutions, as development 
institutions, had a mandate to work through commercial activities. As enunciated 
clearly in the company statement:  
“IFC is a development institution. But we invest on commercial terms, because 
we believe that market discipline is a powerful driver of consumer choice and 
sustainable growth. We expect our investment to generate financial returns, 
which demonstrates that our clients are generating value for their customers 
efficiently. We also expect our clients to adhere to strict social and 
environmental standards, which ensure that they are generating value for 
customers and investors at the expense of other stakeholders” (Jenkins, 2010).  
Investing in commercial terms means that all decision-making was decided on the 
basis of commercial arrangements.  In the case of the inclusive financing model 
through the agri-finance program, the loan package was developed by the IFC in 
collaboration with investees including BTPN Bank and the Armajaro company. The 
loan model, if successful, was intended to tap huge low income customers for the 
BTPN and potentially loyal and captive suppliers for Armajaro. 
Both cases were trying to show the importance of lead firms in supporting the poor 
through direct support and intervention at the community level, reflecting a value 
chain upgrading model of development. On the other hand, lessons learnt both 
from the market linkage and the agri-finance project indicated that the tactical GVC 
approach in the implementation process seemed to imply a strong, top-down 
approach and little actual empowerment at the farmer group level. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how development agencies have applied the upgrading 
concept to activities in the Indonesian cocoa sector. The chapter has discussed how 
development agencies have shifted their interventionist approach from field 
technology transfer towards the increasing adoption of market linkage programs as 
a result of the increasing application of the Value Chain Approach (VCA) to 
agricultural economic development.  
However, this approach has been adopted not merely because of the increasing 
popularity of the VCA for development as indicated in the introduction to this 
chapter. Rather it has been deeply shaped by the various contextual and socio-
institutional factors. These factors include: the farmers’ need to have committed 
buyers for their products, the lead firms’ anxiety vis-á-vis shortage of supply, and 
the politico-economic interests of the donors. All of these factors collectively 
influence the upgrading process that in turn has affected their approach to using a 
Value Chain mechanism for upgrading activities. Given this fact, the point made by 
Neilson (2014, p. 57) seems valid, that “the adoption of a value chains for 
development discourse reflects the persistent ability of mainstream neo-classical 
economics, and the organisations that embody such thinking, to co-opt critical 
theory and perpetuate long-held commitments to neo-liberal development 
approaches”. The following chapter will explore in depth how lead firms develop 
their own interventions in the effort to upgrade cocoa production in Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 6: LEAD FIRMS-DRIVEN UPGRADING  
6.1 Introduction 
In the literature, lead firms are often described as influential companies that 
exercise their power regarding what to produce, how to produce, and when to 
produce. They are also considered to be sources of learning for new technologies, 
for improving the production process, and for delivering consistent and high quality 
products (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002).  
Lead firm-driven upgrading quite often translates into how said firms facilitate and 
accelerate the upgrading process of their suppliers, either through exercising a high 
product standard for their supplier (Fold & Larsen, 2011) or providing direct support 
for their suppliers (Gereffi, 1999; Gibbon, 2001; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000).  
Exercising standards requirement is often a simple way to drive suppliers to upgrade 
their products and quality. However, this mechanism can frequently only be 
followed by big suppliers or companies. For the smallholder farmers, meeting high 
standard requirements may exclude them from the global value chain (Fold & 
Larsen, 2011). The question is therefore: how can a lead firm exercise an upgrading 
process with a global requirement, e.g., certification standards, and at the same 
time offer solutions to farmers’ potential exclusion from the global market? 
In the context of direct support for upgrading smallholder farmers, lead firms-driven 
upgrading looks promising. Potential technology transfer could be delivered by lead 
firms to improve the productivity of smallholder farmers, the assumption being that 
lead firms could upgrade smallholder farmers with the latest technology of farm 
management. By adopting this technology, poor smallholder farmers can upgrade 
their production and increase their incomes.  However, a consequence may be that 
the poor smallholder farmers will become increasingly dependent on the lead firms. 
Upgrading support quite often requires longer term contracts to allow the 
knowledge transfer to materialize (Brach & Kappel, 2009). In the smallholder case, 
this could see them fall into a captive governance relationship with much more 
powerful actors. 
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This chapter will explore the case study of Mars Incorporated’s farmer development 
support in Indonesia.  In particular, it will explore: (1) the question of how lead firms 
support the upgrading of smallholder cocoa farmers in Indonesia; (2) some 
important factors that drive Mars as a top lead firm in the industry to upgrade 
cocoa farmers in Indonesia; and, (3) how its upgrading support mechanism has 
impacted on various players along the cocoa value chain. 
6.2 Description of Mars 
Mars, one of the lead global firms operating in the Food and Drink industry, was 
founded in 1911 in the United States of America. According to Forbes (2014), the 
company  employs 75000 staff. Its headquarters are in McLean, Virginia, and in 
2013 it reached total sales of $33 billion. It operates six business segments: 
Chocolate, Petcare, Food, Wrigley, Drinks and Symbioscience. Specifically in the 
confectionary industry, the company is the top global lead company in the industry, 
producing the highest net sales value (International Cocoa Organization (ICCO), 
2015). 
Table ‎6-1 Global Confectionary Net Sales Value in 2014 
Company 
Net Sales US$ millions 
Mars Inc (USA) 18480 
Mondelez International Inc (USA) 14350 
Ferrero Group (Luxemburg/Italy) 10,911 
Nestlé SA (Switzerland) 10,466 
Meiji Holdings Co Ltd (Japan) 9,818 
Hershey Foods Corp (USA) 7,485 
Chocoladenfabriken Lindt & Sprungli AG (Switzerland) 4,022 
Arcor (Argentina) 3,500 
Ezaki Glico Co Ltd (Japan) 3,049 
August Strock KG (Germany) 2,272 
Source: ICCO, 2015 
The company promotes its sustainability commitments that focus on improving the 
quality of life for its customers. It is also known for its raw material supplies from 
smallholder farmers. It is also known for its raw material supplies from smallholder 
farmers. According to Mars (2013), in order to be sustainable in business,  the 
company needs to address three challenges: the company operation, raw material 
sourcing and customers. As part of this operation, the company needs to reduce its 
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environmental foot print. As regards its raw material sourcing, the company needs 
to ensure the sustainable source of its product ingredients. And, consideration for 
its customers requires the company to address nutrition and obesity. 
In recognition of the company’s commitment and efforts for sustainability, Mars 
was awarded the best Ethical Corporation Responsible Business Award in 2013 by 
Ethical Corporation8. The award recognises companies’ sustainable business 
practices across their operations, mainly the reduction of energy use, water and 
waste across their operation, and their leading efforts in the cocoa sustainability 
work in the cocoa industry (Mars, 2013). 
Over the last decades, in an effort to achieve sustainability in the cocoa industry, 
Mars has not only been working to support cocoa farmers through its technology 
transfer programs, but has pledged its commitment to source 100 per cent certified 
cocoa beans by 2020 (Mars, 2014b). In the context of upgrading smallholder cocoa 
farmers and the cocoa industry in Indonesia, both programs will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 
6.3 Lead firms driven-upgrading 
The main objective of Mars’ sustainability program has been to improve the farming 
methods employed by smallholder cocoa farmers. The company calls it ‘Farmers 
First’, the underlying assumption being that for the cocoa industry to be truly 
sustainable it requires sustainable cocoa production at the smallholder level. 
Smallholder farmers, the major cocoa producers, should be able to use this 
commodity to build a profitable business, which means establishing farming as a 
business, improving incomes and profitability. The projected outcome will be that 
farmers can support their families adequately (Harner, 2012). 
Mars believes that the most effective way to improve farmers’ incomes is by 
improving their productivity. This is considered the important way to empower 
farmers’ economic activities and create lasting change in their livelihoods (Harner, 
                                                        
8 Ethical Corporation is a global business publication focused on global business and exploring 
how large companies are responding to the sustainable agenda (www.ethicalcorp.com) 
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2012). With this as its major goal, Mars has exercised its capacity to upgrade 
farmers using two main approaches: first, providing technical support that is 
embedded in the supply chain; and, second, supporting farmers’ compliance with 
global certification standards. 
6.3.1 Technology transfer programs 
Over the last decade, Mars has been providing technical transfer support to cocoa 
farmers in Indonesia. Mars representatives recorded that the total number of 
farmers trained during the period 2003-2014 was 43,403 smallholder farmers (Own 
calculation, based on Mars representative primary data, 2014). Direct training 
conducted by Mars accounted for 16,534 farmers, and indirect training by field 
technicians trained by Mars was recorded at 26,869 people. The majority of farmers 
(84%) trained were on Sulawesi Island. The remainders were from other islands 
across Papua, Nusa Tenggara and Sumatra. All of the training was delivered via six 
major technology transfer programs (see Table 6-2). 
The company program support could be classified into three evolving approaches 
over the ten year period. First, managing fully the technology transfer program; 
second, working with other extension agencies, including NGOs, privately funded 
extensions and the government in an attempt to leverage impacts; and, third, 
empowering local farmers as private extension agents.  
  187 
Table ‎6-2 Mars technology transfer programs between 2003-2014 
Years Program Approach Location 
2003-
2005 
Pest Reduction 
Integrated 
Management 
(PRIMA) 
Value chains integrated with 
research and technology 
transfer; partnered with 
ACDI-VOCA 
1000 ha in Nolling 
Village Luwu, South 
Sulawesi 
2006 PRIMA outreach Value chains integrated with 
research and technology 
transfer 
743 ha in Pongo, North 
Luwu, South Sulawesi 
2006-
2008 
Mars Sustainability  Provided Training of Trainers 
to CSP partners (ASKINDO, 
Swiss Contact, Mercy-corps, 
Government extension 
services); partnered with 
CSP, IFC, ASKINDO and Swiss 
Contact 
248 field technicians 
and 5137 farmers 
trained, across Flores, 
Maluku, South 
Sulawesi, South East 
Sulawesi. 
2009 Mars Cocoa Clinic 
(MCC) 
Centre of excellence; 
partnered with Local 
Extension Agency (Disbun 
Luwu) 
Palopo, Luwu, South 
Sulawesi; Papua 
2010 Mars Cocoa 
Development Centre 
(MCDC) Tarengge 
Research and Training 
centre for field technicians, 
owned and managed by 
Mars 
28 ha of research, 
demonstration and 
training facilities in 
Tarengge, East Luwu 
South Sulawesi  
2011-
Present 
Cocoa Development 
Centre (CDC) and 
Cocoa Village Centre 
(CVC) 
Partnering with other cocoa 
buyers to develop local 
entrepreneurs with primary 
business to provide 
integrated services to 
smallholder cocoa farmers 
3 CDCs in East, South 
and Central Sulawesi. 
Source: Interviews with company representatives, 2014 
6.3.1.1 Fully managed extension activities 
Fully managed upgrading support for smallholder farmers was conducted when 
Mars delivered the Pest Reduction Integrated management (PRIMA) project in 2003 
in Nolling village, Luwu district, South Sulawesi. The project was a co-funded project 
between the Dutch Government and the Mars Sustainability Program, with the 
primary objective of combating pests and disease infestations, primarily the CPB 
pest. This suggests, of course, that it is not always clear what constitutes a 
corporate program and what should be considered a donor-funded activity. 
During the course of the project, Mars demonstrated integrated practices to 
combat CPB, including applying standard farming practices (Fertilizers, Pruning, 
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Frequent Harvesting and Sanitation), performing safe and measurable pesticide 
usage, demonstrating the pods sleeving method, utilizing CPB predators such as 
ants, and using chemical pest traps. In addition to these pest practices, Mars also 
conducted rehabilitation projects. 
Regarding off farm activities, Mars developed a market linkage program by 
establishing buying stations in the middle of the project areas, which were intended 
to absorb the increasing production from the assisted smallholder farmers. In 
addition, Mars also supported the establishment of farmer groups within the 
project areas. 
It is important to note that the PRIMA project was relatively successful in terms of 
persuading farmers to upgrade their farming practices. A study conducted by 
Perdew and Shively (2009) revealed that after three years of project 
implementation, farmers showed some positive impacts. Among these impacts 
were a spraying strategy to combat CPB (which showed yield difference); and, a 
number of field visits ensured the adoption of CPB control. An important policy 
implication found in the study was the farmers’ adoption of the control mechanism. 
According to the study, the PRIMA project’s extension visit appeared to facilitate 
adoption of effective pest management practices. 
However, the PRIMA project was considered difficult to scale up, given that the cost 
associated with the project was extremely high. And, the project only covered 1000 
hectares, with 734 participant farmers during the three years project 
implementation. Learning from this first hand project experience, Mars expanded 
its program to include North Luwu district and started collaborating with other 
extension agencies to reach a larger number of farmers. The PRIMA project model 
was duplicated in North Luwu district. This covered 743 hectare farms, with some 
modifications such as fewer field staff and demonstration plots, and partnering with 
local government extension agencies. 
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6.3.1.2 Leveraging extension outreach 
The second approach was leveraging field staff by providing training to other 
extension agencies. Mars undertook two approaches, providing trainings to the 
extension agencies, and vocational trainings to the students at senior high schools 
and technical colleges. 
Under the Mars Sustainability name, Mars actively provided the training of trainers 
to NGOs and government extension activities. After closing the PRIMA project 
program and its outreach in 2006, Mars continued to operate on the ground, with 
an emphasis on providing learning experiences and training to other extension 
agencies. Between the years 2006 and 2014, Mars trained 1224 field technicians 
operating across Indonesia, covering Sumatra, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, 
and Papua. Details of these organizations appear in Table 6-3. 
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Table ‎6-3 Names of institutions and numbers of trainers trained by Mars over the 
period 2003-2014 
Typical 
Institutions 
No Name of organization Year of 
training 
Participant 
trainers 
NGOs 1 ACDI-VOCA 2004 45 
2 Swiss Contact:     
  - Flores 2007-2009 114 
  - Aceh 2010-2012 374 
  - Nias 2011 3 
  - South Sulawesi (CPQP) 2013 64 
3 Mercy Corps 2008-2009 50 
4 Veco 2013 5 
5 ACIAR:  2010   
  - Polman 2010 20 
  - Manokwari 2010 16 
6 North Sulawesi     
7 ASKINDO 2006 15 
Govt 
Extension 
Agencies 
8 Maluku Province 2008-2009 10 
9 South Sulawesi 2003-2010 197 
10 South East Sulawesi 2008-2010 85 
11 Nusa Tenggara Timur 2006-2010 22 
12 Sumatera 2012 35 
13 Lampung 2012 10 
14 Aceh 2007 2 
15 Papua 2007 1 
16 Gorontalo 2013 30 
17 Bogor-BRIEC 2010 1 
Private 
actors (CDC 
Partners) 
18 ECOM trading 2013 6 
19 Armajaro 2013 9 
20 General Food 2011-2013 13 
21 PT. Olam 2014 11 
22 CC 2013 14 
23 PT. LONSUM 2013 43 
24 PVS 2010 12 
25 Guan Chong 2013 4 
26 RA 2013 13 
Source: Mars Sustainability Data, 2014 
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Mars provided training to senior high technical schools and local Technical Colleges 
(see Table 6-4). This support was aimed at improving the attractiveness of the field 
extension staff as a promising career for the younger generation in rural areas, 
specifically those young people who resided in the centre of the cocoa producing 
areas. This approach was implemented to check the trend of young people 
migrating to urban areas looking for job opportunities in the cities. 
Table ‎6-4 Academic institutions and numbers of students participating in the GAP 
training 
Institutions Name of Institutions Partici
pants 
Types of training 
Senior High 
Technical 
School 
SMK Tomoni, South Sulawesi 75 Good Agricultural 
Practices (GAP), 
Rehabilitation 
technique (side 
grafting, chupon 
grafting), Nursery 
Management 
SMK Bone-Bone, South Sulawesi 54 
SMK Walendrang, South Sulawesi 81 
Polytechnic Pangkep, South Sulawesi 59 
Universities UNANDA, South Sulawesi 14 
UNCOK, South Sulawesi 34 
UNIPA, Papua 50 
Total trained 367   
Source: Mars Sustainability Data, 2014 
Given the scale of training it has provided to support the various extension agencies, 
Mars has puts considerable effort into the upgrading process for productivity 
improvement in Indonesia. However, in order to allow the upgrading process to 
occur sustainably at the farmers’ level, long-term programs and consistent support 
are required at the community level. Mars, in an attempt to address these issues, 
has developed a private extension model, designed to empower Indonesia’s 
smallholder farmers. 
6.3.1.3 The ‘hub and spoke’ private extension model 
The extension outreach that has been intensively conducted through partnering 
with other institutions, discussed above, has two main limitations: (1) it is lacking in 
monitoring and continuity of support at the community level; and, (2) it is lacking in 
supply chain integration that provides a significant incentive for farmers to maintain 
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their farms. These two issues needed to be urgently addressed to enable upgrading 
of farmers and motivate them to applying the GAP to cocoa.  
In an effort to establish sustainable extension activities, Mars developed an 
extension model that could be operated privately and sustainably. This private 
extension service, built around the Cocoa Development Center (CDC), would 
function as ‘the hub’, and the Cocoa Village Clinic (CVC) as ‘the spoke’. One CDC is 
expected to support 30 CVCs, and one CVC to support at least 100 farmers (Mars, 
2012). 
The CDC-CVC concept emphasises four innovative extension systems designed to 
answer the needs of smallholder farmers, enabling them to elicit continuous 
support from extension staff. The concept introduces a business-oriented outreach 
system, delivers continued engagement between extension agents and farmers, 
provides an affordable productivity package, and integrates the service within  the 
supply chain system through ‘a spoke and hub’ network (Mars, 2012).   
This business-oriented outreach system seemed intended to answer the lack of 
extension services available to the cocoa sector. Government extension services in 
Indonesia have been prioritised to supporting the central government’s program for 
self-sufficiency of staple food, mainly for rice, such that the budget allocation to 
support cocoa-related extension activities has been limited.  Government extension 
activities for cocoa are only active when there is a project such as the GERNAS 
program. Even then, the GERNAS project only employed extension staff on a 
contractual basis, unlike the extension staff for food crops. Upon completion of the 
project, the extension activities ended.  The business-oriented outreach system 
allows extension activities to be sustainably operated without government and 
donor support. It is designed to accommodate the need for cocoa buyers to secure 
their supply and, at the same time, to provide business opportunities for 
independent extension services to undertake business activities such as agro-inputs 
and technical services.  
The second aspect of this concept is the continued engagement between extension 
staff and farmers. Lessons learned from the various donor-funded projects 
implemented over the last decade indicate that Indonesia’s smallholder cocoa 
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farmers require constant interaction with extension agents. The SUCCESS alliance 
project, for example, succeeded in providing short-term training and technical 
support to cocoa farmers. However, upon completion of the project, the extension 
support also ended. Farmers often need continued access to expertise to consult 
and discuss the problems they were facing on their cocoa farms. Some places, such 
as Nolling and Kamanre in Luwu district and Pongo in North Luwu, where Mars had 
been present for approximately ten years, demonstrated the benefits of such 
continuous engagement with farmers.  
The third innovative component was providing an affordable productivity package, 
an important factor in making sure that the upgrading process materialized at the 
farmers’ level. Quite often smallholder farmers found that the recommended agro-
inputs for productivity improvement were far too expensive for them. Hence, many 
were reluctant to invest in the recommended productivity package. The case of the 
IFC’s access to finance programs (see discussion in previous chapters) is one 
example, where the recommended productivity improvement package included one 
of the most expensive brands in the market. Thus, while use the recommended 
fertilizer resulted in production increase, total profit gained from this package was 
questionable. The increased production did not automatically suggest an increase in 
profitability.  
The last important feature of the approach was integrating the service within the 
supply chain system through ‘a spoke and hub’ network. The biggest challenge 
facing the private extension services was to enlarge the coverage areas to as many 
cocoa farmers as possible at the minimum cost. By adopting the ‘hub and spoke’ 
network, extension activities could reach thousands of farmers with reduced costs 
due to engagement with independent extension agents. 
By promoting the above concept and business rationale, Mars seemed keen to tap 
into the existing business entities at the village level by scaling up the CVC model, 
which involves local collectors and local agro-input suppliers. These two business 
entities were, in fact, already quite dominant at the village level; but, they rarely 
were engaged systematically in providing technical support for the farmers. The 
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agro-input suppliers, who had a strong sales team equipped with strong knowledge 
and technical skills, are generally compensated based on their sales.  
In the following section I will in more detail how the CDC and CVC were delivered in 
an effort to upgrade the technical capacity of the smallholder cocoa farmers. 
6.3.1.3.1 The hub-Cocoa Development Centre (CDC)  
In its role as a hub, the CDC functioned as a centre of technical support and 
learning. The CDC facilities aimed to provide a Wow! Farm (a well maintained 
demonstration plot), a budwood garden, nursery and coaching centre. It was 
suggested that the site for a CDC should be centrally located amongst a high 
concentration of cocoa growers, and near old cocoa plantations in need of 
rehabilitation (Mars, 2012). 
According to Mars (2012), the initial cost of setting up such a facility amounts to 
approximately US$35,000 with an annual cost of US$30,000 to run. The cost would 
be lower if the CDC facility was integrated into the existing buying operation in the 
rural areas. The majority of Mars’ CDC facilities were established as part of its 
buying stations. To leverage its outreach, the CDC model was open to duplication by 
other private companies or NGOs.  
The CDC appeared to be an improved model of the PRIMA project, in which Mars 
developed and managed demonstrations to encourage farmers to adopt improved 
technologies. The difference was that the CDC staff were also required to establish 
outreach facilities in the surrounding areas through a network of CVCs.  
6.3.1.3.2 The spoke-Cocoa Village Clinics (CVCs) 
An entrepreneurial spirit, which was predominantly rooted in the Buginese people 
in South Sulawesi, had been the major characteristics of the vast majority of cocoa 
farmers in the Island (Ruf et al., 1996; Ruf & Yoddang, 2001). Learning and adopting 
the existing entrepreneurial spirit of cocoa farmers combined with over ten years 
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period of hands-on9 experience with evolving programs (as explain in the above 
sections) working to provide sustainable technical support to cocoa farmers in 
Sulawesi, Mars designed the CVC as a franchise model for local entrepreneurs, 
specifically to serve the needs of cocoa farmers at the village level. Interested 
farmers would attend training in agronomical and business management at the 
Mars cocoa academy. Following graduation, the farmers would become ‘cocoa 
doctors’ with the ability to establish a set of business services to serve farmers in 
their communities.  
It was agreed that there were three main possible services that a cocoa doctor 
could provide to surrounding farmers: (1) selling agro input products, such as 
planting materials, fertilizer, and pesticides spraying products; (2) providing farm 
maintenance services, such as grafting or spraying; and, (3) conducting 
administration services, such as managing an Internal Control System (ICS) for 
certification.  
In order to gain the farmers’ trust, an important step for the cocoa doctor was to 
demonstrate a ‘Wow’ farm that would make surrounding farmers believe that the 
cocoa doctor’s advice was credible. The power of ‘seeing is believing’ would be 
exercised through this farm, and farmers are expected to seek advice after trusting 
the cocoa doctors expertise. A Wow farm is expected to produce at least 2000 
kilograms of cocoa beans per hectare. The cocoa doctor should start his extension 
activities by providing both technical provisions and the required agro inputs to 
improve the farmers’ cocoa farms, such as ‘drugs and vitamins’ for the trees, which 
could be purchased from the cocoa doctors.  In short, the CVC model nurtures an 
entrepreneur-extension agent, who should become financially independent and 
generate income from technical provisions and agro inputs. 
To be able to establish a fully functioning CVC requires a gradual upgrading process. 
One cocoa doctor I interviewed from the Wajo district in South Sulawesi, explained 
                                                        
9
 The program development manager of Mars in Sulawesi, Husssin Purung, is a cocoa expert with 
strong experience in cocoa plantation in Sabah, a Malaysian citizen but a Buginese descendent 
was hired 20 years ago to develop technical support program to cocoa farmers in Indonesia.  
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that his upgrading process trajectory materialized after intensive technical support 
and business coaching from the Mars’ CDCs. The upgrading path that he was 
pursuing was a combination of process and functional upgrading of value chain 
activities. Not only was he a farmer, but he gradually improved his farming practices 
and became an agro-input trader and cocoa bean collector in his village.  
His upgrading trajectory started when it was suggested that he should rehabilitate 
his unmaintained 5 ha cocoa farm, which only produced 200 kg/ha in 2010. The 
CDCs staff assisted him to rehabilitate part of his cocoa crop (approximately 0.7 ha). 
Then he decided to become a cocoa doctor so he attended the intensive training 
program offered by the cocoa academy. After graduating from the academy, he 
initiated his CVC as a seedling distributor, before expanding (after three years) into 
other services and products (grafting buds, grafting services, fertilizer, even 
agricultural tools).  In 2014, he then upgraded his business activities into collecting 
and buying cocoa beans, hiring two workers to help him maintain his farm, and 
casual staff to help him manage the nursery business. Over the period 2012-2014, 
he recorded a total of 418 customers, of whom approximately 12 per cent came 
from his village whilst the majorities were from further afield. In terms of revenue, 
he reported earning more than US$8,100 annually, a significant income for a person 
living in rural areas of Indonesia. 
An important observation was that the CVC model required the cocoa doctor to 
have a strong entrepreneurial spirit. Indeed, the Buginese people, the major ethnic 
group on Sulawesi Island who started the expansion of cocoa cultivation (Ruf et al., 
1996), appear to have a deep-rooted sense of individual entrepreneurship. In fact, 
many of the cocoa programs that had been working to organize cocoa farmers in 
groups did not deliver satisfying rewards to the individual achievers. The CVC model 
seemed to sit comfortably with the Buginese people’s proclivity for individual 
entrepreneurship. 
In short, the CDC-CVC model presented and discussed above was an innovative 
approach developed to tap into the entrepreneurial spirit within the farming 
communities. The model provided some answers to the need for locally-based 
extension agents, who should be available to address farmers’ issues. The model 
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also became a tool for integrating independent extension agents into the buyer 
supply chains. 
6.3.2 Exercising a voluntary standard 
The second mechanism that Mars employed to upgrade the smallholder farmers 
was by promoting certification standards.  The certification program was part of 
Mars global commitment to source 100 per cent sustainably-certified cocoa by 
2020. But, this objective has had some consequences for the smallholder farmers, 
such as looking at cost effective ways of doing the certification process that would 
allow the farmers to become more effectively integrated into the global cocoa value 
chain. 
The most challenging factor vis-á-vis smallholder farmers acquiring certification was 
the need to have an ICS (Internal Control System) in place that would conduct an 
internal audit and develop a documented quality assurance system. The latter 
would be the basis for the periodic inspections conducted by an external auditor 
appointed by a certified certification operator.  The central role of the ICS was to 
prepare, assist, and monitor farmers and the cocoa farms, in order to comply with 
certification requirements. To do this, the ICS required staff who could constantly 
monitor and verify internally the quality assurance of the certification 
implementation. 
The fact was that it would be costly for farmers to implement the certification on 
their own. Characteristically, some smallholders joined farmer groups with an 
average membership of 25 farmers, although the combined area of these farms was 
only around 25-30 hectares of land. At this size, it would be very challenging for 
smallholder farmers to participate in the certification programs. 
Mars initiated four different models of ICS to enable the delivery of the certification 
program and offer solutions to the smallholder farmers. The models were: i) fully 
funded and managed by Mars; ii) outsourcing the operations of the ICS; iii)  co-
funding with a local collector; and iv) operated under a ‘CVC plus certification’ 
model.  
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6.3.2.1 Fully funded and managed ICS 
A fully funded and managed certification program was initiated and conducted in 
2010: it covered approximately 3000 hectares in Luwu district South Sulawesi. It was 
considered a field learning experience for the company that would facilitate an 
understanding of the dynamics of smallholder farmers as well as the companies 
pursuing certification standards.  
Based on the Mars’ experience, attracting farmers to join certification in the first 
place was indeed a question of incentive. For this reason, in the initial stage, Mars 
offered various incentives to participant farmers. Based on my interviews with 
participant farmers in the initial phase of the certification program in 2010, several 
incentives motivated them to join the program. First, there was the price incentive 
and fee. Mars nominated a price of approximately Rp. 500 per kilogram, with an 
additional fee for farmer groups’ management (Rp. 100 kg) and a transportation fee 
at Rp. 100 per kilogram. Second was safety equipment for pesticide spraying. Mars 
provided safety equipment including masks, glasses and boots. Lastly, farmers 
gained new knowledge about safety and environmental farming practices, such as 
safe pesticide usage, cleanliness of pesticide tools, and waste management. Among 
the above incentives, the most crucial was the price and fee incentive. As one of 
Mars field staff said: ‘farmers are only willing to join if there is significant price 
incentive’. The Mars certification program in Luwu district, South Sulawesi along 
with Rainforest Alliance (RA), was apparently the first cocoa program to be awarded 
certification in Indonesia. 
6.3.2.2 Outsourcing 
The outsourcing ICS model was a model whereby a local business provided ICS 
services. A subsidiary business entity of a farmer cooperative managed the internal 
quality assurance of the certification program.  
Looking at the institutional context of business service providers, the outsourcing 
models accommodated existing NGOs’ networks and independent service providers 
and cooperatives. Former field staff from the USAID programs developed a network 
of NGOs and built institutional capacity of local cooperatives and farmer groups. 
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This network, which operated independently, had a wide range of coverage across 
Sulawesi Island. Since 2007, some NGOs within the network have started business 
facilitation services, whereby interested companies could link their supply chains to 
assisted collectors. NGOs provided services to farmers such as productivity and 
quality improvement programs; in return, the field staff would receive a fee from 
the buyers. The local NGO in West Sulawesi, Wasiat, was the first NGO to 
successfully arrange this model and expand it through its networks, including CV 
Marewa in North Luwu district, a traditional source area for Mars. These existing 
institutions were utilised by Mars by developing an outsourcing mechanism that 
allows the local NGOs and their affiliates to offer ICS services.  
Through this outsourcing mechanism, Wasiat, together with its extended networks, 
successfully facilitated external audits in December 2014 in two provinces, West and 
South Sulawesi. In both provinces, the NGO has assisted and facilitated an external 
audit, in total covering 7, 387 hectare farm areas with 234 farmer groups and 6396 
participant farmers. The details of each location appear in Table 6-5. Based on 
information provided by CV Marewa, the incentive for this certification program 
was US$140 per ton, US$100 for individual farmers and US$40 for ICS service for CV 
Marewa. 
Table ‎6-5 ICS outsourcing service providers in Sulawesi 
Local NGOs Farmer 
groups 
Areas (ha) Farmers Location 
Wasiat 82 2,222 1564 Polewali Mandar, 
West Sulawesi 
Cahaya Sehati 
Cooperative 
60 2,035.80 1778 East Luwu district, 
South Sulawesi 
CV Marewa 45 92 3,129.39 3054 North Luwu district, 
South Sulawesi 
Source: Parmansyah-WASIAT, 2014 
6.3.2.3 Local collectors  
Local traders have also become Mars’ partners for targeting un-organized farmers. 
Mars has co-invested with local collectors to conduct the certification process. 
According to the regional director of Mars, investing together with its suppliers and 
partners to support farmers is part of the company’s commitment to sustainable 
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production. Thus, investing through certification is a mechanism employed to 
ensure that Mars’ investment benefits farmers in effective ways (Choo, 2014).  
Mars offers three phases within three years to upgrade local collectors to be able to 
implement full certification. During the first year, Mars fully pays all costs associated 
with the ‘ICS set-up’: this includes training and a farming audit. The second year, 
Mars offers cost sharing 50:50 per cent of the cost; and, by the third year, local 
traders are expected to be self-financing. This approach of local collector upgrading 
through certification was piloted in Tinombo, Central Sulawesi, and covered 
approximately 1800 hectares of cocoa farms. 
What is important to highlight regarding this co-investment with local collectors is 
the target farmers. Un-organized farmers are quite often excluded from any or all 
program developments-either from governments or development agencies, which 
generally require some form of farmer organisation. Offering an alternative 
mechanism for specific farmers will allows them to integrate with Mars’ supply 
chains in Indonesia.  
6.3.2.4 CVC plus certification  
The ‘CVC plus certification’ model serves two purposes: (1) it is designed to provide 
business services for the cocoa doctor; and, (2) it aims to complement what is 
perceived by Mars to be an absence of productivity improving measures in the SAN 
standard. Fold and Neilson (2016) write of this hybrid approach to upgrading 
smallholder farmers as a part of global leading firms efforts to boost long-term 
global production. 
Along with some other chocolate companies, Mars are concerned that certification 
programs do not explicitly enhance farm productivity, and they perceive 
productivity to be the major indicator shaping farm incomes. According to Mars’ 
sustainability manager, “certification is considered meaningless for farmers without 
productivity improvement”. The argument is that the 10 per cent price premium for 
certified cocoa is insignificant compared to potential income gains possible from 
tripling productivity per hectare.  This rationale echoes arguments made by Mars’ 
regional director that positions sustainable production as the end goal, ”sustainable 
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production means farmer prosperity, sustainably supply, and responsible practice, 
with emphasis on focusing on high performing farmers” (Choo, 2014).  
The existing CDC-CVC model is presented by Mars as a ‘franchise’ that can be used a 
means to triple production (Mars, 2012), and which can be combined with 
certification. In other words, the private extension services of the CVC model are 
designed to provide services that not only improve productivity, but also comply 
with certification requirements. This service has recently been offered to the one of 
the CVCs in East Luwu district, South Sulawesi 
Mars-driven upgrading activities for smallholder farmers has manifested through 
four main activities. First, Mars has integrated its farmer support programs into 
their supply chain. As a private company, Mars’ main business activity requires 
cocoa beans to be grown by farmers. Observations from the field revealed that 
technical support provided to farmers proved quite difficult without market 
integration. The areas in which Mars was actively involved in providing technical 
support, which had been operating for approximately ten years or more, were 
located in the centre of the cocoa-producing region. The sustainability operations in 
Luwu, North Luwu and Eastern Luwu, were integrated into buying stations. 
Second, Mars provides research and training facilities, as evident at the latest Cocoa 
Academy facilities in Tarengge, East Luwu, which were a result of a decade of 
evolution of cocoa development programs carried out by Mars in Sulawesi. The 
training and learning facility was established initially by borrowing farmers’ cocoa 
farms during the PRIMA project in 2003. The training facility and learning site 
expanded further during the PRIMA outreach project in North Luwu in 2006. 
Responding to local government requests to establish learning sites, Mars 
established a cocoa clinic in collaboration with local extension agencies. By 2009, 
Mars decided to establish a fully-managed research and training centre facilities in 
Tarengge. 
Third, the company is maximizing the existing available local institutions to leverage 
the extension activities to larger coverage areas. During its extension activities, 
Mars continuously works with other extension agencies, either from private 
extension (NGOs) or from government extension agencies. Furthermore, Mars has 
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developed an innovative CDC-CVC private extension model. The CDC model was 
developed to align the need for private actors to provide technical support to 
farmers with integrating this service into supply chains. The cocoa doctor in the CVC 
model makes an effort to incorporate individual entrepreneurs in local 
communities. In the certification programs, an effort to utilize local existing 
institutions as leverage is also being exercised. The three models (outsourcing, the 
local collectors and the CVC model) - I discussed in the previous section-were 
models designed to accommodate the existing social context of smallholder 
farmers.  
Mars continuously upgrades its extension structures and certification model so that 
it will be able to operate efficiently and reach a wider group of farmers. The 
extension structure has evolved from fully managed and funded extension agents to 
empower farmers to carry out the extension activities.  In short, the above 
approaches were developed to encourage farmers to engage with productivity-
related upgrading activities. The cocoa academy, the private extension services and 
certification are all tools to support this process. 
6.4 Institutional interests 
In this subsection, I will discuss the factors that drive Mars, a lead firm in the global 
cocoa industry that provides support to process upgrading of smallholder cocoa 
farmers in Indonesia. Two main business reasons drive the company to support 
smallholder farmers; the first is to deal with the potential problems surrounding a 
lack of raw material supply; and, the second is to improve the brand reputation of 
the company.  
6.4.1 Potential issues related to supply 
Mars’ intense support for improving cocoa farmers’ productivity was driven by the 
fear of future unmet demands and their price consequences. Four reasons related 
to potential future shortages were of critical concern. First, future demands from 
new emerging markets such as China: second, the geopolitical instability of West 
Africa, the major cocoa producing region; third, looking at alternative regional 
supplies; and, fourth, maintaining the cheap price for long-term supply. 
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6.4.1.1 Increasing demand from new markets 
There is a general perception that cocoa demand will continue to increase in the 
coming years. Using the assumption of 2 per cent annual growth, Mars have publicly 
voiced a prediction that the world will require at least one million more metric 
tonnes if it is to fulfil the demand by 2020. This projection is based on the 
assumption that farm-related issues will be addressed properly and sustainably 
(Mars, 2014).  
Among the growth markets, China is presented as a huge untapped market, and as 
wealth there increases, chocolate consumption is expected to rise substantially. 
Based upon a euro monitor data analysis, chocolate sales in China between 2006 
and 2010 increased by 50 per cent; and, the country is predicted to be  the world’s 
fastest-growing confectionary sector by at least 2016 (Ferdman, 2013).  
Mars leads the chocolate confectionary market share in China at 40 per cent in 
2013, and is predicted to continue to lead the market share during a period of 
continuous growth. The multi brand strategy it employs in China, complemented by 
aggressive advertising around Christmas and Valentine’s Day, and supported by 
strong penetration of China’s smaller cities through internet marketing seems to 
have positioned Mars to stay as market leader in the country for years to come 
(Euromonitor International, 2013).    
In addition to tapping new emerging markets, Mars has also developed specific 
products promoted as healthy chocolate that will help to improve human health 
through cocoa flavanols. Dark chocolate, which contains more flavanols than regular 
chocolate, was reported as the fastest growing segment of the $10 billion-a-year 
global chocolate market (NBC News, 2006). Mars’ cocoa flavanols chocolate, which 
is branded CocoaVia®, is marketed mainly in the US market. It targets consumers 
seeking to maintain a healthy circulation system (Mars, 2014a).   Notwithstanding 
some research questioning this health claim (Wollgast & Anklam, 2000), others such 
as Steinberg, et al. (2003), have re-asserted the links between cocoa flavonoids and 
cardiovascular health, and further recommending consuming flavanol-rich chocolate 
in moderate amounts. 
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On the market side, a combination of economic growth in developing countries such 
as China and the development of new niche markets for further chocolate 
penetration of health-conscious people, has driven the cocoa demand on the global 
market. This increasing trend will possibly continue over the coming years, 
contingent to market expansion of Mars into new areas and new segments of 
customers. This aggressive marketing in new markets and ongoing product 
innovation in traditional markets underlies industry predictions for future growth 
and therefore prompts concerns whether long-term supply can meet these 
predictions.   
6.4.1.2 The instability of the major cocoa producing region 
As outlined in Chapter Three, approximately 70 per cent of world cocoa beans come 
from West Africa, and any socio-political uncertainty in this region could trigger 
supply shortages and the subsequent price hikes.  
The West African region is indeed prone to constant geo-political instability. In early 
2000, the Ivory Coast, the largest cocoa producer in the world, was constantly 
embroiled in civil unrest and an anti-foreigner mindset that resulted in thousands of 
people leaving the country and impacting on hundreds of thousands of its citizens, 
leaving those who stayed dependent upon food assistance (Senghore & Grospierre, 
2004). This civil war contributed to the uncertainty surrounding cocoa production, 
given that many farmers and labourers felt unsafe when cocoa farming. The latest 
political unrest to trigger a cocoa price hike was the 2012 power struggle between 
Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to step down from power and Alassane Outtara, the 
winner of the election. As a result, cocoa exports from the Ivory Coast halted for 
almost ten months, with serious implications for global prices at the time (Artcon, 
2011). 
The latest issue in this region that has disrupted the cocoa industry has been the 
spread of the deadly Ebola virus in 2014. Even though there is no evidence yet of 
any Ebola cases in the Ivory Coast, the hardest hit areas have been Sierra Leone, 
Guinea and Liberia, the latter two of which share borders with the Ivory Coast  
(Wexler & Jerving, 2014).  
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The prospect of an Ebola outbreak in Ivory Coast, and possibly elsewhere in South 
East Asia and West Africa has been of major concern to the global buyers. If Ebola 
spread to these countries, then without doubt the flow of cocoa would be 
disrupted.  For this reason, the World Cocoa Foundation, whose members are big 
global cocoa-chocolate players, announced a US$600,000 donation for 
humanitarian purposes, to support Ebola care and prevention efforts in West Africa 
(McCoy & Neumann, 2014). Should the Ebola outbreak reach these Ivory Coast and 
Ghana, agricultural quarantine and travel restrictions will most likely be 
automatically applied.   
Regarding the constant instability in the West African region, it is hardly surprising 
that the leading cocoa companies have started to extend their support to countries 
outside of the region, including South East Asia and primarily Indonesia.  
6.4.1.3 Looking for alternative cocoa supplies 
The Mars operation in Indonesia, which started in 1996, was intended to secure 
alternative raw from the African region. Through the processing facilities in 
Makassar, South Sulawesi, Mars managed to buy not only standard cocoa beans 
from Indonesia, but also wet beans directly processed at the country level.  
The major reason why Mars directly operated buying stations at the country level 
was so that it could manage the post-harvest treatment of newly-harvested cocoa 
beans, essential for the new health products discussed above (Mars, 2014a). The 
flavanol content of the cocoa beans can be enhanced if cocoa beans are directly 
processed within a few hours of harvesting. To this end, Mars established buying 
stations for wet beans directly at the country level (Mars, 2014a). 
The farmers received a premium price for the beans’ freshness and high quality. 
This proved a double incentive for the farmers: (a) they did not need to spend up to 
five days to dry the cocoa beans; and, (b) they could get quick cash for their newly-
harvested beans. In addition, the farmers enjoyed continuous support from the 
Mars field technician through the company’s CDC-CVC facilities. This was of mutual 
benefit to both the farmers and Mars. As explained on the Cocoavia website: 
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Mars Inc. helps the farmers produce high-quality cocoa by educating them in 
sustainable farming practices that foster healthier farms and trees. This helps 
farmers increase their incomes, leading to improvements in overall quality of 
life. In exchange, the farmers help Mars, Inc. secure the best and most fresh 
cocoa for its flavanol-rich products, like CocoaVia® supplement (Mars, 2014a). 
Indonesia has been relatively free of social unrest over the last decade, despite a 
few incidents having occurred in the Poso region of Central Sulawesi, one of the 
major cocoa producing districts in Sulawesi. Over all, political stability and security 
in Indonesia, indeed in South East Asia as the whole, tends to be relatively 
favourable compared to West Africa. 
6.4.1.4 Maintaining a cheap cocoa price for long-term supply 
As one of the world’s largest commercial end-users of cocoa beans, Mars is keenly 
interested in maintaining supplies of raw material that will help the company to 
continue to produce affordable chocolate for its customers. Indeed, affordability is 
pivotal to its expansion plans in China and other emerging markets. Its efforts to 
maintain such a product for its customers were stated by its global marketing 
officers as follows: 
We are committed to our brands being affordable to many people. To do this, 
we want to make sure the raw materials we need continue to be available and 
affordable (Mars, 2013, p. 39). 
At the same time, one of Mars competitors in the cocoa and chocolate industry, the 
Hershey Company, has announced it will increase the price of its chocolate products 
due to the high price of key raw materials such as cocoa. In 2014, the company 
decided to increase by approximately 8 per cent the price of its instant consumable, 
multi-pack, packaged candy and grocery lines (The Hersey Company, 2014). 
Regarding the securing of sustainable supplies that allow leading companies such as 
Mars to provide affordable chocolate brands to its customers, Fold and Neilson 
(2016) argue that despite the opportunities to improve the livelihoods of cocoa 
farmers, the primary concern for global chocolate manufacturers is to secure long-
term cheap raw materials to meet the demands of emerging markets such as China.  
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In line with Fold and Neilson’s argument, the ICCO also announced that there was 
no threat to cocoa supplies for chocolate manufacturers for three main reasons: (1) 
over the last decade, the global cocoa market experienced  five years’ of surplus and 
five years’ of deficit and, in 2014, the latest year, the cocoa stocks were in surplus; 
(2) the price of cocoa fluctuates widely on a yearly basis; the current price is just 
below the average historical price (1850 – 2014) in real terms (adjusted for 
inflation); and, (3) because the cocoa commodity is similar to other agricultural 
commodities, farmers could be incentivised to produce more when the price rises. 
In other words, cocoa production will adjust to price changes with only a slightly 
longer time due to the lag between planting new materials and harvesting (ICCO, 
2014b). In this regard, there seems to be less a genuine crisis of cocoa supply than a 
crisis of cheap cocoa for chocolate manufacturers. 
6.4.2 Brand development 
Another important business interest for a company, either through certification or 
in direct support to local farmers, is to build strong brand recognition as a 
responsible company. In recent years, global consumers are constantly being 
educated by NGOs about environmental matters, labour, and social issues.  For 
example, an Oxfam announcement regarding top global food companies mentioned 
several companies that have failed to protect farmers. This information was 
broadcast through various media in Europe, such as BBC News (2013) and  via a blog 
(Cockerell, 2013). Through these exposes, Oxfam’s chief executive emphasised the 
importance of consumers knowing how their food was produced:  
Consumers have the right to know how their food has been produced and the 
impact this has on the world's poorest people who are growing the ingredients. 
Companies have a responsibility to treat local producers, communities and 
environments with respect (BBC News, 2013). 
As regards child slavery issues, global activists went even further, producing a real 
life documentary on child trafficking. Titled ‘The Dark Side of Chocolate’, the movie 
was filmed in West Africa using a hidden camera. It was made by Mistrati and 
Romano (2010) and broadcast in several cities in European countries. The issue has 
been widely publicised across North America and Europe for more than a decade 
now, such as the early report on a New York Times blog (Onishi, 2001).  
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The global brand reputation of recognised companies is about building a good 
image not only about advertisements, but also about doing real work on the 
ground. All of these efforts should become part of a long-term business policy, 
designed to convince their costumers that they are both ethical and responsible. As 
Nadvi (2008) points out, brand recognised companies are most vulnerable to 
reputation issues and Roberts (2003) argues that reputations are companies most 
valuable assets. For this reason, non-compliance with ethical practices could 
potentially exclude them from profitable markets and business generally. They 
require strong commitment and consistent work on the ground to build and are 
disturbingly easy to destroy. 
With reference to responsible sourcing, one way of building a responsible 
reputation is by joining voluntary private standards, internationally recognized such 
as Rainforest Alliance, Fair Trade, and UTZ certified. Even though these private 
standards have been challenged by some company representatives vis-á-vis their 
effectiveness to improve the social conditions of small producers in particular 
(Choo, 2014), as third parties they are not perceived to have strong conflicts of 
interest. In addition, they are external tools and may be used to encourage powerful 
intermediaries with otherwise little interest in implementing sustainable business 
practice solutions. In the global cocoa-chocolate industry, power relationships are 
considered bipolar, shared between cocoa shared between cocoa grinders and 
chocolate manufacturers (Fold, 2002). Thus, certification could be an effective tool 
for chocolate manufacturers to impose sustainable practices on their strong 
suppliers.  
As regards sustainability efforts at the global level, Mars was awarded the 2013 
Ethical Corporations Responsible Businesses Award; and, the Sustainable Cocoa 
Initiative was among the initiatives that allowed the company to achieve the award 
along with the ‘Sustainable in a Generation’ program. It represented an effort to 
eliminate fossil fuel energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, minimize impacts on 
water quality and availability, and mitigate the impacts of waste by 2040 (Hower, 
2013). 
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Overall, the effort to build strong brand reputations as ethical and responsible 
companies was among the strategies employed to stay competitive in the business. 
This particular business interest, in building a strong brand that is associated with 
ethical practices, is another strong driving factor behind Mars support programs at 
the farm-level in Indonesia. 
6.5 Impacts of lead firm-driven upgrading 
Mars private innovative extension approach has provided alternative technical 
support to the Indonesian smallholder cocoa farmers. The franchise CDC-CVC 
model, provides support and technical assistance to cocoa farmers. Unlike the 
government and donor approaches that tend to be project based and time bounded 
for a certain period, the CDC-CVC private extension model provides continuous 
support to cocoa farmers. This model attempts to leverage an entrepreneurial spirit 
and profit-oriented motives. 
As evidence from the field indicated, the entrepreneurial spirit of the cocoa farmers, 
particularly in Sulawesi, is quite high, and is reflected in the presence of local 
collectors, lead farmers, and private agro input suppliers. While most of them own 
cocoa farms, at the same time they undertake additional business activities and 
provide services to the cocoa farmers. Utilising institutions such as local-level 
entrepreneurship is helping provide sustainable services to cocoa farmers. 
The positive side of this model for farmers is that these services are available in 
their local communities and operated by local farmers. As Neilson and McKenzie 
(Forthcoming) claim, they are ‘becoming facilitators of knowledge exchange and 
interaction among stakeholders, and being presented with new incentives to 
facilitate knowledge exchange’. Thus, the cocoa doctors perform an important role 
in adapting good agricultural practices to local conditions. 
For the local collectors in the village model, the CVC model could be a potential 
opportunity as well as a threat to their businesses. The natural relationship of the 
CDC-CVC design is to integrate technical support into the supply chain. Local 
collectors can take this as an opportunity when adopting the CVC model as part of 
their business models. In essence, local collectors could provide technical services as 
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well to cocoa farmers. Conversely, the CVC model could also become competition 
for local collectors if a local lead farmer gradually upgrades himself to be a cocoa 
doctor and later purchases cocoa beans from farmers. 
The CDC-CVC model is a new model that has established a new benchmark for 
buyers and suppliers’ relationship coordination. Thus, it becomes obvious that this 
model would promote a new governance relationship among the cocoa actors in 
the supply chains. 
For the big traders or exporters, the CDC-CVC model and the certification programs 
could be used as a tool to strengthen its ties to the suppliers, from market 
coordination to a more relational type of coordination. Buyers who sponsored CDC 
facilities built a strong relationship with the CVCs; through the latter, the buyers 
could provide close monitoring of production and quality improvement. This would 
most likely occur when a cocoa doctor upgrades himself to be a purchasing agent. 
The CDC-CVC model, along with certification, would likely improve and strengthen 
the engagement coordination between buyers and suppliers, either between local 
collectors (who had become cocoa doctors, or cocoa doctors who had upgraded and 
integrated their service with the purchasing agent) and farmers, or between local 
collectors and exporters. This would bring a new dynamic of linkage coordination to 
the cocoa sector in Indonesia. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how a lead firm has provided opportunities for process 
upgrading amongst smallholder cocoa farmers through direct support and 
exercising voluntary standards. A detailed discussion was presented regarding the 
factors that have influenced lead firms’ upgrading strategies, and how said firms’ 
direct support has evolved to meet the local dynamics, and regarding the impact on 
the actors along the cocoa value chain.  
As the leading firm in the industry, Mars has a powerful influence over how their 
raw materials should be produced.  Its commitment to sourcing 100 per cent 
sustainable cocoa beans by 2020, in fact, has impacted directly on smallholder 
farmers.  The company utilized the market institutions to exercise its power to 
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upgrade cocoa producers and to ensure its suppliers along the global cocoa value 
chains comply with the requirements. 
This chapter addressed how lead firms support the upgrading of the cocoa 
smallholder farmers in Indonesia. This was done through an evolving approach of a 
technology transfer mechanism that has allowed Mars to reach more farmers on 
the ground. It discusses how Mars has continuously improved its approach 
responding to local dynamics, such as the increasing participation of NGOs, local 
governments and private actors to provide technology transfer to farmers. Mars 
had been utilising this trend not only to scale up the outreach of the company but 
to facilitate more cocoa farmers’ training on GAP. The latest innovative solution to 
providing continuous support to smallholder farmers is tapping into the institutional 
setting of the local community, the entrepreneurial spirit of individual people within 
said community. Offering local farmers who demonstrate a strong entrepreneurial 
spirit a self-funded extension service provider through a ‘franchise like’ model has 
allowed Mars to expand its outreach to upgrade smallholder cocoa farmers. 
In Section 6.4, I discussed some important factors that drive Mars to invest in 
technology transfer to cocoa farmers in Indonesia. I have also discussed the 
business interest as the primary objective; that is, how factors such as the need to 
secure long term cheap cocoa supplies and brand development initially became 
important driving factors to support smallholder farmers. Working to support 
smallholder farmers has allowed the company to achieve those objectives. The 
company believes in a win-win synergy whereby increased production means more 
income for farmers, while more raw materials will allow them to produce affordable 
chocolate products for end consumers.   
Section 6.5 discusses the various support mechanisms that have impacted on 
players along the chain. The latest model to support farmer development has had 
some consequences for the farmers, local collectors and big traders in Indonesia. 
The immediate consequence has been the shift of governance relationship between 
suppliers and buyers among actors in the cocoa value chain. The endorsement of 
certification all the way down to farmer level, and the offering of a ‘franchise like’ 
private extension model has moved the market type coordination towards a 
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broader relationship and captive coordination.  Certificate holders, for example, 
potentially represent captive coordination to the smallholder farmers while the CVC 
franchise model tends to encourage both relational and captive coordination, 
depending upon the level of agreement played out by the ‘cocoa doctors’ with the 
CDC sponsors. 
In effect, the case study of Mars shows the factors that drive the global lead firm to 
exercise its power to set up a benchmark of how to produce raw materials; and, 
how the company deals with the potential consequences at the farmer level. 
Despite the genuine effort to provide better livelihoods to cocoa farmers by 
improving their incomes, in fact, business factors still remain the primary objective 
of the companies that drive the process of technology and skill transfer. Apropos of 
the consequences, Mars, as the lead firm, has used certification as a tool to make 
sure that its suppliers re-invest in the cocoa farms, and to ensure the sustainability 
of cocoa production. In fact, the setting up of a global target to source certified raw 
materials has potentially excluded some cocoa farmers from the global value chains. 
Mars developed an alternative certification model that could be fit into a different 
social context of communities in Indonesia, such as organized and un-organized 
farmers tied to local collectors.  
In short, in its effort to upgrade Indonesia’s smallholder cocoa farmers, Mars has 
provided technology transfer services either direct or indirectly to cocoa farmers. 
The company has continuously, and adaptively, improved its approach to encourage 
farm-level improvements on a wide scale and, it is hoped, in a sustainable manner. 
The latest approach to certification and the CDC-CVC ‘franchise’ model has shifted 
coordination governance from market towards relational and potentially captive 
governance. There is no doubt that the lead firm has brought positive impacts to 
the farmers through new technologies, but, on the other hand, it has potentially 
created an imbalance in the power relationship between the lead firms and its 
suppliers, including the smallholder farmers. This will be discussed in chapter seven, 
the discussion chapter. 
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7 DISCUSSION  
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CHAPTER 7: THE INSTITUTIONAL (POLITICAL) INTERESTS OF 
UPGRADING AGENTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how to advance the understanding of upgrading processes in 
the GVC by incorporating multiple key players as drivers of the process, and looking 
more deeply into actors’ interests as the underlying factors within the institutional 
settings that influence governance structures within the GVC. The interaction 
between institution and governance in turn shapes the upgrading possibilities along 
the GVC.   
The conventional understanding of upgrading processes in the GVC is focused on 
the strong role of lead firms (Gereffi, 1999, p. 1022) and the way governance 
structures determine the upgrading processes (Gereffi et al., 2005).  
My argument will build on previous arguments on the centrality of governance 
towards upgrading (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2005)  and the co-creation of 
governance and institutional settings that determine upgrading outcomes (Neilson 
& Pritchard, 2009). To understand upgrading processes along the GVC, initially 
Gereffi (1999) introduced the governance concept as the key starting point. 
Governance was conceptualised as the power exerted by global lead firms, with  
Gereffi (1994) initially recognising two main types of governance in the GVCs. The 
first is the buyer-driven chain, where the retailer is positioned as the lead firm and 
the second is the producer-driven chain, where the producer is the lead firm. 
Gereffi et al. (2005) then suggested the interpretation of governance of the GVC as 
‘the co-ordination of economic activities through non-market relationships’, in 
which a new typology of governance was based on ‘complexity of transactions’, the 
‘ability to arrange information systematically’, and the ‘competence and capability 
of suppliers’ in the GVC (p. 4). This new typology helps to understand the 
relationship between firms along GVCs, and in particular how the upgrading process 
might occur in a certain type of relationship that firms might have.  
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The co-creation of institutions and governance that facilitates upgrading (Neilson & 
Pritchard, 2009) constituted a new manner in which to understand with greater 
nuance how the upgrading process could occur. Neilson and Pritchard argued that 
the interaction of institutional settings and governance of the GVC created a causal 
dimension that in turn facilitates and connects to upgrading outcomes. 
This chapter will start the analysis by discussing the cases of multiple key players as 
the drivers of upgrading; then it will discuss the co-creation of governance and 
institutions cases, and finally, it will discuss the political interests of actors in the 
cocoa industry in Indonesia.   
7.2 Multiple key players as the main driver of upgrading 
The conventional understanding of upgrading processes in the GVC is focused on 
the strong role of lead firms (Gereffi, 1999, p. 1022). Mainly considered as the 
source of learning process for their suppliers, a powerful value chain actor that 
could exercise high standard and  the provider of upgrading supporting facilities for 
their suppliers (Gereffi, 1999; Gibbon, 2001; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000). However, 
the notion of lead firm as the sole key actor to facilitate upgrading is dubious. The 
presented cases in the previous chapters show how different key players operated 
at various level of upgrading processes. The multiple key players as the driver of 
upgrading, shown from the cases in Chapter Four, Five and Six, shaped outcomes in 
terms of both process and functional upgrading. 
7.2.1 Process upgrading  
The process upgrading in the GVC typology, is commonly defined as ‘transforming 
inputs into outputs more efficiently by reorganizing the production system or 
introducing superior technology’ (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002, p. 1020). In the 
context of farm level upgrading, this type of upgrading has been associated with 
improving farming practices, and includes the efficient use of farming inputs and 
adopting new technology and practices. 
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The presented cases in the previous chapters pointed out that Mars, a lead firm in 
the cocoa industry, in fact, works in parallel, with other key drivers of upgrading 
actors in the cocoa value chain in Indonesia.  
Mars worked to upgrade its suppliers through two main strategies. First, providing 
direct technical support to smallholder cocoa farmers, and secondly, exercising 
global certification standards. In the early years of its technology transfer program 
in 2003, Mars emphasised its supports to combat the high infestation of CPB 
through direct supports.  The firm disseminated standard practices of how to 
manage cocoa farms, such as appropriate fertilizer usage, regular pruning to reduce 
humidity; and introducing new methods of combating pest and diseases such as, 
utilizing predators and chemical pest traps.  
Those direct supports were carried out, in fact, in many cases in collaboration with 
the state and development agencies. Among the programs are the PRIMA project, 
which focus on integrating value chains, research and technology transfer, 
partnering with ACDI VOCA; the Mars Sustainability project which a focus on 
expanding and disseminating the outreach of standard farming practices in 
partnership with CSP members such as ASKINDO, Swiss Contact, and IFC; and the 
Mars Cocoa Clinic in partnership with local extension agencies. Some of those 
partners delivered direct technical support at different locations and even 
overlapped in locations where Mars operated, such as the USAID funded projects 
(the SUCCESS, the SUCCESS Alliance, and the AMARTA project) and the State funded 
project (such as GERNAS). Those program details could be seen in the Chapter Four 
and Five.  
Important information to be highlighted is the number of smallholder farmers 
reached from the process upgrading projects.  Even though Mars seems the most 
consistent training provider over the last 11 years, the number of farmers reached 
by its direct supports were considered small. The latest record in 2014 indicated 
that total farmers who had received direct training from Mars was 16,534 farmers, 
with additional indirect training by field facilitators was 26,869 people. Meanwhile, 
the SUCCESS and the SUCCESS Alliance projects, successfully trained approximately 
70,000 farmers, and disseminated the farm management practice indirectly to an 
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estimated 271,000 people.   In the meantime, the GERNAS project, the state led 
national cocoa project intended to reach 450,000 cocoa farmers. However, there 
was no official announcement at the later stage of the program, in which final 
information that reveals the actual number of farmers reached from the GERNAS. 
Regardless the outcome of those projects, the total number of farmers reached out 
for trainings and supports to improve the farm management indicated that lead 
firm outreach through direct technical supports was much less than those reached 
by development agencies and the state.   
The second strategy from was the requirement to enforce global sustainability 
standard for its suppliers.  As a leading chocolate firm at the global level, Mars has 
required the implementation of ethical sourcing for its entire global suppliers to 
comply with sustainability standards, such as Rainforest Alliance and UTZ certified.  
A challenge for Mars is to ensure that all its suppliers (the grinders) apply their same 
professed commitment to sustainability. The structure of the global cocoa and 
chocolate industry has been identified as ‘bi-polar’, in which the power between the 
manufacturers and grinders is somewhat equal (Fold, 2002). This equal power is a 
result of the high concentration of chocolate manufactures on one side, along with 
even greater concentration amongst cocoa grinders (Fold & Neilson, 2016).   
In fact, given that the grinders are primarily trading companies with limited 
interaction with end consumers, it is not surprising if their overt commitment to 
ethical sourcing seems limited.  In this context, the Mars’ pledge to global voluntary 
standards could be seen as an important strategy to exercise value chain 
governance over their equally powerful suppliers.  This strategic move is in line with 
Roberts (2003) suggestion that lead firms need ‘to develop systematic mechanism 
for interacting with all their key stakeholders’ (p.168), in particular to push the 
commitment of suppliers to provide assurances of their pledge to sustainability 
practices. This notion is consistent with the idea of Mars director of Asia operations, 
who emphasises that ‘certification must be positioned as a system for verification of 
quality support services to farmers’ (Choo, 2014).  
Such a strategy to govern its suppliers through third party mechanisms may also 
provide several benefits for smallholder farmers.  For the producers, this private 
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governance has helped smallholder farmers to secure supply relationships with 
Mars, and additional price incentive for premium quality. This finding corroborates 
Gibbon, Ponte, and Lazaro's (2010) finding in their study on sustainability standards 
and its implementation in the agro-food exports in East Africa. The sustainability 
standard has help to enhance ‘the possibility for producers to undertake direct 
exports, increased their security of contract and had measurable financial benefits’ 
for producers (Gibbon et al., 2010, p. 137). In the context of Mars’ linkage with 
smallholder farmers in Indonesia, the farmers only sell to locally active international 
firms, but do not performed export activities themselves.  
In the social upgrading context, Knorringa and Pegler (2006) indicate that the 
‘increasing importance of standards, and codes of conduct’ drive global branded 
companies (p.477), which in turn drives the social upgrading processes. As such, the 
effect of Mars global governance strategies has been felt by all suppliers along Mars 
supply chains, as they started to adopt third party certifications. At the global level, 
one aspect of public pressure to apply the third party standards was to counter child 
labour and human trafficking in Africa (Mistrati & Romano, 2010). In this context, 
social upgrading is pursued through an imposition to meet global standards for 
ethical sourcing practices.  
However, despite the benefit, the lead-firm strategy to govern the GVC through 
implementation of corporate governance raises potential public concerns of   
smallholders’ exclusion. Farmers could be excluded from the cocoa GVCs due to the 
strict standard requirement. Several studies elsewhere have presented evidence of 
this exclusion due to the stringent standard requirements imposed on agro-food 
producers from the European market (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Fold & Larsen, 
2011).  One of the classic argument for this exclusion is that transaction and 
supervision costs are lower when dealing with larger producers (Dolan & Humphrey, 
2000, p. 167). However, in the context of cocoa industry, smallholder farmers 
dominate global production (see Chapter 3). Excluding smallholder farmers means 
reducing the global supply of cocoa. As such, Mars realised that pledging 100 per 
cent compliance with sustainability standards means that the company needs to 
engage at the farmer level to able  to include smallholder farmers in the GVC. As 
such, this second strategy to facilitate process upgrading at the farm level came 
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with various ICS and market linkage arrangements that allow smallholders to get 
global certifications. Details of those models were explained in the Section 6.3.2. 
The effort to build various, locally-adaptive, market linkage arrangements in relation 
to certification programs, substantiates findings from Perez-Aleman and Sandilands 
(2008), who claimed that value was constructed both at the top and bottom of 
supply-chain pyramids. They emphasised that an active lead firm is required to 
provide support in the early period of adopting sustainability practices, helping 
farmers break barriers to entry into the global market, and empowering small 
producers during the process, as well as providing them with support during the 
implementation phase of the sustainability standards. Following these practices 
means that certification reduces the exclusion of farmers from GVCs.  
7.2.2 Functional upgrading  
Functional upgrading is defined as ‘acquiring new functions to increase the overall 
skill content of activities’ (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002, p. 1020). Based on this 
definition, two major functional upgrading activities were identified during the 
period of this research, occurring at different segments - the cocoa producer level 
and at the trader-grinders level.  Both segments have materialized functional 
upgrading, but have been triggered by different key players.  
7.2.2.1 The new independent private extension agents 
New independent private extension agents emerged mainly in South Sulawesi, due 
to the new franchised-extension model, the CVC’s. The CVC’s is an independent-run 
clinic, where lead farmers transformed into cocoa doctors to serve cocoa farmers at 
the village level. The service spans across the selling of agro-input products, 
providing farm maintenance services, and delivering administration service for ICS 
for certifications.  
In this case, Mars offered and facilitated farmers to attain new roles and run new 
activities by improving the skill set of farmers. Mars provided not only agronomical 
training to the farmers, but also business management. The business management 
skill set was introduced to allow farmers to run profitable services. Mars seems to 
be tapping the entrepreneurial spirit of the Buginese people that is socially 
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embedded within the cocoa farmers (Ruf et al., 1996). The spirit that drive the lead 
farmers to take a new role as a ‘cocoa doctor’, where farmers assume the new 
function of an extension agent and at the same time engage in agro-input trading 
and service provision for farm rehabilitations. 
What is important to highlight from the above conventional upgrading is the impact 
of the CDC model and the certification programs (as discussed in the previous 
section) to the value chain level also appears to entail an intrinsic feature of ‘social 
upgrading’. Discussion elsewhere of social upgrading in the GVC has been mainly 
related to improving labour conditions within firms that have engaged in economic 
upgrading activities (Barrientos, Gereffi, et al., 2011; Barrientos, Mayer, et al., 2011; 
Fernandez-Stark, Frederick, & Gereffi, 2011; Knorringa & Pegler, 2006).  Based on 
the Knorringa and Pegler (2006) classification of areas where social upgrading in the 
GVC might take place, and as presented in Chapter 6, it is identified that social 
upgrading occurred at two levels: at the value chain and at the global level.  
At the value chain level, the alignment of social upgrading activities come from the 
hypothesis that the social upgrading at the value chain level, likely occurs when 
‘chain responsibility is more mainstreamed as part of ethical sourcing’ (Knorringa & 
Pegler, 2006, p. 477).  Through the CVC-CDC model for example, Mars promotes the 
need of suppliers to complement their business activities with supporting services 
at the community level. Ethical sourcing such as transparent price and quality in the 
trading practices, and imposing the environmental practices on farm management 
are among the features of mainstreaming the ‘ethical practices’ along its supply 
chain in Indonesia.   
At the firm level, social upgrading affects the suppliers’ staff along the chains who 
deal with procurement functions. Roberts (2003), in a study of understanding the 
ethical sourcing initiatives, pointed out that ‘to effectively implement ethical 
sourcing codes of conduct, will require companies to build the capacity of 
procurement functions to manage environmental and social issues in their supplier 
network’ (p.169). In this case, the supplier ‘offers more opportunities for 
representation and learning’ to their procurement staff and possibly the marketing 
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staff who manage to control the image of companies (Knorringa & Pegler, 2006, p. 
477). 
7.2.2.2 The expanding cocoa processors 
The functional upgrading has also occurred within the cocoa processing segment of 
the value chain. Within this segment, the state has instituted trade policies that 
favor processing operators or companies, mainly through the export tax policy. The 
policy has provided pricing advantages for cocoa processors operating in Indonesia 
compared to the competing companies operating overseas, but mostly depending 
on cocoa beans from Indonesia. Details of the trade policy discussion were 
explained in the Section 4.3.2.  
In the case presented in Chapter four, it was clear that the export tariff and the 
abolition of VAT were the major triggers of the growth of grinding companies in 
Indonesia. It was recorded that since the implementation of the policies, the 
grinding facilities have doubled in capacity from 235,000 tons to 539,000 tons. In 
other words, through setting up new institutional settings, the Indonesian state has 
generally been successful in attracting investors in the cocoa industry.  
Those state policies have triggered functional upgrading that could be seen in two 
of the world’s largest cocoa grinders (Barry Callebaut and Cargill). Those companies 
expanded their operations in Indonesia; right after the 2010 tax was introduced. 
This strategic move to expand their operation in Indonesia seems to consolidate 
their global operations and strengthen their supplier networks in the country. Barry-
Callebaut has become the largest grinder in Indonesia. In terms of supplier 
networks, it has acquired local partners with strong trading networks across the 
major cocoa producing areas in Indonesia. Meanwhile, Cargill already had its own 
strong trading networks across Indonesia prior to the tax. Its reputation for quality 
and premium price, successfully built its network as the network for high quality 
beans.  
Besides the above major global grinders, smaller grinders also expanded their 
processing facilities, such as the opening of new processing operation Malaysian 
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based companies, such as PT. Asia cocoa and JB Cocoa, and the expanding capacity 
of PT. Bumi Tangerang, an Indonesian based company.  
Unlike the situation in India, where protective state supports allowed the initial 
growth of downstream activities in the coffee sector (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009), 
the Indonesian state did not restrict foreign investors from operating in Indonesia. 
This policy might be the result of the non-protectionist view embraced mainly by 
the Indonesian policy makers (Basri & Hill, 2011; Basri & Patunru, 2012), which 
could be a legacy of trade reform during the economic crisis. The structural 
adjustment program that was a part of Indonesian agreement with the IMF meant 
that domestic ‘trade in agriculture products was fully deregulated’  (Soesastro & 
Basri, 2005, p. 7). The cocoa sector, in fact, had never been tightly regulated 
(Akiyama & Nishio, 1997).  
An interesting fact is, even though the cocoa sector never had been tightly 
regulated, the capacity of cocoa processing facilities had remained stagnant at 
around 200,000 tons capacity per year, up until the imposition of the export tax. 
This clearly indicated that strategic decisions undertaken by global and local 
companies to exercise functional upgrading was driven by the state. Hence, it could 
be argued that the state has performed a major role in driving the cocoa industry 
upgrading, in particular in putting institutional settings in place that provide 
advantage to the cocoa processors in the cocoa value chains in Indonesia.   
In short, this sub-section discussion has confirmed that multiple key players have 
been the driving actors that facilitate and triggers the upgrading processes in the 
cocoa industry in Indonesia. As such, incorporating the notion of multiple key 
players as the driver of upgrading in the GVC could enhance and provide better 
understanding of upgrading trajectories in developing countries. 
7.3 The co-creation of governance and institutions in Indonesia 
The centrality of lead firm governance in in the GVC has been widely applied to 
understand the upgrading processes in developing countries (see Chapter 2 on lead 
firms). However, the GVC approach has also attracted some critical concerns among 
the scholars due to the limited attention given to the institutions that affect the 
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upgrading processes (Bair, 2005; Neilson & Pritchard, 2009; Selwyn, 2008). Bair 
(2005) pointed out that while the  GVC framework has advanced the understanding 
of governance structures for the upgrading prospects, it is not in itself sufficient. She 
argues that to complement the strength of the chain framework, ‘closer attention 
to the larger institutional and structural environments in which commodity chains 
are embedded is needed in order to more fully inform our understanding of the 
uneven social and developmental dynamics of contemporary capitalist at the global-
local nexus’ (Bair, 2005, p. 153). In line with Bair’s argument, Selwyn (2008) argued 
that the GVC ‘framework has failed to investigate the role of local institutional 
context and how it impacts on firm upgrading opportunities’ (p.380). Selwyn (2008) 
emphasises the need to invest in ‘factors that create upgrading processes, 
mechanism such as government and private research institutions, and bodies 
providing infrastructures to continue  firms’ competitiveness’ (pp.380-381). 
Responding to such criticisms, Neilson and Pritchard (2009) argued that ‘the GVC 
approach has been conceptualised all too frequently as being solely about 
governance, leading to the misguided perception that the approach has little to say 
on the complex questions about why and how particular  industries come to be 
located in particular places’ (p.8). Further, they emphasise that ‘what is missing in 
the literature is the precise articulation of ‘institutions’, and how they relate to GVC 
governance’ (p.9). In fact, they emphasised that ‘institutions are not just framing 
devices external to product /commodity systems (‘out there’), but exist also as the 
rules, norms and behaviour vehicle that shape the very essence of how 
product/commodity system are organized (‘in here’) (p.9). In this regard, they 
incorporate institutional analysis in the GVC framework: 
“Systems of value chain governance intermesh with the institutional life of 
territoriality embedded production arrangements: institutions shape 
governance forms, and governance is enacted through institutions. The 
point is: institutional formations and governance arrangements coexist in an 
iterative way nexus within global value chains”  (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009, 
p. 9). 
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The following discussion will further develop the co-creation of institutions and 
governance in the context of upgrading processes in the cocoa industry in 
Indonesia.   
7.3.1 The governance of cocoa exporting 
Setting formal institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ in order to drive economic 
development in Indonesia has been a characteristic feature of Indonesian economic 
development, reflecting a ‘developmental state’ approach (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 
1990). This approach was undertaken when the state pledges to expand the 
national grinding capacity of the cocoa industry.  
Chapter 4 discussed how the founder of AIKI, consistently approached and met with 
key actors within the Indonesian Government. In brief, the association sought 
concessions from the government to provide supportive institutional settings, such 
as the export tariff and the abolition of VAT that would favour the growth of 
grinding companies in Indonesia. The rationale behind him making such requests  
were to add value to cocoa beans domestically, which would, it was argued, create 
domestic employment along the GVC, contribute to the multiplier effect that such 
investment would create, and finally it will generate state revenue, especially when 
cocoa beans exported after processed in Indonesia.   
AIKI (despite having a relatively small member base) intensified its lobbying in the 
months before and after the presidential election both in 2004 and in 2009, and 
both times was apparently successful in gaining important policy concessions 
(removal of the VAT and the export tax respectively),  
However, ASKINDO, in which the majority of members are exporters (both local and 
international exporting companies), was consistently opposed to the export tax. In 
the national discourse, ASKINDO consistently raised the argument of the potential 
negative impacts on farm-gate prices. However, the underlying motive was the fear 
of the value chain impacts resulting from the installed institutions, and the new 
governance structure in the cocoa industry in Indonesia. It was predicted by the 
major members of ASKINDO that when the export tariff policy was passed and 
imposed by the Indonesian government, most of the exporters would have to 
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reorganise their buying operations in Indonesia. The restructuring operation would 
require them to either affiliate with the local grinders or close their operations. 
Indeed, evidence since the introduction of the export tariff suggests that these fears 
were well founded (Fold & Neilson, 2016).  
The strong governance from local grinders to establish policy regulations that 
favours grinders leads to the enactment of an export tariff, as a new institutional 
setting in the cocoa industry. This institutional setting, in turn, attracted new FDI in 
the industry, including Barry Callebaut and Cargill. The combination of strong 
market networks in the cocoa GVC, and strong supplier networks within Indonesia, 
has created a new governance structure in the industry. The big players consolidate 
the bean trading and grinding activities, making stronger bi-polar market structure 
in the global cocoa-chocolate industry. The ongoing interplay between institutions 
and governance is clear from this discussion, and suggests we need to more clearly 
understand the motivations and power structures that can intervene in these 
processes of co-creation. 
The new FDI in grinding has created unequal competition for some local grinders. A 
source from a local grinding company in Indonesia expressed resentment towards 
the expansion of foreign companies, stating that ‘we failed to anticipate the impact 
of this policy on the increasing competition between the foreign and locally owned 
grinding companies’ (Personal Communication, June 5, 2013). The expression of this 
player reflects how fierce the competition has become after the substantially 
expanded foreign grinding presence in Indonesia. Historically, the Indonesian state 
has applied a ‘hands-off’ policy for trading beans (within Indonesia), unlike the 
marketing board in Ghana (Akiyama & Nishio, 1997). The export tax policy only 
limited bean exports, but did not restrict the role of foreign companies in local 
trading activities within Indonesia.  Thus, the presence of foreign companies, 
supported by better financial operation, technological superiority, global market 
linkages and strong local supplier networks, has tended to marginalise local 
companies.  
Nevertheless, having linkages with lead chocolate manufacturing firms can also help 
local companies compete with the new governance structure in the cocoa industry 
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in Indonesia. The bi-polar competition between cocoa grinders and chocolate 
manufacturers, has also opened opportunities for some local companies, especially 
if manufacturers prefer to have a diversification of suppliers to avoid dependency 
on the few global grinders.  PT. Bumi Tangerang, for example, successfully doubled 
its grinding capacity after the export tariff was implemented. Before the tax, the 
company had established strong market networks with a global lead firm in the 
chocolate and food industry, Nestle. Meanwhile, other domestically owned 
companies are not able to collect rents from the export-tariff policy, since an 
established market linkage with global buyers is absent. This case, seems to 
resonate with the GVC premise on the need to have linkage with lead firms to stay 
competitive in the globalised world (Gereffi, 2011, 2014; Gereffi et al., 2001; Gereffi 
et al., 2005). 
7.3.3 Farmers’ on upgrading 
Farmers upgrading in Sulawesi illustrates how institutional settings and governance 
of the GVC created a causal dimension that in turn facilitates and connects to the 
upgrading activities. Two main examples can be drawn from the presented cases in 
the Chapter 6 are the certification program and the new business outreach model. 
7.3.2.1 The certification schemes 
Global certification schemes are one example where global markets institute 
governing mechanisms, where it shapes how to produce and to source raw 
materials in the cocoa industry. At the local level, it institutes new models of 
engagements and relationships between buyers and suppliers. 
Generally, governance relationship between farmers and lead firms in the cocoa 
industry, in Indonesia, is a market relationship. The cocoa bean produced from farm 
is not a complex product. It is a simple agricultural product, with a modest cultural 
technique production. Buyers and sellers are quite easy to switch from one to 
another.  
Through the certification arrangements, the buyers-farmers’ relationship shifted 
toward captive relationship. Even though the productions of certified cocoa beans 
are not complex in terms of technological sophistication, but the introduction of 
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new practices that meet the certification standards is socially complex. A great deal 
of interventions, such as, financial and management supports, traceability and 
standard practices monitoring mechanism at the farm level, were required to be 
able to pass the audit. Thus, intense interactions between farmers and buyers were 
occurred due to the increased need to meet certification standards. 
The most challenging requirement is the cost of doing certification itself. For 
farmers, thousands of US Dollars for certification processes is considered high cost.  
This challenge has driven Mars, as the lead firm, to find cost effective ways of doing 
the certification. Mars developed several models where organizations or buyers, 
could fund the cost of doing certifications. The four models presented in the Section 
6.3.2 were the options. They were the fully funded certification with internally 
managed ICS, fully funded with outsourced ICS, and local collectors funded as well 
as the CVC certification plus arrangement.  All arrangements were designed to find 
the most effective mechanism to integrate smallholder farmers into global markets 
and meet the certification requirements for their products. Since the cost of doing 
the certification was absorbed by the buyer, all four different models have put 
farmers as the captive suppliers for their buyers.  
Despite the captive relationship resulting from the arrangements, the certification 
program  facilitates the ‘exchange of knowledge and development assistance along 
the value chain (Neilson & McKenzie, Forthcoming, p. 12). As such, the buyers 
provide supports to the participant farmers not only to improve their farming 
practices that should follow the guidance of certifications, but also the arrangement 
improves the capacity of farmers.  In other words, it facilitates and drives upgrading 
processes at the farm level.   
7.3.2.2 The business oriented outreach model 
Business oriented outreach has become a new institutional mechanism to upgrade 
smallholder farmers. It is an innovative institutional mechanism that is delivering 
new skills and innovations to the cocoa farming community in Indonesia (p.12) 
(Neilson & McKenzie, Forthcoming). The longstanding provisions and interaction 
between lead firms, farmers, and research institutions, which was started in the 
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year 2000, seems to have encouraged Mars to establish this new extension 
mechanism. 
The CDC-CVC model, as explained in Chapter 6, provides an alternative mechanism 
to deliver sustainable extension services to smallholder farmers. The model ties 
together the entrepreneurial spirit, business opportunities, and the need to provide 
continuous extension services to smallholder farmers. This new model, in fact, 
institutes a new governing system between cocoa buyers and farmers who become 
the cocoa doctors, as independent extension providers.  
Several contexts that need to understand why this functional upgrading could be 
materialised. The context includes the increasing need to find alternatives to 
project-based extension providers, and to benefit from the socially embedded 
entrepreneurial spirit of cocoa farmers. 
Over the last 14 years period, various transfer technology programs had been 
delivered to support the upgrading processes for smallholder farmers in Indonesia. 
The major shortcomings of those programs included their short term and project 
basis, and the fact that they tended to be administered in a top down manner. The 
extension staff working to support the cocoa farmers only worked during the 
project duration. Once the project ended, then the services were also stopped. In 
fact, the majority of smallholder farmers need continuous support, requiring 
technical staff to be available on the ground when they need to have consultations 
and help.  In a few villages, the fellow farmers, who are skillful would support their 
peers. But those peer supports are not available in wider areas. In addition to this 
problem, the availability of farming inputs were also scarce, due to the facilitation 
role from the extension staff supported by the projects, having been stopped.  
A solution for the extension providers was sought by tapping the entrepreneurial 
spirit of cocoa farmers, which is a strong trait that is socially embedded mainly in 
the Buginese ethnic, as the major smallholder farmers in Sulawesi. Among the 
smallholder farmers, there were lead farmers, who have attended several trainings 
from various cocoa projects. Some of them, in fact, have started providing services 
to their surrounding farmers. The service includes regeneration services such as side 
grafting, selling entries and developing nurseries for new seeds and fertilizers.  
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These were natural responses from local farmers seeing the opportunities after 
gaining some skill from trainings. Many of those businesses existed since the USAID 
SUCCESS project and Mars PRIMA project in the early 2000.  However, those 
business services were carried out individually but with a limited coverage, without 
any business standardisation and technical supports. It is purely driven by the 
individual farmers who saw business opportunities in their neighbourhoods.   
The CDC-CVC model was, therefore, designed to allow lead firms or cocoa buyers to 
provide supports for sustainable farm practices through independent extension 
providers. It’s a franchise model arrangement that provides standardisation of 
technology and business model. It would allow the participant farmers to have skill 
and knowledge, in the farming as well as in the business practice. At this point, the 
relationship occurred between the lead firms with its CDC, and farmers with their 
CVC, where a knowledge transfer mechanism created technology diffusion to 
smallholder farmers at the village level.  
In terms of maintaining and standardising the service of farmers as the cocoa 
doctor, the lead firms provide a great deal of upgrading supports and interventions. 
This relational value chains occurred in fact without the need to provide product 
exchanges. However, gradually once the cocoa doctors and their CVC business 
model was operating, the relationship stepped up to the business transactions, 
where the cocoa doctors could buy cocoa beans from farmers in their  villages, and 
sell it to the lead firms, that supported them to establish and run CVC.  
In this context, the governance relationship that occurred between farmers and 
lead firms were shifting. Before the CDC-CVC model, the governance was in the 
market relationship.  After the CDC-CVC model, the governance arrangement 
became relational value chains, but with simple products, the supplying of cocoa 
beans. The relationship shifted from loose to the relatively tight due to the intense 
interaction during the knowledge transfer and the standardisation of business 
practices for the extension outreach. The CDC as an institution funded by a lead firm 
provides continuous monitoring and supports to the cocoa doctors with its CVC 
business model. An important point from this finding is that the governance 
relationship occurred between lead firms and farmers were driven by the need to 
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upgrade the competency of smallholder farmers to be the extension agent. The 
category of relational value chain only occurred in the context of improving the 
competency and capability of farmers to be private extension providers. As such, 
this typology slightly deviated from the Gereffi et al. (2005) definition that requires, 
strong coordination due to the complexity of products that need information 
arrangement (codifiability) capability of suppliers.  
In any case, the above discussion shows how interactions between institutions and 
governance both at the local and global level has shaped the upgrading processes in 
the cocoa industry in Indonesia. The presented discussion on the governance of 
exporting cocoa demonstrated how deeply the institutional life of cocoa industry 
stakeholders in Indonesia, influenced the government rules in the trading policy. In 
turn, the trading policy has considerably success in driving national upgrading at the 
processing level, which in turn, impacted new structural governance between cocoa 
traders and exporters; and cocoa processors in the national industry. For farmers’ 
level upgrading, the institutional settings through the certifications and the CDC-
CVC model has created new governance arrangement between farmers and lead 
firms. The certification has driven process upgrading at farm level and also created 
various new modes of engagement between buyers and farmers.  The CDC-CVC 
model demonstrated how a local norm, which is the strong entrepreneurial spirit of 
the Buginese, and the experiences of lead firms engagement with farmers and some 
extent research institutions, were utilised and adopted to develop the CDC-CVC 
model, a franchise-like model for private extension providers. 
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7.4 The political interests of key actors associated with the chain 
Now we come to the third point of the discussion, and the main contribution of this 
study. Neilson and Pritchard (2009) point out that ‘the institutions are not just 
framing devices external to product/commodity system, but exist also as the rules, 
norms and behaviours vehicle that shape the very essence of how 
product/commodity system are organized’ (p.9). At this point, this section 
advancing this argument by looking at the underlying interests that shapes the 
rules, norms and behaviours of key actor associated with the chain, including – most 
importantly - their political interests. 
The existing literature on GVCs and GPNs has only addressed these political 
interests marginally.  Some literatures might seem to touch on these subjects, such 
as the inquiry to bring the political economy and cultural economic approach into 
the GPN frameworks  (Coe, Dicken, & Hess, 2008); or bringing the embeddedness 
perspective into GPN framework (Bair, 2008); and the relevance of national 
trajectories in mediating local and global relations  (Fernández, 2014); and taking an 
actor-centered approach toward theory development (Yeung & Coe, 2015).  
Glassman (2011) perhaps can be identified as explicitly trying to insert the political 
process as in integral aspect of value chain production processes. Glassman (2011) 
pointed out that ‘GPNs has avoided the discussion of political issues that speak to 
the messiness, contestation, and violence that often accompanies globalization’ 
(p.154). In fact, ‘politics clearly enters directly into the mix under the heading of 
extra firm relationships, including through legal structures, government contracts, 
and join research and development collaborations with the state (Glassman, 2011, 
p. 157). At this stage, Glassman tended to focus on war and geopolitics to extend 
the understanding of the globalization process rather than the more mundane 
vested interests of individual actors. 
This study’s contribution focuses on the ‘politics’ or political interests of upgrading 
actors which underlie the co-creation of institutions and governance in the GVC of 
cocoa industry in Indonesia. 
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7.4.1 Dual role of the IFC 
Apparently conflicting interests are a major challenge for the IFC when supporting 
upgrading processes in Indonesia. On the one hand, the IFC is a development 
agency and on the other it operates as a private investment entity. This dual role is 
reflected in the binary structure of the organization, which is divided into technical 
advisory services and investment. The combination of these two roles has been 
adapted both in supporting the poverty alleviation program, as well as supporting 
the growth of its clients. Translating this dual role into upgrading processes, IFC 
positioned its clients as the driver for development, including supporting the poor 
people.  
The implementation of pro-poor development policies is aligned with the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD), an organisation that 
operates in 23 developed countries and which highlights the issue of ‘pro-poor 
development policies’:  
For the private sector to deliver pro-poor growth, a set of factors need to be 
in place that allow all private sector actors to participate in and benefit from 
growth. These factors are providing incentives for entrepreneurship and 
investment, increasing productivity through competition and innovation, 
harnessing international economic linkages, improving market access and 
functioning, reducing risk and vulnerability. Putting these factors into place 
requires action on a number of interconnected fronts; macroeconomic 
stability, a sound enabling environment for investors, reducing important 
barriers to doing business, and building supply-side responsiveness. 
(Manning, 2005, p. 38) 
Chapter 5 presented the result of this dual role, which put IFC in a dilemma. On the 
one hand, the IFC tried to develop an inclusive financial support for smallholder 
farmers, on the other hand the company needed a bridge for its client interests. 
Following this dilemma, IFC was also confronted with the need to decide target 
areas with high levels of poverty incidence, but the scale that allows operating for 
the lead firms was not always feasible in these areas.  
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This conflict of interests tended to favour the IFC investee. It was obliged to ensure 
that the technical assistance designed and developed through the advisory service 
of the IFC would be linked to the lead firm, which was one of IFC’s clients. 
Therefore, IFC needs to convince its clients that the proposed program is profitable 
and feasible for their business. At this point, the conflict of interest tends to favour 
the investee clients rather the poor.    
An important observation is that even though the governance relationship tended 
to be ‘locked-in’ through contract farming. However, the cocoa bean is a 
commodity, and the nature of value chain governance is ultimately a market 
relationship, where buyers and sellers are easy to find (Gereffi et al., 2005). Thus, it 
is not surprising when farmers, dissatisfied with a contract, find it easy to conduct 
side selling.  
In short, conflict of interest could be important factors to understand the upgrading 
agencies behaviour. The IFC case on inclusive financing shows how the institutions 
and governance are deeply influenced by their own vested interests. 
7.4.2 USAID and aid-for-trade 
The stated interests of USAID are to expand the economic opportunities for US 
firms, as well as  ensuring the economic security of the USA (USAID, 2004). 
Translating this mission into development practice, USAID frequently employs the 
GVC approach due to its potential capability to bring together two principal aims—
economic growth and poverty alleviation   (Kula et al., 2006) —by offering market-
based solutions (Baan & Janssen, 2006) to poverty alleviation. 
It is not surprising if the large agricultural projects supported by USAID in Indonesia 
are also connected to US economic actors. In the cocoa sector, despite the fact that 
the volume of cocoa beans exported directly into the US market has tended to 
decline from 134 thousand tonnes in 2000 to 89 thousand tonnes in 2010 (UN 
Comtrade, 2015), US chocolate companies continued to remain critically dependent 
on Indonesian cocoa, even if it has been processed elsewhere first, such as in 
Malaysia. Since the export tax, while the volume of beans exported to the USA has 
  235 
crashed further to only seven thousand tonnes in 2013, being somewhat replaced 
by 26 thousand tonnes of cocoa butter to the USA (UN Comtrade, 2015).  
In the market linkage program, it’s clear that USAID’s politics on aid were reflected 
through the pre-design partnership with US-affiliated companies/suppliers, such as 
Armajaro and Olam (the latter intended to supply Hershey in the US).  This approach 
is designed to secure commitment from buyers to work to upgrade smallholder 
farmers. However, this selective support creates unfair competition among the 
excluded companies, similar to concerns voiced elsewhere in the Indonesian coffee 
sector, ‘drawing concern from existing industry  actors that the programme was 
providing an unfair advantage to what was widely considered to be a US business 
interest’ (Neilson, 2014, p. 55).  
Working in the context of corporate capitalism, selective partnership and aid for 
trade demonstrate how the private sector is driven to develop economic growth in 
developing countries. This top–down practice is identified by Gereffi (2014) as a 
common practice by the World Bank that urges private players to build the capacity 
of developing countries in their economic activities. In this context, Neilson (2014) 
argued that the value-chain development approach is only utilised as ‘an 
institutional system’ for the expansion of multinational capital, and rises concern on 
the  potential advocates from development-agency institutions that might 
recommend a ‘one-size fits all value chain for development’, especially when used 
as a ‘diagnostic tool to further ideologically driven reform agendas’ (p. 23). A such, 
when the GVC tool was applied in policy recommendations, the reports revert to an 
agenda that departs very little from the Washington Consensus (Ravenhill, 2014). 
The political interests of USAID also appear to be reflected in their policy 
recommendations. Related to the issue of the export tariff, USAID funded a team of 
consultants, consisting of an international consultancy teamed with Ministry of 
Trade staff (Marks et al., 2007), to investigate the potential effect of the export 
tariff on the smallholder farmers in Indonesia. The conclusion suggested that the 
export tariff would reduce the farm-gate price, which would in turn reduce the 
profitability of the farmers. Some stakeholders in Indonesia accuse this study of 
policy bias, since it was funded by USAID, which it was suspected would favour 
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trade openness, which would also favour the exporters. As such, it is not surprising 
that USAID supported consultants advocating an open trade policy against the 
export tariff. 
7.4.3 Mars’ political interests 
From the management perspective, firms need to become political actors in their 
own right, so as to adapt the challenging institutional environments, particularly 
when confronted with social and environmental demands (Scherer, Palazzo, & 
Matten, 2014; Skippari & Pajunen, 2010), or when confronted with labour issues 
(Contu, Palpacuer, & Balas, 2013) or when directing certain government policies in 
attempt to improve their performance (Luo & Zhao, 2013).  
The mobilisation of public resources to address the potential lack of future supplies 
demonstrates the driving role that lead firms may have in altering institutional 
settings. Mars’ effort in mobilising public resources is another important strategy 
that shapes the upgrading processes in Indonesia. Since the early USAID 
interventions in Indonesia, the Mars global sustainability team has been involved in 
supporting the programs, either through the WCF, such as the Success Alliance 
program; or through the designing team of USAID program in Indonesia, such as the 
AMARTA program. Mars has also been involved in providing supports for the 
GERNAS design program through the CSP forum.  
In this context, Mars demonstrates its action as a corporate political entity. Looking 
at their actions from a corporate political perspective helps us to understand how 
Mars behaves in supporting the cocoa upgrading processes, both at the global and 
national level. 
7.4.4 The interests of state based actors 
7.4.4.1 Political economy 
The political economic reasons have also been the major motive for state-facilitated 
upgrading of the cocoa industry in Indonesia. The Indonesian government has a 
strong desire to become one of the major cocoa-grinding countries in the world 
(Barani, 2010). This ambition was highlighted by the Vice Minister of Agriculture 
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during a research interview in 2010 in which he stated that ‘at least all cocoa beans 
produced in Indonesia should be ground in Indonesia’. Senior bureaucrats the Vice 
Minister of Agriculture and the Director of Directorate General of Estate Crops 
agreed on the political economic perspective of adding value to Indonesian cocoa 
beans in Indonesia instead of in neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and 
Singapore. Although there was some ambiguity whether this value-adding activity 
should be reserved for domestic (indigenous) economic interests or whether FDI 
should be encouraged. Indigenously-informed political nationalism is also found in 
other countries, such as in India who also attempted to support the growth of local 
coffee chains (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009). 
On preliminary examination, the (former) director of the Directorate General of 
Estate Crops embraced the traditional dichotomy of ‘foreign versus local’ business 
players. He demonstrated a strong intention to nurture and empower locally owned 
grinders through ‘specific protection and companies’ empowerment’ (Barani, 2010, 
p. 113). The former director stated that if Indonesia succeeds in creating value-
added activities, ‘we are not fettered in the same way as the VOC colonial period, 
when Indonesia only produced raw materials’ (Barani, 2010, p. 116), apparently 
alluding to the impacts from declining terms of trade for raw materials. The former 
director further embraced the need to protect infant industries in Indonesia. 
However, the Vice Minister of Agriculture emphasised that Indonesian investment 
regulations are no longer discriminative between domestic or foreign investors, as 
long as these investors are serving the major interests of Indonesian economic 
development in creating jobs and reducing poverty (personal communication, 19 
August 2010). The other reason for not supporting the dichotomous view of local 
versus foreign ownership, it was claimed by the Vice Minister, was to prevent 
reciprocal policies from other countries to the due to potential Indonesian 
companies expanding overseas. 
At the Indonesian state level, it’s clear that one of the underlying motives for the 
government to support the upgrading processes is the political economic reason. 
The need to add value added to the cocoa beans in Indonesia is highly desirable, to 
change the landscape of cocoa grinding industry, especially in the South East Asia 
region. 
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7.4.4.2 Patronage and rent seeking behaviour 
The rent seeking motive seems obvious in driving upgrading processes in the 
Indonesian state programs, and has generally been observed when the state 
supports industry development by subsidising it (Öniş, 1991).   
This mentality is embedded within the institutional settings of the bureaucratic 
system in Indonesia. It entails a great deal of collusive practices between the 
bureaucrats, the business players and the members of parliament (both national 
and local) (Ananta & Riyanto, 2006). According to the Hadiz & Robison (2005), this 
practice comes from a long New Order legacy in the post-reformasi era in Indonesia: 
‘it is the reorganisation of the old predatory power relations within a new system of 
parties, parliaments and elections’ (p. 231). The decentralisation of authority 
perpetuates these practices further (Hadiz, 2004a). Due to decentralisation, local 
districts in Indonesia have greater authority in some areas, including in the fields of 
agriculture, industry, trade and investment. As such, predatory practices that can be 
found at the district level increase the number of interest groups to be 
compensated in business activities (Resosudarmo & Kuncoro, 2006).  
This study’s observations of several agricultural projects in South Sulawesi strongly 
indicated such practices and mentality. For example, the cases of the chocolate 
manufacturing plant in Gowa in South Sulawesi and the SE seeds distribution. All 
those projects are most likely ‘supply driven’. The machinery rarely operated due to 
high costs, while the SE seeds were not well adapted to the local environment. 
However, these interventions did, one presumes, successfully serve another deeper 
purpose – ensuring patronage support from important political constituencies 
within the bureaucracy.   
As such, it is not surprising that there were corruption allegations during and after 
the GERNAS project. These corruption allegations generally identified the corruption 
occurring at the district-government level, but some reports also indicated a 
potential connection to the central government (AgroIndonesia, 2009; Infokorupsi, 
2011; Lengkong, 2014; Luwurayanet, 2011; Politik Indonesia, 2010).  
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In fact, the alarming potential downfalls of GERNAS was anticipated by stakeholders 
in the Indonesian cocoa sector through the CSP forum, when providing input to the 
government before the intervention (Neilson, 2008). The report clearly identified 
nine major technocratic components, which it was argued if implemented, would 
maximise the chance of success of GERNAS. The components ranged from the 
planning to the implementation stage; including data management, provision of 
planting materials, appropriate technological support, recruitment and training 
facilitators, sustainable cocoa-farm system, government policy, farmer credit, 
monitoring and evaluation, and greater coordination of the action plan. 
Patronage and rent seeking behaviour has clearly affected the decision making and 
delivery of upgrading processes in the Indonesian state programs. Patronage and 
oligarchy re-emerged and were consolidated in the post-democratisation period 
(Hadiz & Robison, 2005; V. R. Hadiz, 2004b; Young, 2005). Winters (2013) noted that 
since the democratisation era in Indonesia, the power of the oligarchy has actually 
become stronger and thus, the ‘oligarchy rightfully holds a central place in the 
analysis of Indonesian politics’ (p. 12).  
As overall, the various political interests presented above shows how political 
interests deeply influence the dynamics of institutional settings and governance in 
the cocoa industry in Indonesia. Inserting these political interests within an 
advanced framework to complement the current framework would help advance 
the nuance of understanding the upgrading processes in the GVC. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the understanding of the underlying institutional 
dynamics that drive upgrading activities in the GVC. This chapter demonstrates that 
it is important to explore in greater understanding of upgrading processes by 
incorporating the analysis of multiple key players as the driver of upgrading 
activities at different levels and segments along the value chains within an industry. 
Along with these upgrading actors, it is essential to explore in greater depth the 
upgrading actors’ interests (which become the motivations influencing dynamics in 
the institutional environment). This finding advances the analytical framework in 
understanding the upgrading in the GVC. As discussed in the section 7.1, the 
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analytical framework to understand the upgrading in the GVC was in the co-creation 
of institutional settings and governance shaping upgrading activities. This study 
advances this analytical framework by revealing the need to incorporate the 
multiple upgrading agents and to understand their interests, especially the political 
interests, as the underlying institutional settings that should co-create governance 
and in turn shape upgrading activities.  
Adopting this analytical framework has helped this study to understand how the 
real world of upgrading activities in the cocoa sector materialised and was shaped 
by the Indonesian state, development agencies and the lead firms. From the GVC 
perspective, this advanced analytical framework will help to understand different 
adaptations of the GVC framework into development practice and within 
development strategies. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that institutional actors’ political, ideological, 
and commercial positionality play a significant role in shaping the dynamics of 
upgrading trajectories in Indonesia. This study has demonstrated that the 
Indonesian state needs to strategise its policy development so that it aligns with the 
current dynamics of GVCs and in particular, the strategies of both lead firms and 
development agencies.  
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8 CONCLUSION  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
This study set out to advance an understanding of the upgrading processes within 
GVCs. Thus, to support the thesis argument, I have drawn empirical case studies of 
upgrading interventions implemented by the state, development agencies and a 
lead firm in the cocoa industry in Indonesia. The intensive support for the various 
upgrading program interventions provided by various agents in the cocoa industry 
prompted me to strive to understand the real work of upgrading activities. The core 
questions that guided this inquiry were:  
1. What interventions have been taken by the state, firms and development 
agencies to promote upgrading within the Indonesian cocoa industry? 
2. How processes of value chain upgrading are facilitated and shaped in 
practice by the actions of these different sets of development actors? 
3. How can an improved understanding of upgrading processes be usefully 
applied to ensure appropriate development strategies in developing 
countries? 
All of the above questions support the main aim of this study which is to understand 
the upgrading concept of the GVC by presenting three upgrading agents working in 
the same sector. Examination of the three upgrading actors, which collectively 
influence sectoral upgrading, appears infrequently presented in the extant GVC 
literature. 
Guided by the three main questions, I conducted field research in Indonesia to 
gather the relevant information pertinent to the activities of the three different 
upgrading actors. Prior to and after my field visits, I reviewed the relevant literature 
on economic development paradigms and the GVC literature as an alternative 
framework to understand the current global dynamics (Chapter 2). In order to 
situate the context of the cocoa industry in Indonesia, and to situate the following 
results chapter and the discussion chapter, chapter 3 explored the global value 
chains of the cocoa industry. Chapters 4, 5 and 6, presented the thesis findings in an 
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attempt to answer (part of) questions one and two.  The findings which I have 
analysed in Chapter 7, provide answers to the third research question. 
This concluding chapter is presented in three sections. Section one discusses the 
major empirical findings of this study to describe how the concepts found in the 
GVC literature have been translated into development practice by three different 
upgrading agents. Section two, discusses the implications of the research for the 
analytical framework for understanding upgrading of the GVC, and for the potential 
future police derives from the study. In the final section, the discussion centres on 
policy implications that might be undertaken to facilitate upgrading processes for 
sectoral development in developing countries, including the Indonesian state. 
8.1 Major empirical findings 
8.1.1 Upgrading as development strategy 
This study found that the adaptation of GVC to development was translated into a 
market-linkage program, i.e., into two ways of development: first, external 
endorsement of the lead firms such as the market linkage implemented by the 
Development agencies (USAID and IFC); and second, a market linkage that was 
internally (as an integrated part of global strategy) developed and delivered; for 
example the market linkage developed by Mars.  
The consequences of these two approaches were different. These differences were 
mainly discernible in the consistency of the lead firms to provide technical support 
for smallholder farmers. Regarding the externally endorsed type of market-linkage, 
the lead firms involved in the program were only capable of providing technical 
support during the project duration. The expectation that lead-firms’ role would 
continue to support smallholder farmers when the project finished, failed to 
materialize. This might have been due to the dependence of lead firms on donor 
support during the project duration. Conversely, Mars’ technical support over the 
last two decades demonstrated the consistency of technical support to smallholder 
farmers. This consistency most likely resulted from the internalization of a ‘farmer-
first’ credo among the three pillars of Mars (besides efficiency and customers) that 
enable the company to sustain its global business. Positioning farmers first in the 
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company’s strategy allowed decision-makers within the company to put equal 
importance on the continuity of the company’s sourcing operation and technical 
support for farmers, as an integrated strategy of its business operation.     
Despite the significant interventions delivered by various upgrading agents in 
Indonesia cocoa industry, national cocoa production has stagnated for almost a 
decade, and is now estimated at around 400 thousand tonnes (International Cocoa 
Organization (ICCO), 2014a). There were two slightly different reasons that could 
logically explain the cause. First, the three different upgrading agents may not have 
achieved their intended objective in facilitating upgrading at the producer level. The 
expansion programs supported by the government in several different places across 
Indonesia’ major island and implemented through the GERNAS project were only 
capable to covering the declining production occurring in various other places. As a 
result, national cocoa productivity (see Chapter three) was declining year by year.  
With reference to the development agent case, the USAID program, the total 
number of cocoa farmers trained directly by the project was estimated at 
approximately around 50-60 thousand farmers; and, through its communication 
tools, the program was believed to have reached approximately 300 thousand 
(Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas 
Cooperative Assistance (ACDI VOCA), 2005). However, some questions surround this 
claim that the reported trained farmers, who moved from one project to another, 
were the same farmers. Hence, the claim may have been too high. The number of 
people directly trained constitute approximately one fifth of the total cocoa farmers 
in Indonesia. The other reason was that the knowledge transferred did not 
necessarily translate into adoption of improved farm management. The farmers’ 
technology adoption needed a constantly supportive environment, such as the 
availability of field technical experts resident in the local communities, rewarding 
market incentives, and financial support. Any suggestion of availability of technical 
support at all times, was not applicable in the cases of USAID, IFC and the GERNAS 
project, all of whose programs were project based.   
The second view is that the current level of national cocoa production could be 
considered adequate, since Indonesian cocoa trees have reached the declining stage 
due to loss of ‘forest-rent’.  Taking into consideration the forest-rent scenario, and 
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drawing a comparison between Indonesian and Malaysian national cocoa 
production might provide a good example of this view. The advantage accruing from 
young cocoa trees resulting from fertile forest land, and the absence of pests and 
diseases in the early years of cocoa growth due this ‘forest-rent’ is no longer a 
reality when cocoa trees have reached 20 years of growth. The declining stage 
resulting from aging trees, infertile soil, high pest incidence and disease has 
culminated not only in high production costs, but also in demotivating behaviour 
among cocoa farmers. Thus it is hardly surprising that some farmers are converting 
their cocoa trees into other profitable commodities. This scenario occurred in 
Malaysia, where massive cocoa trees were converted into other crops. As a result, 
national cocoa production in Malaysia has significantly dropped year by year since 
the late 1990s, and has continuously declined to the point where the country’s total 
cocoa produced is similar to the level of sub-district production in Indonesia. A 
discussion of the comparative national production among the major cocoa 
producing countries in three different regional production areas (global level) is 
presented in Chapter three.  
A further impact deduced by this study is that upgrading interventions have tended 
to perpetuate the dependency of small producers on external support, especially on 
global cocoa buyers. Mars’ upgrading interventions, for example, have provided 
strong supports to the local communities, while at the same time technical support 
from Indonesian government is weakening. In due time, this dependency might 
continuously increase, leading to the farmers being entirely reliant on global buyers 
for social supports as well as extension services. 
8.1.2 The positionality of upgrading agents 
This study found that upgrading actors’ interests constitute significant drivers that 
shape institutional settings for upgrading activities. Their interests or motives are 
politically, ideologically and commercially driven, and are deeply embedded in each 
upgrading agents’ institution. Examination of the Indonesian state, Development 
agencies and a lead-firm reveals how rooted these factors are, in influencing the 
upgrading dynamics in the cocoa industry. This influence is explored in the two main 
upgrading interventions: (1) the policy exercised (export tariff) to facilitate 
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downstream processing; and, (2) the technical support targeting smallholder 
farmers.  
Apropos of policy, this study found three major interests underpinning the 
upgrading agents’ decision-making process that resulted in contradictory 
recommendations to upgrade the country’s cocoa industry. The first was 
commercial interest. Trade policy is mainly contested between AIKI, which 
represents the grinders, and ASKINDO, which mainly represents the exporters. Due 
to the conflicting commercial implications among the two organizations, the export 
tariff recommendation was advocated differently. AIKI supported export tariff 
implementation as it would favour grinding expansion. Conversely, ASKINDO 
opposed it, saying it would challenge their competiveness. The Indonesian state and 
USAID also held contradictory views on the export tariff. The Indonesian state 
favours implementing it for politico-economic reasons, such as to improve the value 
added activities of cocoa within the country, rather than have neighbouring 
countries engaging in value added activities. USAID, on the other hand, supported 
consultants who recommended against an export tariff, the main argument being to 
avoid price decreases at the farmer level. Reducing the price at the farmer level 
would eventually reduce the farmers’ incomes, and in turn, would increase the 
number of poor in Indonesia. However, despite appearing to support the farmers’ 
argument, in effect USAID embraced a free market view vis-à-vis economic 
development in line with consultant recommendations. In addition to the USAID 
ideological view, somehow, the politico-economic reasons also contribute towards 
policy advocacy. A market linkage program funded by USAID selectively works with 
US affiliated (extended trader) networks in Indonesia, suggesting a politico-
economic interest that is difficult to ignore.  
On the technical side, this study found all the three upgrading agents exercising a 
‘top-down’ approach to their upgrading interventions with smallholder farmers. 
However, due to diverse interests and motives, this approach was delivered 
differently by each agent. 
As regarding Indonesian state interventions, this study found that upgrading 
programs were delivered in the form of ‘supply driven’ projects. A number of 
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projects delivered via the GERNAS program, for example planting material and 
drying machines, were poorly adapted to the farmers’ needs. The planting material 
was incompatible with the local environment; and the machines were not 
compatible with the operational scale for smallholder farmers. This study further 
found that the strong legacy of socio-political conditions, for example, a project 
mentality that reflect the vested interests of oligarchy, a legacy of the former New 
Order authoritarian regime re-emerged, in this democratic and decentralized 
political system. As such, the vested interests that underpinned the supply-driven 
approach to several projects delivered by the Indonesian state significantly 
influenced the institutional settings surrounding the government program. The 
resultant corruption allegations that accompanied the GERNAS project in various 
districts were strong evidence of this corrosive element. 
Regarding the Development agencies, the USAID and the IFC, this study found that 
political economy and the tendency of ‘nurturing clients’ strongly nuanced the 
underlying institutional interests, and impacted on the upgrading intervention 
delivered and supported by the development agencies. In the political economy 
sphere, USAID’s market linkage program selectively supported lead firms affiliated 
to the US companies, a similar argument to the policy recommendation discussed 
previously. In the IFC case, its efforts to develop a financial agri-input credit scheme 
that was aligned with their ‘nurturing clients’ approach. The IFC developed a 
scheme especially to help its investee clients to expand their economic activities in 
the rural areas. In this context, the major concern was the availability of IFC 
partners to provide the best outcomes for farmers; the best price for the beans, and 
the best benefit from financial support. But, as the study found providing the best 
for farmers was difficult, both for the beans and for the financial scheme. Finally, 
after three cycles of harvest season, this financial scheme was discontinued. 
In the case of Mars, clearly commercial interest was the major driver supporting the 
upgrading for smallholder farmers. As a lead-firm in the cocoa-chocolate industry, 
Mars primary interest was to sustain its raw material supplies. This study found that 
among the commercial interests, fear of future lack of supplies and meeting the 
increasing demand from emerging markets were identified as the major commercial 
hazards that influenced Mars’ institutional and corporate governance. While their 
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approach to upgrading smallholder farmers emulated the top-down approach, the 
distinctive difference from other upgrading agencies was Mars ability to present at 
the country level consistently, and to continuously improve its technical support 
model. 
8.2 Theoretical implications 
This study advances an understanding of upgrading in the GVC in ways that suggest 
(i) the need to incorporate several key players as the main driver of upgrading; and, 
(ii) the imperative to explore deeper the institutional settings that influence the 
decision-making processs for GVC upgrading agents.  
Based on the presented cases (Chapter 4, 5, and 6) and the discussion (Chapter 7), 
upgrading processes within the value chains are influenced by several powerful 
actors in the industry, but not necessarily in the form of rational coordination of 
activities between lead firms and suppliers. The second argument is that political 
aspects of upgrading agents, manifest in their interests, have deeply influenced the 
institutional settings within the GVC.  As such, exploration of the underlying factors 
that impact on decision-making process within each institution, along with the GVC, 
would provide an understanding of the institutional dynamics driving upgrading 
activities in the GVC.   
The above arguments advance the previous understanding of how to facilitate 
upgrading in the GVC proposed by two complementary arguments; first, the need to 
understand the centrality of the lead firms’ governance that allows value chains 
actors within a GVC to upgrade (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2005). This concept 
emphasises the strategic roles of the global buyers who act as lead firms nurturing 
firms in developing countries to be able to integrate with the global market. 
Therefore, establishing linkages with lead firms could potentially improve the 
capacity of firms in developing countries. This linkage relationship governs via five 
types of relations from loose to tight: markets, modular, relational, captive, up to 
the  hierarchy relationship (Gereffi et al., 2005). From this relationship, the value 
chain actors might learn how to operate efficiently, develop new products, and 
increase product quality. They might even step up to higher value activities, such as 
branding and marketing, and  shift to other profitable sectors (Humphrey & Schmitz, 
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2002). At this point, this thesis argue that instead of singling out one key player as 
the driver of upgrading, it is imperative to incorporate multiple key players, which 
are equally important in driving the upgrading processes for value chain actors. The 
type of intervention and the level of operation of those key players might different 
within the value chains, but their activities profoundly contributed and drove the 
upgrading process within the chains. 
The second argument postulates that advances on understanding of  upgrading in 
the GVC is that the co-creation of institutional settings and governance facilitates 
upgrading activities (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009). Neilson and Pritchard (2009) 
suggest that institutional settings that embed sites where value chain actors are 
situated influence the governance of the GVC; and that institutions and governance 
in turn facilitate upgrading activities in developing countries. In this context, 
institutions set by the state, for example, allow firms in developing countries to 
prepare themselves to compete with global firms. This study has considered 
providing nuanced ways to understand upgrading activities in developing countries.  
Here, I advance the analytical framework to understand the real world of upgrading 
activities. This thesis suggests a need to explore further the underlying interests of 
upgrading agents that shape institutional settings in the GVC.  The upgrading 
agents’ interests, which demonstrate political consideration on how each agent 
behaves (see Chapter 7), show how deeply the said interests are induced in setting 
institutions and influencing governance of the GVC. Due to the different interests 
rooted in each institution, the transition to upgrading value chains actors in the real 
world, has resulted in the employment of different approaches. In some cases, 
different upgrading actors suggest different institutional arrangements; they even 
contradict each other. For example, take the case of export tariff regulation that 
was intended to upgrade the downstream processors in the cocoa industry. This 
study suggests deeper exploration of the institutional interests of agents who 
advocate and deliver program interventions to better understand upgrading 
activities in developing countries.  
This study, additionally suggests adding political aspects (especially on upgrading 
agents’ interests) as an extended analysis to understand the myriad interests that 
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shape the institutional settings and governance that in turn drive upgrading 
activities in the GVC.   
8.3 Policy implications 
Translating the upgrading concept of the GVC into development practices generally 
involves mediation through the interest of upgrading agents. Nevertheless, this 
study provides important insights to provide meaningful upgrading processes. The 
insights might benefit those upgrading agents, such as the state, the development 
agencies and the lead firms delivering upgrading interventions in developing 
countries.  
Apropos of any effort to redefine the strategic role of the Indonesian state,  the 
state needs to develop meaningful dialogue among industry stakeholders; that is to 
act as an inter-scalar mediator (Yang, 2009) that will facilitate information exchange 
between local and international firms.  In this context, the state will be required to 
think thoroughly to identify the strategic coupling between local and international 
firms that operates within the global production network (Yeung, 2009). In addition, 
when targeting upgrading for domestic companies operating in the primary 
commodities, the Indonesian state needs, as Gibbon (2001) suggest, to provide pre-
conditioning stages that allow local firms to compete in the GVC.  
The programs of Development agencies are generally focused on stimulating 
economic changes in the impoverished areas; and to the poor producers, the 
weakest actors in the GVC. The crucial part is how to balance the unequal power 
relationship between lead firms and poor producers.  As such, adopting market 
linkage program in the development action, would be meaningful when 
complemented with empowerment programs for the poor producers. This might 
reduce the ‘exploitation nuance’ of the market linkage for the benefit of lead firms 
to secure raw material supplies.  
For the lead firms, integrating technical supports for farmers as an integrated part 
of commercial activities would be an important step to provide meaningful 
upgrading support for farmers. The second step would be the ability to respond to 
local dynamics by constantly adjusting the upgrading programs, either in the 
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technology package or in the delivery method. Lastly, dealing with small producers, 
comes at a cost (huge numbers with small scale producers dispersed in widespread 
areas). Thus, developing an empowerment business mechanism for individual 
farmers, as ‘an independent extended agent’ from the lead firms, might help to 
reduce the cost and increase the coverage areas for upgrading support to farmers. 
In conclusion, this study suggests that upgrading agents that would like to provide 
meaningful upgrading activities are required to: understand the institutional 
interests among other actors in the GVC; acknowledge local social dynamics 
(including politics) and adapt to these; and, situate the policy and programs in the 
latest sectoral dynamics in the global context of the industry in question. 
8.4 Future research 
The geographical scope of this research is limited to the Indonesian context and to 
the cocoa sector to Indonesia. There is potential to undertake similar research in 
other geographical contexts or in other sectoral contexts to understand how 
upgrading activities are delivered by upgrading agents. The focus should remain on 
the critical assessment of upgrading agents’ interests that are embedded into 
institutional settings of the chain. 
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